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Epictetus, Stoic Philosopher

Stoicism under Rome. Epictetus (c. 50 A.D. - c. 130 A.D.) Despite their basic difference in world-picture (for Socrates "took no interest in metaphysics", but only in ethics, with logic as its workhorse), Epictetus shows Stoicism's deep roots in Socrates' thought.

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Life of Epictetus

Epictetus was a Greek born in Hierapolis in Phrygia, Asia Minor, in about 50 A.D., taken as a slave to Rome, then freed there. He was lame and poor. He heard lectures of the Stoic C. Musonius Rufus, and then taught until he was banished by the Emperor Domitian (r. 81-96) with all philosophers from Rome and then from Italy (c. 89-95 A.D.)

Thereafter he taught at Nicopolis in Epirus, where "he lived in a house with only a rush mat, a simple pallet [bed on the floor], and an earthenware lamp (after the iron one was stolen)" (Encyc. Philos. (1967)). The lamp was placed beside his household gods (Discourses i, 18 and i, 29). "In later years he took a wife to help him care for an infant that he had rescued from exposure" (W. Durant, Caesar and Christ (1944) xxiii, 3, p. 491).

The Greek philosopher and historian Arrian of Nicomedia wrote down Epictetus's words and published them in 8 Books (4 remain) of "Diatribai -- "rubbings" or copies" (Durant, p. 490) -- now called Discourses, and an Enchiridion or 'Handbook' or 'Manual' (on which Simplicius wrote a commentary), which is an abstract of Epictetus's practical philosophy ("training in virtue") in 53 aphorisms; there are also some 181 fragments.

God (Universal Reason) and the Rational Universe

According to Eduard Zeller, Epictetus studied the logic and physics of the old Stoa, especially Chrysippus, and there found the basis "for his moral precepts -- [namely] the belief in God", in man's kinship with this Father, "in the rational ... course of the universe", and that "general moral principles are implanted in us by Nature".

Though he often speaks of Nature as an impersonal force, Epictetus as frequently infuses his conception with personality, intelligence, and love. [Its "self-surrendering piety" is "akin to that of the Stoic emperor" Marcus Aurelius "who would soon read" Epictetus "and echo his thought".] He speaks with fine eloquence of the majestic order prevailing in time and space, and the evidences of design in nature, but proceeds to explain that "God has created some creatures to be eaten, others to serve in farming ..." [Discourses i, 6] The human mind itself, he thinks, is so marvelous an instrument that only a divine creator could have brought it into being; indeed, so far as we possess reason we are parts of the World Reason. If we could trace our ancestry back to the first man we should find him begotten by God; God is therefore literally the father of us all, and all men are brothers. [ibid. i, 9]

If a man could only subscribe heart and soul to this doctrine ... I think he would entertain no mean or ignoble thought in himself ... You are bearing God about with you ... [ibid. iii, 9; ii, 8]

There are passages that breathe the piety of Augustine ... (Durant, op. cit. xxiii, 3, p. 492-493)

While teaching "unconditional surrender to the course of the world" -- since the world is directed by divine providence -- he also taught "the most unbounded and comprehensive philanthropy" [Because men are all sons of the benevolent Father, they should make their deeds resemble His]. (Zeller, p. 270)

It won't do, therefore, to say, as Durant says (p. 491), that, like Socrates, Epictetus took no interest in metaphysics but only in the conduct of our life (ethics). Unlike Socrates, Epictetus had a complete world-view; Socrates knew nothing except the fact of his own ignorance (Diog. L. ii, 32), especially with regard to cosmology ("things worth knowing, things of importance").

[Philosophy] means training oneself in the practice of wisdom. The essence of the matter is that a man should so mold his life and conduct that his happiness shall depend as little as possible upon external things ... he will know how to "endure and renounce". (Durant, p. 491)

Never say about anything, "I have lost it," but only "I have given it back."... So long as God gives it to you take care of it as something not your own ... These are the lessons that philosophy ought to rehearse, and write down daily, and practice. (Discourses i, 12, 22; vi, 25)

The words 'God', 'nature', and 'natural world'

Grammatical note: for Epictetus, "nature" [The double-quotes indicate that the word 'nature' is commonly used ambiguously] is nowise simply laws of nature or thoughtless elemental power -- but nature is instead thoroughgoingly informed by divine reason -- which is the only sense in which "nature" and God are one and the same, I think. Thus in Epictetus the words 'Nature' and 'God' are synonymous (interchangeable, used indifferently), whereas 'natural world' and 'God' are not.

Texts and Translators: (in most cases): Discourses and fragments, tr. Hastings Crossley; and Manual, tr. P. E. Matheson. Many of these quotations are useful to the Socratic way of life, to how to amend one's present way of life to a life guided by philosophical reason alone.

Epictetus's teaching and views

Epictetus "held that only one thing lies in our power -- our will [with respect to our own thoughts about the world, our way of looking at or seeing conditions and events (The Stoicism in Hamlet ii, 2: "for there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so")) ... our happiness depends on this alone". All else is indifferent: "the distinction between desirable and condemnable [events in the world] had scarcely any significance for him ... it was the Cynic [as Diogenes of Sinope] whom he described as the true philosopher".

What is my object? To understand Nature and follow her. (Manual 49)

In Diogenes there is a unity of thought and life: Diogenes' life is the embodiment of his thought. But by 'following Nature' (not 'nature') Epictetus does not mean shamelessly imitating the animals (donkeys seek only for fodder (Discourses ii, 14)). The word 'cynic' comes from the Greek word for 'dog'; but the aim of the philosophy of Epictetus is to become a rational man, as Nature is rational. That what is amoral cannot teach man morality, is Epictetus's criticism of Cynicism.

... to desire to be wise and good is not enough. It is necessary to learn certain things. This then is the object of our search. The Philosophers would have us first learn that there is a God, and that His Providence directs the Universe ...

secondly, what the nature of God is. Whatever that nature is discovered to be ... man ... must strive to be made like unto Him. If 'the Divine' is faithful, he must also be faithful; if free ... if beneficent ... if magnanimous ... as an imitator of God must he follow Him in every deed and word. (Discourses ii, 14)

And if "the Divine" is capricious, cruel, sadistic, indifferent, amoral as an anthropomorphic natural world is -- because there is absolute evil in the natural world (children are raped and murdered, abandoned, torn to bits by crocodiles)? So it seems that by 'the Divine' Epictetus can only mean Divine Reason [or the rational, as e.g. personified by the god Apollo]. Either that or he appears as delusional as Jesus Christ does to those without faith (although Christianity, according to Schweitzer, does not explain the relationship between the ethical Father of religion and the God of the natural world).

