Wittgenstein's Logic of Language - Table of Contents and Preface | Search | Bibliography

Did Wittgenstein have a Philosophy of Language?

Topics on this page ...

Preface: what follows are "logic of language" studies. The quotation marks here mean: the quoted expression is jargon; in my jargon 'logic of language' = 'a method for making a distinction between sense and nonsense (in the context of philosophy)'. Wittgenstein's logic of language, according to my account of it, makes an objective distinction.

It "is possible to be interested in a phenomenon in a variety of ways" (PI § 108), in the phenomenon of language e.g.

Did Wittgenstein have a Philosophy of Language - or only a "Logic of Language"?

"A contradiction is necessarily false." No, that is not correct. The contradiction is in the form. The contradiction is not, as it were, in the meaning. A meaningless contradiction is not false, and a contradiction with a use may be true or false. "He is honest and he is not honest." -- "No, both witnesses are liars."

Did Wittgenstein have a theory of "grammar"?

Could we reasonably say that Wittgenstein had a theory of meaning? I don't think so. In his case it is not a matter of denying the correctness of other meanings of the word 'meaning', but of selecting one meaning rather than others, for a particular purpose. But could we reasonably say that Wittgenstein had a theory of grammar -- that is, could we say that Wittgenstein had "revised" the concept 'grammar', that if school grammar is regarded as a theory, then Wittgenstein had revised that theory to account for anomalies? For example, wouldn't the word 'elf' be an anomaly -- for is it correct to say that the word 'elf' is "the name of a person, place or thing"? Of course, in that definition of 'noun' is the answer: school grammar is not a theory -- because of the word 'thing' in the definition: this excludes any possibility of anomalies, because anything and everything can be placed in the category 'thing'. What Wittgenstein invented with his redefinition of 'grammar' was a new system of classification, based not on form (syntax) but on meaning (semantics).

Did Wittgenstein have a philosophy of language?

Wittgenstein was not a philologist (He wrote nothing about syntax) or a semanticist. He was a philosopher. He had no philosophy of language. (In the Tractatus language is conceived as a concatenation of names of objects, but this conception is not subjected to criticism and therefore it is not a philosophy of language. It (logical atomism) is an assumption about language (Words are names of simple objects) -- and philosophical consequences are deduced from that).

The title "Wittgenstein and the Language of X" expresses a fundamental misunderstanding. Because it should be "Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of X". The philosophy of X might look at X from the point of view of the "logic of language" (but Wittgenstein did not approach aesthetics or religion that way), but it would not be a philosophy of language. Because Wittgenstein looked at language from one point of view only ("what happens considered as a game"; "Let's only bother about what's called the explanation of meaning, and let's not bother about meaning in any other sense"). The Philosophy of Language does not do that. There are many meanings of the word 'meaning'; Wittgenstein chose one. But the Philosophy of Language gives an account of all of them -- and that account is given for its own sake, not in order to throw light on philosophical problems.

Language has many features, and one of those is meaning; the broad study of this feature is commonly called 'semantics'. But there are countless more meanings of the word 'meaning' than the one Wittgenstein used. One can be interested in language from many points of view, but Wittgenstein was only interested in it from the point of view of its role in philosophical problems.

Also Wittgenstein did not simply describe the rules of the game; he often imagined different rules, or gave exact rules (definitions) for using words that are commonly used according to rules that are quite vague. Philosophical problems are solved by "looking into the workings of our language" -- but this looking "gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems" (Philosophical Investigations § 109). Language is only important because philosophy is important. That is not Philosophy of Language; it is Philosophy.

Wittgenstein's Break with the Speculative Tradition in Philosophy

Those who speak of "Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language" are looking at Wittgenstein from a point of view that is foreign to his philosophy. They are, like Bertrand Russell, failing to see what is radically different about Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy: that it is a complete break with the post-Socratic -- i.e. the Platonic -- philosophical tradition: that his work consists only of definitions, metaphors and methods -- i.e. that Wittgenstein defined a way of looking at things (that is, from the point of view of grammar and sense and nonsense) and of asking questions from that point of view; he did not invent a collection of speculative theories about how things [e.g. language] "really" are. After the Tractatus, that yardstick no longer has any application to his work. (cf. "My new method in philosophy leaves aside the question of truth and asks about meaning instead" (Culture and Value (1998 rev. ed.) [MS 105 46 c: 1929]); that is the opposite method of the speculative tradition.)

Wittgenstein did not have a "theory of language-games". Rather he made a comparison between using language and playing games; but he did not claim that using language "really is" playing games. What Wittgenstein invented was a method of language-games, one that is not useful everywhere in philosophy, for language is not always the principal source of perplexity in philosophical problems, nor are rules.