Epictetus's exhortation to philosophy

Give thyself more diligently to reflection: Know thyself ... (Discourses ii, 12)

The beginning of philosophy is to know the condition of one's own mind ... (ibid. i, 26)

If a man would pursue Philosophy, his first task is to throw away conceit. For it is impossible for a man to begin to learn what he has a conceit that he already knows. (ibid. ii, 17; cf. Plato, Meno 84c)

... in actual life, [ignorant] men not only object to offer themselves to be convinced, but hate the man who has convinced them [of their ignorance (Plato, Apology 21c-d)]. Whereas Socrates used to say that we should never lead a life not subjected to examination [Apology 37e-38a]. (Discourses i, 26)

Plato uses the expression "conceited ignorance" (Sophist 229c); it contrasts with "Socratic ignorance". Synonyms are 'presumptuous' and 'unwise' -- 'conceited' means 'fancying oneself wise when one is not, thinking one knows what one does not know' (Apology 29a). The expression "hubristic ignorance" (from the Greek word hýbris or 'hubris') could be used for Plato's expression as well.

Augustine wrote, "He only errs who thinks he knows what he does not know." The Imitation of Christ has, "Confess thine ignorance." (Both these testify to the presence of Socrates in the Middle Ages.)

But to make the confession "I don't know" -- even if only to oneself -- is not easy for proud man to do, not at the deepest level, to confess that before the mystery of existence he is helpless. But without this one cannot know oneself. Presumption is thus its own punishment (Xenophon, Memorabilia iii, 9, 6).

The different foundations of Stoic and Socratic ethics

Epictetus, resembling Socrates in this as in so many other ways, ... his one subject and passion was the conduct of life. (Durant, op. cit. p. 491)

Nevertheless, there is a basic difference between Socratic ethics and Stoic ethics. Because although according to both it is only "conceited ignorance" that thinks it knows what death is, Socratic ethics is based only on the nature of man himself, holding that a life in accordance with the specific excellence that is proper to man (namely, moral virtue under the guidance of reason) is the good for man and therefore the guide to how man must live his life. In contrast, Stoic ethics is based on the nature of a universe, holding that the universe is rational, a thoroughgoing work of divine reason, and that the good for man is a life in acceptance of the course of nature, thus conforming his attitude towards his life to the will of God. The first principle of Stoic ethics is the proposition that in order to "Know himself" man must "Know Nature", whereas Socrates makes no claim to such knowledge.

"Seems it to you so small a thing?" (The reward of goodness)

Know you not that a good man does nothing for appearance's sake, but for the sake of having done right?

"Is there no reward then?"

Seems it to you so small a thing and worthless, to be a good man ...? (Discourses iii, 24)

The "reward" of a morally virtuous life is being a good man. Xenophon has Socrates speak of "growing daily in goodness" (Memorabilia i, 6, 9; iv, 8, 6). If moral virtue is knowledge, then doing what is good is not a sacrifice, for no man harms his ethical self except through ignorance, through thinking himself wise when he is not (Plato, Apology 29a): through mistakenly thinking he knows what he does not.

The stolen lamp

The reason why I lost my lamp was that the thief was superior to me in vigilance. He paid however this price for the lamp, that in exchange for it he consented to become a thief. (Discourses i, 29)

"... he consented to become a thief." The gravest wrong that can be done to a man is the wrong he does to himself -- by his own wrong-doing, because by it he harms his soul (Plato, Gorgias 469b), as does the robber in Epictetus's story.

As I remembered the text: "The lamp was a poor thing and did not cost much. But the one who stole it paid a very high price for it, the price of making himself a thief." Epictetus replaced the iron lamp with an earthenware lamp (Discourses i, 29), but he does not appear to find himself blameworthy for placing a temptation in front of the thief by leaving the lamp unattended. But that is another lesson.

The philosopher is an example of philosophy

Thou wouldst do good unto men? then show them by thine own example what kind of men philosophy can make, and cease from foolish trifling. (Discourses iii, 13)

Thus at a banquet, do not discuss how people ought to eat; but eat as you ought. Remember that Socrates thus entirely avoided ostentation. (Manual 46, tr. Crossley)

Let silence be your general rule; or say only what is necessary and in a few words. Talk, but rarely, if occasion calls you, but do not talk of ordinary things. (ibid. 33)

The truth is that I find most people's company taxing, even if I like them. I can only explain it this way: most of the people I have met seem to live under a very low ceiling, as if they had never looked deeply into the sky at night, and wondered. Most men talk only of "ordinary things", and so all I can really do is listen and ask questions; I haven't the wisdom, the eloquence and tact needed to redirect the conversation to what is important.

Just as it is not the healthy but the sick who are in need of a physician (Luke 5.31), so too it is not the wise but the confused who seek out philosophy. I am thoroughly confused about our existence, clinging with faint understanding to that which reason says is the good in logic and ethics, but otherwise wholly perplexed. And to ignore "metaphysics" is to be already dead although in life.

The philosopher and the lost sheep

A guide, on finding a man who has lost his way, brings him back to the right path ["step by step" (Xenophon, Memorabilia iv, 6, 13-15; Plato, Sophist 230b-d] ... You also must show the unlearned man the truth ... But so long as you do not show it him, you should not mock [Memorabilia iii, 13, 1], but rather feel your own incapacity. (Discourses ii, 12)

Service to the body versus service to the soul (which is service to Reason)

What you give to the body, you presently lose; what you give to the soul, you keep for ever. (Fragment from Stobaeus, tr. Crossley; cf. Plato, Apology 30a-b, 36c)

Stoic self-sufficiency

... a man should also be prepared to be sufficient unto himself -- to dwell with himself alone, even as God dwells with Himself alone ... considers the nature of His own administration, intent upon such thoughts as are meet unto Himself.

So should we also be able to converse with ourselves, to need none else beside, to sigh for no distraction, to bend our thoughts upon ... what needs perfecting [in us] as Reason would direct. (Discourses iii, 13)

"... as Reason would direct." That is the Socratic life of thoroughgoing reason alone, reason being the specific excellence that is proper and unique to man, and therefore the good for man is to live by its guidance. And, Epictetus says, reason is all man has need of (It is the source of his self-sufficiency, as it is the source of God's as well; reason would be the "image and likeness" of God his father in man, as is "knowing good and evil"; God is Rational Moral Virtue).

The Stoic is not afraid to be left alone with his own thoughts, because reason is his companion in solitude (He does not need or seek to be diverted or entertained). His time is dedicated to reasoning out how he should live his life in accord with the ethical good (or moral virtue) that is proper to him both as man and as an individual in the circumstances in which he lives.

When asked what benefit he had gained from the study of philosophy, [Socrates' companion] Antisthenes replied, "The ability to hold discourse with myself." (Diog. L. vi, 6; Hicks's translation: "The ability to hold converse with myself")

By 'discourse' Antisthenes means Socratic dialectic: to cross-question one's own thoughts as if in a dialog with a critical companion.

How to live in accord with the excellence that is proper to man, namely reason

In the Stoicism of Epictetus, what standard guides man in ethics? What is its answer to Plato's "we are discussing no small matter, but how to live"?

"My brother ought not to have treated me thus."

True: but he must see to that. However he may treat me, I must deal rightly by him. This is what lies with me ... (Discourses iii, 10)

"My brother has wronged me." Epictetus's motto was "Bear and forbear". As in Plato, it is small thing to be wronged -- but all-important not to do wrong.

Shame is unique and proper to man

How are we constituted by Nature? To be free, to be noble, to be modest (for what other living thing is capable of blushing, or of feeling the impression of shame?) (ibid. iii, 7)

Man has a moral choice and reason with which to evaluate the choices he must make. That is why the specific way of life proper and unique to man is rational moral virtue.

Attitude of mind and Freedom

"Throw him into prison!" -- What prison? -- Where he is already: for he is there against his will; and wherever a man is against his will, that to him is a prison.

Thus Socrates was not in prison since he was there with his own consent. (Discourses i, 12)

"But thinking makes it so"

If any be unhappy, let him remember that he is unhappy by reason of himself alone. (Discourses iii, 24) ... Remember that foul words or blows in themselves are no outrage, but your judgment that they are so ... know that it is your own thought that has angered you. (Manual 20)

No man is free who is not master of himself. (Fragment, tr. Crossley)

Yet Epictetus himself adopted an abandoned child. He knows therefore that terrible things that are done to the most innocent of creatures in this world. This existence of absolute evil cannot be evaded by a change of attitude. Man does not live in the world of a benevolent natural world, but, to anthropomorphize, of a capricious nature, indifferent to good and evil.

Further, because man is not an angel, but instead a rational animal, the irrational part of man leaves him subject to unbearable pain and emotion. So that Epictetus says only what the ideal is for man, not the reality for all but the blessed, namely forbear and (try to) bear.

Stoic common humanity in Epictetus

What you shun enduring yourself, attempt not to impose on others. You shun slavery -- beware of enslaving others! If you can endure to do that, one would think you had been once upon a time a slave yourself. (Fragment, tr. Crossley)

"... attempt not to impose on others." Although that precept is not a tautology (in form), a related precept is found by (what I called) Plato's method of tautologies in ethics: "If the good man harms his enemies, then what does the evil man do to them; and if both do the same, then what is the difference between a good and an evil man?" If the good man imposes unendurable evil on others, then what does the evil man do?

"Love your friends and hate your enemies" was a maxim which nobody before Socrates ever thought of challenging. (Kitto, The Greeks (1951, rev. 1957) p. 244)

The moral of Aesop's fable about the fox and the stork is said to be "One bad turn deserves another", which would have been the unquestioned view before Socrates, according to Kitto. In Republic 332a-d, 335b-c, Plato refutes the maxim that the just man does good to his friends and harm to his enemies: "to injure a friend or any one else is not the act of a just man, but of the opposite, who is the unjust" (335e, tr. Jowett).

"... ever thought of challenging." But Socrates did challenge it. The stories told by Diogenes Laertius are reflections of Socrates' principal idea in ethics -- namely, that Moral Virtue (in contrast to natural virtue, for the Greek word areté refers to both) is knowledge as Vice is ignorance. It would be foolishness (the opposite of wisdom) to harm men for their ignorance of the good rather than benefit them by leading them (either through example or words) to knowledge of the good (as in Epictetus, Discourses ii, 12). In the Socratic context that would be the meaning of both 'to love one's enemies' and 'to forgive others their wrong-doing' (Matthew 5.43-45, 6.12).

Stoicism's and Christianity's failure to unite on common ground

And this illustrates the tragic historical fact for Western civilization that Roman Stoicism and Christianity, despite sharing an ethics of love, were at war with one another (cf. Albert Schweitzer, Civilization and Ethics, tr. Campion (1929), p. 58-59). Why? To the mind of the Christians the Stoics were pagans (i.e. without knowledge of revelation and faith in the true God), while in the eyes of the Stoics the Christians were superstitious (i.e. their rituals, beliefs and practices were absurd and irrational). Their attitude towards one another stopped them from joining in service of Stoicism's common humanity and Christianity's your neighbor in a neighborhood without boundaries or borders.

Having the spirit of Christ -- "Blessed are the merciful, the peacemakers" -- is, in Schweitzer's view, "the only theology", a view that expresses his rationalism in religion; his view of late Stoicism would have been similar. Tolstoy's conclusion in Resurrection [ii, 40] is that, Whenever men think that there is something more important than treating other human beings with love, that is when every cruelty becomes possible.

In our history ideas have both united and divided mankind. And although it could be said either way, that Nothing is higher than love of God and neighbor or Nothing is higher than love of God and common humanity, late Stoicism and Christianity remained hostile to one another because of their different views about God.

And when death overtakes?

Keep death and exile [i.e. the loss of home and of all possessions] daily before your eyes ... Then wilt thou never think a mean thought, nor covet anything beyond measure. (Manual 21, tr. Crossley)

To see the world aright: wisdom lies in understanding, not habit

What wouldst thou be found doing when overtaken by Death?... let me at least hope for this ... that I may be found raising up in myself that which had fallen; learning to deal more wisely with the things of sense; working out my own tranquility ... (Discourses iv, 10)

Above all, remember that the door stands open.... But if thou stayest, make no lamentation. (Discourses i, 24)

Unhappiness with the world is contrary to Epictetus's account of the Stoic philosopher's world-picture. Not "indulging in discontent" is not a habit one needs to acquire, but rather an understanding of the nature of the world and our place in it.

From the point of view of Epictetus, man appears like a spoiled brat making demands on its poor father, as in Alexander Pope's mocking verse of man, "If man's unhappy, God's unjust." And Epictetus's identification of the natural order with the divine order should have appealed to Wittgenstein, author of the Notebooks written at the time of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: "how things stand is God." (Stoicism's "will that things should be as they are" Augustine called the "counsel of despair".)

What we do from habit is sweet to us

Choose the life that is noblest, for custom can make it sweet to thee. (Fragment, tr. Crossley)

I had remembered Epictetus's words this way, "Practice doing what is right until it becomes a habit, because what we do from habit is sweet to us.."

In Aristotle's descriptive account of ethics, moral virtue is habit: Virtue is "a habitual tendency [habit] towards right which makes it at the same time enjoyable [sweet]"; intellectual virtue [intellectual excellence or areté] is taught, "while moral virtue [ethical areté] comes about as a result of habit" (Nicomachean Ethics 1102b14-20, tr. Ross) -- but how do we know whether a particular habit is good or evil, if not from knowledge of the good? That knowledge is what Socratic ethics is.

The Socratic tests of reason and experience

"From bad companions you learn bad habits" (quoted in 1 Corinthians 15.33) and "You can't touch pitch and not be mucked" (Treasure Island ii, 10). Aristotle says with Theognis, that you may learn good habits from good companions. Those observations seem to belong to ethics, if ethics is practical, i.e. if its aim is to make ethical human beings, not merely to describe them. But those observations, which are ethical theses, like all others, must be put to the Socratic tests of reason and experience, because like everything philosophical, ethics is thoroughgoingly rational.

Reason has nothing to refute the proposition that we should avoid bad companions if we wish to avoid forming good habits: its meaning is not unclear nor is it contradictory. But experience does not confirm that proposition, for it commonly happens that one is made better by revulsion at bad companions (just as one often fails to imitate good companions).

It seems that any thesis may be presented in such a way -- i.e. with or without self-contradiction -- as to make it stand or fall to reason ("They keep two logics"; cf. OC § 1: "any proposition can be derived from other propositions"). And that is one reason why in many cases a test of experience is also needed.