Meaning in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus versus Meaning in the Philosophical Investigations

The Tractatus is a "theory of meaning", not a selected definition of the word 'meaning' such as is found in Wittgenstein's later work; otherwise, we could say of the TLP: well, it's only nonsense in the sense of the word 'nonsense' that Wittgenstein chose [which is, of course, what we should say -- but we can only say that from a point of view -- a frame of reference or way of looking at things -- that is different from the point of view of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein changed perspective is shown by his later acceptance of Sraffa's criticism. A later, alternative account of the meaning of the word 'nonsense' in the TLP].

The TLP claims to state what the essence is -- not of the word 'meaning' [i.e. "essence" in the sense of a general definition of the word 'meaning' such as Plato's Socrates wanted: what all applications of that word have in common] -- but of the thing meaning in itself, and therefore of nonsense in itself: here is what meaning [sense and nonsense] "really is"; and that is not a matter of choosing among conventions. The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is metaphysics; it is not (what is called in my jargon) a logic of language; and to that work the following criticism applies:

The essential thing about metaphysics: it obliterates the distinction between a verbal and a real definition. (cf. Zettel § 458, which has: "it obliterates the distinction between factual [real] and conceptual [verbal] investigations." cf. RPP i § 949)

The Tractatus offers a "real definition" of meaning, saying "what meaning really is"; whereas the Philosophical Investigations offers only a conventional definition of 'meaning', one chosen for the purpose of Wittgenstein's work of clarification, one definition selected from among the countless definitions there are of the word 'meaning', for we call many, many different things 'the meaning'.

The TLP is metaphysics, thorough-going metaphysical speculation. The Philosophical Investigations is logic of language [and that means that one can reject Wittgenstein's logic in favor of an alternative logic of language -- without having to replace one theory about reality with an alternative theory].

The following search query found in my site's referrer logs (That is what "Query:" indicates in these pages) suggests another important insight into the difference between the two books:

Query: Wittgenstein "language as calculus" Tractatus.

By 'calculus' here is meant 'a game played according to strict rules'. And in the Tractatus, that would be the meaning of 'what can be put into words can be put clearly': because the rules (for using a word) would be strict (according to the TLP's account of the logic of our language): there would be no ambiguity in the ideal language -- just as there is no ambiguity in chess e.g.

In the Philosophical Investigations, however, it is argued that in most cases we do not use words according to strict rules (The Blue Book p. 25). At most we can make comparisons between a calculus and actual use, noting similarities and dissimilarities (PI § 81). Wittgenstein called this the "fluidity [in the sense that liquids flow about when they are not contained or frozen] of our concepts".

Just as important is that the Tractatus has, so to speak, a "nominalist" view of meaning: nouns are names and the meaning of a name is the object the name stands for. Whereas in the Philosophical Investigations it is recognized that most nouns are not names of objects -- and that most problems in philosophy concern those nouns.

Contrast to J. L. Austin

If language were, as Bertrand Russell once believed, the transparent clothing of thought [G. E. Moore wrote in his diary (30.8-2.9.1909) that Russell was "too confident of insufficient explanations as to meaning of words ..."], then "looking into its workings" would not be philosophy. There is the example of J. L. Austin's How to Do Things with Words: "I don't know if it's philosophy, but it is interesting," Austin said, and what he wrote in his lectures indeed belongs to the Philosophy of Language. But Wittgenstein would not have said that about his own work.

J. O. Urmson who was his student wrote that J. L. Austin

was far more unlike Wittgenstein than is sometimes recognized. For Wittgenstein an understanding of ordinary language was important because he believed that the traditional problems of philosophy arose from misunderstandings of it, but Wittgenstein had in mind gross category mistakes, and he wished to study ordinary language only so far as was essential for eliminating these. Austin was interested in fine distinctions for their own sake ... (The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1967), Volume 1, p. 215)

Whatever the merit of Urmson's characterization of Wittgenstein ("gross category mistakes"), the difference between an interest in meaning in Philosophy of Language and meaning in Philosophy is pointed out.

The anthropologist's view of language: Wittgenstein imposed his game simile on what he observed

Wittgenstein wanted what anthropology calls an "outsider's view" -- the anthropologist's own view -- of language. That view contrasts with the "insider's view", or, what the users of the language suppose they are doing (CV p. 37 [MS 162b 67r: 2.7.1940 § 2]). Wittgenstein looked -- i.e. he imposed this metaphor -- at our language from one point of view only: what happens looked at as if it were a game, where what defines a game is its rules, which are public and can be fully described by an outsider.

More Features of Games

"What is badminton [What is the meaning of the word 'badminton']?" -- "Here are the rules of the game." But we might look at badminton from many other points of view: the origins and history of the game e.g., the places around the world where people play the game, its role in society [What does the winner win -- other than the game itself? A people might be imagined who choose their rulers this way], the cost of the game's equipment, and so on.

In my account of Wittgenstein's "family resemblances", which compares various games -- i.e. points out likenesses and un-likenesses among some things we call 'games' -- I might have included time rules, for some games can be continued on another day, e.g. chess by correspondence, others must be finished in a non-stop go); and place rules: some games are played in a particular place, e.g. some require a "court" (that markings be placed on the earth) such as tennis does, while other games may be played anywhere, or begun in one place and finished in another, as with a long distance race or a bridge-match begun on an ocean liner and finished on a railway train. Some games can -- i.e. are allowed by their rules to -- end in a tie.

Suppose someone said, "But if there doesn't have to be a winner and a loser, then you're not really playing a game." Someone might want to say that, but it is not a rule that belongs to the held-in-common "grammar" of our language. And that rule would be a false account, because in some instances of what everyone calls 'games' it is not always logically possible for the game to end in anything other than a tie; e.g. a particular combination of chess men is required for checkmate in chess, and if those men are lost by both players then the game must end in a draw. And court cases are won and lost; they are fought to the bitter end, but they are not games. And there is no contest at all in solitaire (patience), but it is a game. ("You play against fate." -- That is an example of how tautologies are made.)

"Language is nothing but names of things"

Note: this continues the discussion Different Parts of Speech.

Maybe "name of a person, place, or thing" should be rewritten: "name of a person, place, or (every)thing (else)" -- or more simply: "name of anything", because persons and places are themselves things. "A noun is a name, like e.g. of a person or a place, or of other things." That is very lazy category making: {person, place, all other things}. Here is a class without limits, the class of all classes: {things}. Everything that exists, and everything that doesn't exist as well; everything that has a name (Even things that don't have names: "What is't you do?" -- "A deed without a name." [Macbeth, iv, 1]) are members of that class.

A grammar like that would be as useful for learning English as a book about chess that ended with the initial set-up of the board would be for learning chess: the Queen always goes here in the sentence. But what is the Queen? -- The Queen is a chess piece. -- But all the pieces are chess pieces (regardless of their shape and use). -- "And all words are words (regardless of their shape and use), just as in the dictionary."

There is a syntactic justification for placing all these words (nouns) in the same class, although there is no semantic justification for it. Wittgenstein wrote nothing about syntax -- why would he have done, for meaning is not a matter form but of use? And so also from this point of view, it could not be said that Wittgenstein had a philosophy of language, for the Philosophy of Language certainly must include the topic of syntax.

"Wittgensteinian" (A philosopher is not a member of any community of ideas)

Note: this continues the discussion in the concluding remarks of my Synopsis of Wittgenstein's Logic of Language, and is continued in the discussion Wittgenstein as "the last word" in philosophy.

The philosopher is not a member of any community of ideas. That is what makes him into a philosopher. (Z § 455)

The following (here slightly revised) is what I wrote earlier:

Ought anyone to adopt Wittgenstein's "grammar" for the word 'grammar' -- ought anyone to use his logic of language for thinking in philosophy? I don't know. The reason for not adopting his jargon that should concern students of philosophy most is that his jargon may be poorly understood and then thoughtlessly applied. (The answer to the question, "Am I a Wittgensteinian?" should of course be No.)

If we use Wittgenstein's jargon, then we must use it in the spirit of philosophy. Philosophers do not have "disciples"; they have students; and neither philosophers nor their students are ideologues; they are not doctrinaire. Religions have disciples, and their leader is addressed as 'Lord', which means 'Master'. The etymology of 'disciple' does not concern us here (Originally it simply meant 'student'), but only how that word is used nowadays, and 'disciple' is now an insult-word if is applied to a student of philosophy; it is used contemptuously. That was the way Bertrand Russell meant the word when he said about Wittgenstein: "I doubt whether his disciples know what manner of man he was."

Teachers and their students: Philosophy. Masters and their disciples: Religious dogma (The "Amen" ["So be it!"] comes before the Lord speaks); the spirit of religion is obedience. No philosopher, on the other hand, is a ruler. Every philosopher wants his ideas to be freely questioned, openly discussed, and if possible refuted. That is the spirit of philosophy; it was expressed by Kant: Dare to doubt all authority! (Yes, all -- what part of 'all' don't you understand?)

It is remarkable that, so far as I know, there is none of Immanuel Kant's jargon to be found in the writings of Albert Schweitzer, although Schweitzer had been a scholar of Kant. I would like my own writings to be free of Wittgenstein's jargon, but (1) even without using his jargon, Wittgenstein's view of logic -- i.e. what in my jargon is called his "logic of language" -- would still be there , and (2) I wonder how much of my desire isn't simply a vain desire to be original. Schweitzer may have been an original thinker, but I am not.