Philosophy's School

A Philosopher's school is a Surgery: pain, not pleasure, you should have felt therein. For on entering none of you is whole. (Discourses iii, 23)

The reason you entered philosophy's school is that you recognized that you were without understanding, that you felt surrounded by vagueness and confusion and nonsense disguised as metaphor. And you confessed that you knew nothing, that your ignorance was from the heights to the depths, from the elementary to the final.

But remember that for Epictetus logic is only a tool towards understanding, that the aim of philosophy is to live the life that is the good for man. For Epictetus, as for Socrates, logic is an instrument of ethics: clarity is an aim but not the end of philosophy, as it was the end for Wittgenstein (although note that if virtue is knowledge, then logic and ethics are inseparable).

... to desire to be wise and good is not enough. It is necessary to learn certain things. (Discourses ii, 14)

The inner man, or outward things

Do you suppose that if you do this you can live as you do now -- indulge desire and discontent just as before?

Nay, you must sit up late, work hard, abandon your own people, be looked down on by a mere slave, be ridiculed by those who meet you, get the worst of it in everything [Plato, Gorgias 486b-c] -- in honor, in office, in justice, in every possible thing ...

you must study either your inner man, or outward things -- in a word, you must choose between the position of a philosopher and that of a mere outsider. (Manual 29)

"Do you suppose that you can live as you live now?" That is the distinction between "this world and all it loves" and the kingdom of God: you cannot keep a foot in both: you must decide wholly for one or for the other (Luke 17.33). For Epictetus the distinction is between the ethics of the philosopher who seeks to know the good for man and the unexamined life of one who presumes he knows what the good for man is, but does not (Apology 37e-38a).

The "inner man" is the ethical part or aspect of man or of man's mind.

Lame and Poor ("Attic Nights")

But the memory of Epictetus, the illustrious philosopher, that he also was a slave, is too recent to be mentioned as a thing obsolete. Two verses are said to have been written by this Epictetus upon himself, in which it is tacitly implied, that they who, in this life, have to struggle with various calamities, are not indiscriminately obnoxious to the gods; but that there are certain mysterious causes, which the investigation of few can comprehend: -- "I Epictetus, born a slave, and lame, and poor as Irus [a beggar in Homer's Odyssey xviii], am dear to the gods." (The Attic Nights Of Aulus Gellius ii, 18, tr. Beloe)

"That Epictetus was for some time a slave and always poor, and likewise lame, are things attested by many ancient writers, and need not be disputed. They are mentioned by Aulus Gellius, who was contemporary with our philosopher, but survived him: who mentions a short Greek epigram which he also ascribes to Epictetus himself, to this purpose

"A slave, in body maim'd, as Irus poor,
Yet to the gods was Epictetus dear."

Simplicius, whose authority is very good, says that Epictetus was a slave of an infirm constitution, and lame from early age, and so well satisfied with extreme poverty, that his small house at Rome needed no securities, having nothing in it but his couch and mattress upon which he lay." -- Lardner. (ibid. ii, 18, note 4)

I have neither city nor house nor possessions nor servants: the ground is my couch; I have no wife, no children, no shelter -- nothing but earth and sky, and one poor cloak. And what lack I yet? am I not untouched by sorrow, by fear? am I not free? (Discourses iii, 22)

Early Sources for knowledge of Epictetus

Simplicius. Peripatetic philosopher, born in Cilicia (Asia Minor), taught at Alexandria and Athens during reign of Justinian, and thus in 529 A.D. was barred along with all other pagans from teaching philosophy.

Among his works are commentaries on Aristotle's Categories, Physics, De Caelo, and De Anima; and a commentary on the Enchiridion, an abstract of the philosophy of Epictetus by Flavius Arrianus of Nicomedia (Arrian).

Aulus Gellius. Latin author, flor. 169 A.D., studied rhetoric at Rome, philosophy at Athens (to age 25), practised law at Rome. Author of Noctes Atticae in 20 books (eighth book lost): quotations, many from lost works, from Latin and Greek authors apropos of language, literature, history, antiquities. Work partly compiled in the winter nights during Gellius' stay at Athens; hence title, "Attic Nights". (Loeb tr. J. C. Rolfe, 3 vols.)

The Attic Nights Durant calls "the largest collection of worthless trifles in ancient literature". But he gives no examples of its "trifles" to explain his meaning. (Durant, op. cit. xx, 4, p. 442)

Stobaeus. Crossley says that many of the fragments are of "doubtful origin", most having been preserved in the Anthology of John of Stobi (Stobaeus), "a Byzantine collector, of whom scarcely anything is known but that he probably wrote towards the end of the fifth century, and made his vast body of extracts from more than five hundred authors for his son's use".

"Philosophy is the practice of wisdom"

Somewhat like Socrates, he asked what it mattered "whether all existing things are composed of atoms ... or of fire and earth? Is it not enough to learn the true nature of good and evil?" (Fragment) "Philosophy does not mean reading books about wisdom, it means training oneself in the practice of wisdom." (Durant, op. cit. p. 491)

[I feel shame when I read the Stoic Chrysippus and find myself unable to] point to actions [of mine] which are in harmony and correspondence with his teaching ... (Manual 49)

"... death is a minor incident in the good man's life; he may advance its coming if he finds that evil too heavily outweighs good [Discourses i, 24]; in any case he will receive it calmly as part of the secret wisdom of nature [ibid. i, 2; cf. ii, 5].

God has sent me into the world to be his soldier and witness, to tell men that their sorrows and fears are vain, that to a good man no evil can befall, whether he live or die. ["... know this of a truth -- that no evil can happen to a good man, either in life or after death" (Plato, Apology 41c-d, tr. Jowett)] ... With such ministry committed to me, can I any longer care in what place I am, or who my companions are, or what they say about me? my whole nature [strains] after God, his laws and commandments ... [Discourses iii, 24; ii, 6]

Epictetus "denounces slavery, condemns capital punishment, and wishes to have criminals treated as sick men [Discourses i, 18, 19; fragment]. He advocates a daily examination of conscience [iii, 10] ... advises men to return good for evil [ii, 10], and to "submit when reviled" [iii, 12], and he gives the rule: "What you shun to suffer, do not make others suffer" [Fragment from Stobaeus; Diog. L. v, 21, ascribes a like rule to Aristotle]. (p. 493) It's possible for the historian to "trace all these ideas back to the Stoics and Cynics", Durant says. (p. 491-493)

If a man is reported to have spoken ill of you, make no defense, but say, "He did not know the rest of my faults, else he would not have mentioned only these." (Manual 33)

"For the body is a source of endless trouble"

It is astonishing that we should love a thing to which we perform such strange services everyday. I fill this bag, and then empty it; what is more troublesome? (Epictetus, Fragment, quoted by Durant, p. 493)

The title is taken from Plato, Phaedo 66b-d.

Epictetus on the Origin of Ethics

Epictetus insists that all men have the capacity for virtue, and that God has given to all men the means ... of becoming men of steadfast character and self-control ... All men have the sufficient initial moral institutions on which they can build up the moral life. "Observe whom you yourself praise when you praise without partiality. Do you praise the just or the unjust, the moderate or the immoderate, the temperate or the intemperate?" (Discourses iii, 1, 8). "There are certain things which men who are not altogether perverted see by the common notions which all possess." (ibid. iii, 6, 8) (F. Copleston, History of Philosophy, Volume 1 (1946), xl, 2, p. 431-432)

Natural regard for justice, moderation and temperance may be shared by all Greeks or Westerners -- or Epictetus's proposition that all share these "common notions" of morality may be a tautology -- but it is not universally shared. In China the common sentiment was that it is right that the strong lord it over the weak, that truth be subordinated to advantage, and that one have no obligation to help anyone but one's own family.

Which might at first blush appear to invalidate Plato's "method of tautologies in ethics", but it does not. For if the good man lords it over weaker men, what does the evil man do (treat weaker men with consideration and respect?); and if the good man subordinates truth to advantage, what does the evil man do; and if the good man cares only for himself (his family being simply an extension of himself), what does the evil man do? Because if there is no difference between what the good and the evil man do, then there is no good and there is no evil, and if there is no good or evil, then there is no moral virtue. (But whether good and evil exist is not a question of fact but of point of view, i.e. of which concepts we use to look at our life.)

From which it should follow that, because "common moral notions" may be flawed or not possessed by all, reason (examination) is necessary to ethics from the very beginning at the very foundations.

Primary versus Applied Notions

Yet, though all men possess sufficient basis for the building-up of the moral life, philosophic instruction is necessary for all, in order that they may be able to apply their primary conceptions of good and evil to particular circumstances ... "Primary conceptions are common to all men" (Discourses i, 22), but a conflict or difficulty may arise in the application of these primary conceptions to particular facts ... Education is, therefore, necessary and, in as much as the right application of principles depends on reasoning and reasoning on logic, the knowledge of logic [should be used by man] to apply his principles to practice ... (Copleston, op. cit. p. 432)

As usual Copleston introduces a variety of words apparently to mean the same thing; here in the space of a few lines he has the words 'intuitions', 'notions', 'conceptions', and 'principles', without saying what distinction, if any, he is making with these words. This is a confusing way to write philosophy.

As practical means to moral progress Epictetus advises a daily examination of conscience (the faithful use of which leads to the substitution of good habits for bad ones), avoidance of bad companions and occasions of sin, constant self-vigilance, etc. We must not be discouraged by falls but must persevere, setting before our eyes some ideal of virtue, e.g. Socrates or Zeno ... (ibid. p. 433)

Self-sufficiency in that which is within one's own power

... from the moral standpoint [sins] are equal in that they all involve a perverted will. To overcome and set right this perverted will is within the power of all. "You must talk to yourself ... no one has more power to persuade you than you yourself." (Discourses iv, 9, 13) (Copleston, op. cit. p. 433)

"You must exercise your will ... as on the other hand relax your vigilance and all is lost, for from within ruin and from within comes help." (Discourses iv, 9, 16) (p. 432-433)

Atheism and denial of Divine Providence, both general and particular, are condemned. "Concerning the Gods, there are some ... [like] Socrates, who say, "Nor can I move without thy knowledge." (Discourses i, 12) (p. 434)

All men have God for their Father and are brothers by nature. [Copleston calls this "cosmopolitanism and love of humanity".] To all men we owe love and should not return evil for evil. (p. 434) "... the really contemptible man is not he who cannot do injury but he who cannot do benefit" (John Stobaeus, Florilegium (fifth century A.D.) 20, 61). (p. 435)

... for Epictetus happiness depends on that which alone is in our power and independent of external conditions -- namely, our will, our ideas concerning things, and the use that we make of our ideas. If we seek our happiness in goods which do not depend entirely on ourselves ... we invite unhappiness; we must practice abstinence therefore ... and seek our happiness within (p. 435) (Discourses i, 22, 29 (p. 432). Writing about Seneca, Copleston uses the expression "self-sufficiency of the wise man" (p. 431).

Seneca, Stoic Philosopher

Born at Corduba [Córdoba, Spain] about 4 B.C., Seneca was soon taken to Rome and educated there. (Durant, op. cit. xiv, 4, p. 301)

Seneca had little use for metaphysics or theology [and expressed contradictory views at the various times he stated his opinions in those subjects] ... The first lesson of philosophy is that we cannot be wise about everything. (ibid. p. 304)

Philosophy is the science of wisdom, and wisdom is the art of living. Happiness is the goal, but virtue, not pleasure, is the road. The old ridiculed maxims are correct and are perpetually verified by experience; in the long run honesty, justice, forbearance, kindliness, bring more happiness than ever comes from the pursuit of pleasure. Pleasure is good, but only when consistent with virtue ... (Letters 72 [Durant, p. 689n41])

But how does one acquire wisdom? By practicing it daily, in however modest a degree; by examining your conduct of each day at its close; by being harsh to your own faults and lenient to those of others; by associating with those who excel you in wisdom and virtue; by taking some acknowledged sage as your invisible counselor and judge.

You will be helped by reading the philosophers; not outline stories of philosophy, but the original works; "give over hoping that you can skim, by means of epitomes, the wisdom of distinguished men" (Moral Essays xxxiii [p. 689n44]). (p. 305) "What happiness, and what a noble old age, await him who has given himself into their patronage!" (De brevitate vitae ("On the Briefness of Life") xiv [p. 689n45])

Read good books many times, rather than many books ... "The primary sign of a well-ordered mind is a man's ability to remain in one place and linger in his own company" (Letters 2 [p. 689n47]).

"If you are forced to be in a crowd, then most of all you should withdraw into yourself" (Letters vii, xxv [p. 689n48]. (p. 306)

His pessimism, his condemnation of the immorality of his time, his counsel to return anger with kindness (De ira ("On Anger") ii, 34 [p. 689n54]), and his preoccupation with death (Letters 1, 61 [p. 689n55]) ... led Augustine to exclaim, "What more could a Christian say than this pagan has said?" (Action, The History of Freedom (1907), 25 [p. 689n57]) He was not a Christian; but at least he asked for an end to slaughter and lechery, called men to a simple and decent life, and reduced the distinctions between freeman, freedman, and slave to "mere titles born of ambition or of wrong" (Letters 31 [p. 689n58]).

It was a slave in Nero's court, Epictetus, who profited most from his teaching. [The Emperors] Nerva and Trajan were in some measure molded by his writings and inspired by his example to conscientious and humanitarian statesmanship ... With all his faults he was the greatest of Rome's philosophers and, at least in his books, one of the wisest and kindliest of men. (p. 307) He died in 65 A.D. (p. 306)

I read in Epicurus today: "If you would enjoy real freedom you must be the slave of philosophy." The man who submits to her is emancipated there and then ... (Letters 62, 3 [p. 689n40]) (p. 305)

Marcus Aurelius, Stoic Emperor

Roman Emperor from A.D. 161-180 [after Hadrian and Antoninus Pius], composed his Meditations (in the Greek language) in twelve books in aphoristic form. For Epictetus he had a lively admiration ... [He] laid [stress] on Divine Providence and a wise ordering of the universe, the close relationship between man and God [God is man's Father], the duty of love towards one's fellow-men. (Copleston, op. cit. xl, 3, p. 435)