Was Wittgenstein "the Final Word in Philosophy"? Many thought that about Aristotle, about Descartes, about Logical Positivism; many still do. For others the philosophers of the past are part of the fossil record. But that record is still being created.

Variation. We could say that my A Synopsis of Wittgenstein's Logic of Language has concerned itself with the reasons for adopting this logic, this jargon (Wittgenstein's concept 'grammar'). But now it is time to consider what are the reasons for not adopting it. (But what are the reasons for not adopting it?)

There is no royal road to philosophy ... although I do not think that Wittgenstein's presentation of his ideas need have been as disorderly as it appears to be. Wittgenstein blamed the disorder on his subject matter -- "the ancient city of language" (PI § 18) --. But as I wrote in the Preface, Wittgenstein's basic principles are not amorphous. There is indeed confusion in natural language -- The "ancient city" metaphor shows the path that Wittgenstein believed his philosophical investigations had to follow -- but that confusion need not be mirrored in a presentation of the elements of what I have called "Wittgenstein's logic of language".

Jargon and Wittgenstein

With no loss of meaning, rather than say that in Wittgenstein's logic, 'semantic logic' is a pleonasm, you could say: given what Wittgenstein meant by 'grammar' (Recall that as he later used those words 'logic' = 'grammar'), the combination of words 'semantic grammar' is a pleonasm.

The combination of words 'semantic syntax' might be used to mean: definitions of syntactic elements (e.g. noun, adjective, verb, adverb) based not only on their position in common propositions (e.g. article + adjective + noun + verb + adverb), but also on their meaning, as in "A noun is the name of a person, place or thing", "An adjective modifies a noun", and so on.

Is there a way to avoid using Wittgenstein's jargon, specifically his redefinition of 'grammar' and his limited sense of 'meaning'? With respect to 'meaning', Wittgenstein did not of course invent the concept 'conventional meaning', i.e. 'meaning' defined as: rules or conventions for using words, phrases, sentences -- i.e. the "signs" of our language: sounds, ink marks (the physical aspect of language [language as artifact]). However, his definition of 'rule' belongs to his concept 'grammar'; so that what I wrote in the Preface is correct:

[My synopsis describes] the tools that Wittgenstein assumed the readers of his works to be already familiar with -- even though Wittgenstein, if he did not invent all of them, so redefined them that they could only be gotten from him.

The difficulty. Whether we use Wittgenstein's jargon or not, a tremendous lot of background (that "Wittgenstein assumed the readers of his works to be already familiar with") is needed to understand what is being said. Even if one could separate Wittgenstein's philosophy from his jargon, one cannot separate Wittgenstein's philosophy from his ideas ("redefinitions", "conceptual revisions", "metaphors"). That is, if you want to be understood, you will need to make reference to Wittgenstein -- that is, unless you want to follow Wittgenstein and confuse everyone by assuming this background and using words like 'grammar' without telling anyone that they belong to your jargon, expecting students to just "catch on" and then say that they cannot be educated if they don't. Which is why Wittgenstein wrote as he did both to Russell (about the Blue Book, that it was something for students "to carry home in their hands if not in their heads"), and to G. E. Moore: "I don't really know if it's worth saving my strength for teaching people most of whom can't learn anything anyway" (Letter, Cambridge, 18 February 1947). His sister Hermine said that Wittgenstein did not have the patience to be a teacher.

Well, very well, too much can be made of Wittgenstein's impatience with his students. But recall that even Cambridge University professor G. E. Moore had to ask Wittgenstein to make clear what Wittgenstein meant when he used the word 'grammar' in his lectures Moore attended in 1930-1933. So it wasn't only his students he confused when he assumed a background that he had not provided them with.

But a different aspect of the nature of Wittgenstein's humanity is shown by his reproach of M. O'C. Drury. Wittgenstein was gently discussing a philosophical question with a patient of Drury's, a man suffering from mental illness, Drury tried to add something to the discussion and Wittgenstein told him to "shut up". After they had left the patient he said to Drury: "When you are playing ping-pong, you mustn't use a tennis racket" (Recollections p. 140, from 1938). Several years later he told Drury:

Bach wrote on the title page of his Orgelbuchlein, "To the glory of the most high God, and that my neighbor may be benefited thereby." That is what I would have liked to say about my work. (ibid. p. 168, from 1949)

Site copyright © September 1998. Send Internet mail to Robert Wesley Angelo. Last revised: 15 July 2010 : 2010-07-15

The URL of this Web page:
http://www.roangelo.net/logwitt/logwit23.html

Back to top of page

Ludwig Wittgenstein's Logic of Language | Search | Bibliography | Site Map