It is man's special gift to love even those who fall into blunders; this takes effect the moment we realize that men are our brothers, that sin is ignorance and unintentional, that in a little while we shall both be dead, that, above all, no injury is done us; our inner self is not made worse than it was before. (Meditations (or To Himself) 7, 22) (p. 436)

A philosopher-king

[Marcus Aurelius writes that from his brother Severus he] received the idea of a polity [nation or society] in which there is the same law for all, a polity of equal rights and equal freedom of speech, and the idea of a kingly government which respects most of all the freedom of the governed. (Meditations i, 14) (Durant, op. cit. xix, 5, p. 426)

I learned from [Severus] also consistency and undeviating steadiness in my regard for philosophy, and a disposition to do good ... and to cherish good hopes ... (Meditations i, 14, tr. Long)

Like most thinkers of his time, Aurelius conceived philosophy not as a speculative description of infinity, but as a school of virtue and a way of life. (Durant, op. cit. xx, v, p. 444)

However, remember the remark in Diogenes Laertius: "if cynicism really is a philosophy and not just a way of life" (vi, 103). Whereas Stoicism's way of life is based on a world-view, as described by Epictetus as Nature = Divine Reason and that life in accordance with that Reason is the good for man, as for all things. Stoicism is not identical with the views of Socrates.

Knowledge is of value only as a tool of the good life. "What, then, can direct a man? One thing only -- philosophy" (Meditations ii, 17) -- not as logic or learning, but as a persistent training in moral excellence ... God has given every man a guiding daimon, or inner spirit -- his reason. Virtue is the life of reason. "[Stoicism's] are the principles of the rational soul ..." (ibid. xi, 1 (xx, v, p. 445) [Marcus Aurelius] was a philosopher-king in the Stoic rather than the Platonic sense. (xix, v, p. 427)

The philosophical way of thinking is that the life of reason is the life of virtue, and vice versa.

From the Meditations

Marcus Aurelius's To Himself (tr. Long) is made up of twelve books. The following are a few words from the first two books which are useful to the Socratic life, and possibly to an understanding of their author's Stoic mind.

[I learned] abstinence, not only from evil deeds, but even from evil thoughts ... (i, 43)

[I learned] to look to nothing else, not even for a moment, except to reason ... (i, 8)

[About those who do what is wrong.] All these things happen to them by reason of their ignorance of what is good and evil. [The defect of "ignorance of good and bad" is "not less than that which deprives us of the power of distinguishing things that are white and are black."] But I who have seen the nature of the good that it is beautiful and of the bad that it is ugly ... (ii, 1, [13])

If only it were that way, but as Dostoyevsky's Dmitri Karamazov says, evil is sometimes beautiful: "Two kinds of beauty -- two kinds of love. God and the devil are fighting there". Good and evil are not to be distinguished by beauty; if they were, evil would be much more easily avoided.

Thou art an old man ... how often thou hast received an opportunity from the gods, and yet dost not use it. Thou must now at last perceive ... that a limit of time is fixed for thee, which if thou dost not use for clearing away the clouds from thy mind, it will go and thou wilt go, and it will never return. (ii, 2, 4)

[There are three parts to a man. The first two are flesh and breath (air).] The third [part] is the ruling part ... no longer let this be a slave, no longer to be pulled by strings like a puppet ... [Have] an object to which to direct ... all [your] thoughts ... The soul of man does violence to itself ... when it allows any act of its own ... to be without an aim, and does anything thoughtlessly and without considering what it is, it being right that even the smallest things be done with reference to an end; and the end of rational animals is to follow the reason and the law of the most ancient city and polity. (ii, 2, 7, 16)

The "most ancient city and polity" being nature itself, primordial reason, and the good for man to conform himself to that. But nature itself is amoral, whereas man is not -- and he would not be were he not dissatisfied "with what comes from gods and men", dissatisfaction which both reason and experience justify. The moral law (as discovered by reason) and the laws of nature (reason = design) are not identical, Stoic doctrine notwithstanding. Otherwise man would have no need to reform his character, as the universe and its animals have no need (because they haven't moral character).

... attend to the dæmon within [yourself] and ... reverence it sincerely. And reverence of the dæmon consists in keeping it pure of passion and thoughtlessness, and dissatisfaction with what comes from gods and men. (ii, 13)

From which it appears that 'dæmon' means "the rational soul" as in "care of the soul", but that was not the meaning Socrates gave to that word. But how can an "attendant spirit" be affected by one's own "passion and thoughtlessness", of which surely it should be independent -- unless logic itself or the ability to examine experience for contradiction can be corrupted and blinded by one's own passion and thoughtlessness? (It's true, though: the truth is not every man's master.)

Remember that all is opinion. For what was said by the Cynic Monimus is manifest: and manifest too is the use of what was said, if a man receives what may be got out of it as far as it is true. (ii, 15)

To get out of every philosopher whatever is true in his thought.

... what belongs to the soul is a dream and a vapour and life is a warfare and a stranger's sojourn, and after-fame is oblivion. What, then, is that which is able to conduct a man? One thing, and one thing only, philosophy. But this consists of keeping the dæmon within man free from violence and unharmed, superior to pains and pleasures, doing nothing without purpose ... and besides accepting all that happens, and all that is allotted, as coming from thence, wherever it is, from whence he himself came; and, finally, waiting for death with a cheerful mind ... For it is according to nature, and nothing is evil which is according to nature. (ii, 17)

That is impossible unless everything is good, which it is not, or one knows how to distinguish what is "truly" from nature and what is not. It is impossible without some distinction. (Wittgenstein's world-picture was Stoic.)

Stoicism and Roman Law

As the terminology of science and philosophy comes mostly from the Greek, betraying their source, so the language of the law comes mostly from the Latin. (Durant, op. cit. xviii, 2, p. 393)

[The] half-official repute enjoyed by the Stoic philosophy permitted profound Greek influence upon Roman law.

The Stoics declared that law should accord with morality, and that guilt lay in the intention of the deed, not in the results. Antoninus [Pius, emperor 138-161 A.D.], a product of the Stoic school, decreed that cases of doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused, and that a man should be held innocent until proved guilty (J.B. Bury, A History of the Roman Empire (n.d.) 527) ... (Durant, xviii, 1, p. 392)

[To the emperor Trajan (r. 98-117 A.D.) the] Digest of Justinian ascribes the principle, "It is better that the guilty should remain unpunished than that the innocent should be condemned." (Digest xlviii, 19.5) (xix, 2, p. 409)

Ulpian [Domitius Ulpianus, jurist, d. 228 A.D.] proclaimed ... that "by the law of Nature all men are equal." (Justinian, Digest L, 17.32) (xviii, 3, p. 398) His legal opinions defended slaves as by nature free, and women endowed with the same rights as men. (Digest i, 1.4 [p. 701n34]) (xxix, 4, p. 634)

It was the glory of Roman law that it protected the individual against the state. The most precious privilege of the Roman citizen was the safeguarding of his person, property, and rights by the law, and his immunity from torture or violence in the trying of his case. (xviii, 3, p. 395)

Stoicism and Natural Law

[What the Roman jurists] called the "Law of the Nations" [or "law common to all nations"] [was actually] local law adapted to Roman sovereignty, and designed to govern the peoples of Italy and the provinces without giving them Roman citizenship ... the philosophers attempted to identify the Law of the Nations with the "Law of Nature". The Stoics defined the [Law of Nature] as a moral code implanted in man by "natural reason". Nature, they held, was a system of reason, a logic and order in all things; this order ... was natural law.

[Cicero wrote that the law of nature was] "right reason in agreement with nature, world-wide in scope, unchanging, everlasting ... [We cannot] alter that law ... abolish it [or] be freed from its obligations by any legislature, and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder of it. This law does not differ for Rome and for Athens, for the present, and for the future ... it is and will be valid for all nations and all times." (Cicero, De re publica iii) (Durant, op. cit. xviii, 6, p. 405)

For Stoicism the principal attribute of God, indeed the essence of God, is reason. But it must be a reason beyond man's understanding -- and this makes the Stoic idea less than attractive, believable, acceptable to reason. Because it is Isaiah 55.9, faith (not philosophy) by any other name.

The West's Ancient Inheritance

It was natural that the Romans should create the greatest system of law in history: they loved order and had the means to enforce it ... (Durant, op. cit. xviii, 6, p. 405) Roman law entered into the canon law of the medieval Church [and] inspired the thinkers of the Renaissance ... Greek science and philosophy, Judeo-Greek Christianity, Greco-Roman democracy, Roman law -- these are our supreme inheritance from the ancient world. (ibid. p. 406)

Strange that Durant does not include art, literature and architecture.

Philosophy and Moral Nobility

[Quintilian (c. A.D. 35-118), born Calagurris, Spain, in the Institutio Oratoria ("Institutes of Oratory", 96 A.D.) defined] rhetoric as the science of speaking well ... The future orator should study ... and philosophy, to mold his character on the dictates of reason and the precepts of wise men. For all preparations will be of no avail unless integrity of conduct and nobility of spirit are present to generate an irresistible sincerity of speech. (Durant, op. cit. xiv, 7, p. 314)

Behind the good sense of the words we feel always the quiet goodness of the man; it is a moral stimulus to read him. Perhaps the Romans who had the privilege of his instruction took from it some part of the moral renovation that, more than any brilliance of letters, ennobled the age of the younger Pliny and Tacitus. (ibid. p. 315)

Contrast Wittgenstein's remark to Malcolm [Letter no. 27] "If philosophy has anything to do with wisdom ..." Cynicism is always cheap, but Wittgenstein's rejection of philosophy is an example of cultural "deterioration" (LC i, 34 , p. 10), of "the terrible degeneration that [has] come over the human spirit". And he thought to call other philosophers "slumlords".

The Stoic Ideal of Public Service

The Roman emperor Trajan (c. 53-117 A.D.) wrote to Pliny the Younger:

I have received from Gabius Bassus the letter you mention, acquainting me that the number of soldiers I had ordered him was not sufficient; and for your information I have directed my answer to be hereunto annexed. It is very material to distinguish between what the exigency of affairs requires and what an ambitious desire of extending power may think necessary. As for ourselves, the public welfare must be our only guide ... (Letter xxxiii, tr. Melmoth rev. Bosanquet)

That would be the "imperial we", but the letter implies that the emperor's representative authority, as Pliny was, must also be guided in his decisions by only concern for the public good.

The rulers of this world according to Paul

The paths of the Apostle Paul and the Stoic philosopher Seneca -- two men whose thoughts, although belonging to very different world-pictures, resemble each other's in the way Stoic and Christian ideas do, but who never met -- did cross in a strange way.

Among the fixed dates Albert Schweitzer gives for Paul's life and Letters is "the proconsulate of Gallio, brother of the philosopher Seneca, in Achaia, before whose judgment-seat Paul was dragged by the Jews (Acts 18.12)" (The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle, tr. Montgomery (1931), p. 46-47). "In Corinth he is dragged before the Proconsul Gallio, brother of the philosopher Seneca, who, however, refuses to have anything to do with religious controversies of the Jews among themselves (Acts 18.12-17)" (ibid. p. 148).

How does Paul come to ascribe this remarkably high ethical value to earthly governments [in Romans 13.1-7: "For there is no authority that is not from God, and the existing authorities are appointed by God ... For rulers are not a tyrant to well-doing but to ill-doing." (ibid. p. 314)]? Its parallel can only be found in antiquity in the consciousness of their office among the great Stoic Emperors, who felt themselves to be truly the servants of the State for realization of good. This Late-Stoic conception of rulership was at that time in process of growing up [and therefore cannot have been the source of Paul's thinking, but Jews had gotten used to living under foreign rulers and so long as these kept the peace and did not interfere with the practice of their religion, this rule was acceptable to them]. It was put into practice in the rule of Trajan (98-117). It is documented in the Correspondence of Trajan with Pliny the Younger ... But from the point of view of the subject [as opposed to the point of view of the ruler whose subject he was] this valuation of rulership was expressed by no other writer in antiquity ... Neither Socrates, Plato, nor Aristotle carry the idea of obedience to authority so far. (ibid. p. 315)

Schweitzer says that Paul might have cited his experience "that whatever justice was maintained in the world was the work of Roman authority, and that its representative at Corinth, Gallio, the brother of Seneca, had refused to condemn him when the Jews brought accusation against him (Acts 18.12-16)" (ibid. p. 317).

Eschatology's view (Jesus's view) of the rulers of this world

For Jesus [in contrast] rulers are not those charged with the maintenance of order; they are the mighty, those who are not humble, those who do not serve [Luke 22.27]; as was for eschatology the natural way of regarding them ... [Mark 12.13-17] was meant ironically [because] there would soon be no [Caesar to render anything unto]. (p. 314)

"This world and all it loves is passing away" (1 John 2.17). Render -- i.e. abandon -- to this world, therefore, what belongs to this world -- and render to God what belongs to the coming kingdom of God (the kingdom of Caesar will soon be gone).

In eschatology's view the rulers of this world render unto themselves the things that are God's. Their kingdoms are ruled by worldly power, whereas the kingdom of God is to be ruled by love. Regardless of whether God's kingdom is Stoic or Christian, the rule is the same: "to love God with your whole heart and your neighbor as yourself" in a universal neighborhood.

They swear to hold no other dearer than Caesar: you, to hold our true selves dearer than all else beside. (Discourses i, 14; Socratic "care of the soul")

Plato: the state as a father to whom obedience is owed

[Tolerance towards others] in our private relations does not make us lawless as citizens. Against this fear is our chief safeguard, teaching us to obey the magistrates and the laws ... (Pericles' Funeral Oration in Thucydides, tr. Crawley)

About the state's rulers [legislators and magistrates], Plato says nothing in the Crito. It is the laws of the state to which the citizen owes obedience. As to the men who are called "statesmen", for the Athenian rulers Plato has little regard: From the point of view of ethics, did the rulers make the people better -- i.e. morally virtuous? is all he says about them; his question is rhetorical and its answer is "No". Plato has the laws cross-question Socrates:

SOCRATES: "... since you were brought into the world and raised and educated by us, how, in the first place, can you deny that you are our child and our slave, as your fathers were before you? And if this be so, do you think that your rights are on a level with ours?

But a child is not its father's slave, and even in childhood a child is obligated, as a soldier is, to disobey all illegal orders, illegal according to the state (or illegal according to morality, although the Crito does not acknowledge the existence of any law higher than the laws of Athens, e.g. the divine law of Antigone or the "natural law" of the Stoic philosophers).

"Or are you too wise [The laws mean the word 'wise' ironically] to see that your country is worthier, more to be revered, more sacred, and held in higher honor both by the gods and by all men of understanding, than your father and your mother and all your other ancestors; and that you ought to reverence it, and submit to it, and to approach it more humbly when it is angry with you than you would approach your father; and either to do whatever it tells you to do or to persuade it to excuse you; and to obey in silence if it orders you to endure flogging or imprisonment, or if it sends you to battle to be wounded or to die?

"In war, and in the court of justice, and everywhere, you must do whatever your state and your country tell you to do, or you must persuade them that their commands are unjust ..."

What answer shall we make, Crito? Shall we say that the laws speak the truth, or not?

CRITO: I think they do. (Plato, Crito 50e-51c, tr. Church, rev. Cumming)

And so Plato's metaphor: the state is like a father, indeed something even higher than a father, to whom the child owes everything and must obey in everything. But is that metaphor apt, because neither all states nor all laws are in all cases just (and not deaf to persuasion) -- and is not only to what is just that one owes the reverence that is owed to one's father? Confucius on the reform of language: "If a father who is not fatherly were not called 'father' ..." Plato writes as if he were thinking of the ideal state, i.e. the state in which all laws are just because they accord with equity (morality).

Should the Crito be read as directed only to the particular circumstances of Socrates and why Socrates should or should not escape into exile rather than let the Athenian state put him to death (so the question is specifically about the Athenian state, not all states)? Is Plato defending the rule of law, i.e. civilization, as being in all circumstances better for man than the rule (caprice) of the individual, the tyrant?

But isn't it the view of philosophy, contra Plato's words here, that it is only to the true and the good (or, in other words, to God) that man owes loyalty, and to nothing else? (Sophocles' Antigone says to the state: "Your laws do not outweigh the eternal laws of God.")

[According to Solon "an orderly and well-constituted state" is] When the people obey the rulers, and the rulers obey the laws. (Durant, Life of Greece (1939), v, p. 118 [Note 77 on page 685 names as source Diog. L., "Solon" xvi, tr. unnamed (1853) [Bibliography, p. 674], but this is not found in Diog. L. i, 45-67)]

Will just laws make the people just (Gorgias 517b)? Does the just statesman make the people better? Will just laws make just men, i.e. men who obey the law regardless of whether there is an authority (magistrate) to enforce the law or not? Men moved by something greater than fear, namely love of the good.

[Plato questions whether moral virtue can be taught (Protagoras 319a-b and Meno 93b-94e), and Xenophon defends Socrates against the charge that he made his companions morally worse rather than better (Memorabilia i, 2, 24).]

Life Under the Open Sky

But I can point thee out a free man, that thou mayest be no more in search of an example. Diogenes [the Cynic] was free ... (Epictetus, Discourses iv, 1)

[A Cynic, such as Diogenes was, should be proof] that a plain and simple manner of life under the open sky does no harm to the body ... his very roughness should be clean and attractive. (ibid. iii, 22)

Others may fence themselves with walls and houses, when they do such deeds as these, and wrap themselves in darkness -- aye, they may have many a device to hide themselves. Another may shut his door and station one before his chamber to say, if any comes, "He has gone forth! he is not at leisure!"

But the true Cynic will have none of these things; instead of them, he must wrap himself in Modesty: else he will bring himself to shame, naked and under the open sky. That is his house; that is his door; that is the slave that guards his chamber; that is his darkness! (ibid. iii, 22)

The Greek climate in Goethe's eyes

[In the northern lands] Nature compels people to make provision, not merely for the next day or the next hour, but for the distant future, to prepare in fair weather for foul, in summer for winter ... For several months of the year we do not go out of doors unless we must, but take shelter in our houses from rain, snow and cold.

What Cornelius von Pauw had the temerity to say, when speaking of the Cynic philosophers in his book, Recherches Philosophiques sur les Grecs fits in perfectly with my argument. It is false, he says, to think of these people [i.e. the Cynic philosophers] as miserable; their principle of going without was favored by a climate which gave them all the necessities of life. Here, a poor man, whom, in our country, we think of as wretched, can satisfy his essential needs and at the same time enjoy the world to the full, and a so-called Neapolitan beggar might well refuse to become Viceroy of Norway or ... Governor of Siberia.

A Cynic philosopher would, I am certain, consider life in our country intolerable; on the other hand, Nature invited him, so to speak, to live in the south. Here the ragged man is not naked, nor poor he who has no provision for the morrow. (Goethe, Italian Journey: 1786-88, tr. Auden and Mayer (1982), p. 316-17)

But someone from a temperate climate may find the heat enervating and pine for the well-pronounced seasons. Many would miss the temperate zone's fall and winter. And indeed the British-sent rulers of Greece longed to return -- and did return -- home to Britain after their reign for just this reason. And while it is true that temperate man must make provision for shelter from the cold -- all men must make provision for doctors. Toothache was regarded by the ancient Greeks as the worst suffering of all, although it was an attack of ophthalmia that made the former Stoic Dionysius of Heraclea (called "the Renegade") break with Zeno's teaching.

Historians, Climate and Culture

Writing about the birth of philosophy, historians may point to the geography and climate of Greece, but if climate and geography made the Greek way of life possible -- it hardly made it necessary. Otherwise the Mediterranean would have been home to countless cultures like that of ancient Greece.

In Athens, they held the first dramatic festival of the year -- in the open air -- in February. [Such was the Attic climate that the Greek man] could and did spend most of his leisure hours out of doors ... he did not need to work in order to buy settees and coal ... three-quarters of the things which we slave for the Greek simply did without.

So, spending out of doors the leisure which he earned largely by doing without things which we find or think necessary, the Greek ... was able to sharpen his wits and improve his manners through constant intercourse with his fellows. Few people have been so completely sociable.

What society but Athens could have produced a figure like Socrates -- a man who changed the current of human thought ... simply by talking in the streets of a city ...?

[In a different climate Athenian culture and democracy] could not have developed as it did. (Kitto, The Greeks (1951, rev. 1957), p. 36-7)

"His eye is on the sparrow" (Matthew 10.29)

Every winter millions of birds starve or freeze to death here among us in the north. For the most part that goes unknown or unnoticed by us. However, no one with an eye to our actual experience of the world would make the following claims, either in the north or in Athens.

To have God as our maker, father, and guardian -- shall not this suffice to keep us from grief and fear? And wherewithal shall I be fed, asks one, if I have nothing? But what shall we say of ... the animals, every one of which is sufficient to itself ...? (Discourses i, 9, quoted by Durant, Caesar and Christ (1944), xxiii, 3, p. 493)

Could there have been a Diogenes the Cynic in the Nordic world? Men have lived in caves during the winter and igloos year round.

Questions of climate and culture are like Dulcinea's existence, not something you can demonstrate conclusively one way or the other.

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