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Socrates - Care of the Soul

Early thoughts about what is useful towards becoming and being good, which is the object of discussing ethics.

Outline of this page ...

To "care for the soul" is to become good

I spend my whole life in going about and persuading you all to give your first and greatest care to the improvement of your souls, and not till you have done that to think of your bodies or your wealth. (Plato, Apology 30a-b, tr. Church, rev. Cumming)

Introduction: For both Plato and the historical Socrates, to 'care for one soul' means to become a thoroughly good or (what is the same thing) ethical human being.

Plato has a metaphysical theory about what death is, about the soul's existence prior to its life in the body, and about the soul's immortality, and says that if the soul survives the death of the body, "it can have no escape or security from [being judged and punished for being] evil except by becoming as good and wise as it possibly can" while still in the body (Phaedo 107c).

In contrast, the ethics of the historical Socrates has no theories about the soul and death; it is not based on an afterlife punishment for wrong-doing. The word 'soul' in the context of Socrates' thought means the definition specific to ethics that Socrates used, namely 'soul' DEF.= 'the the ethical aspect of the human mind' or 'man considered as an ethical being'.

(The distinction between Platonic and Socratic thought is important here to point out the distinction between Plato's ethics, which is speculative, and Socratic ethics, which is not.)

In Plato's Apology 40c-41c, Socrates says that to think you know what death is -- is to think you know what you do not know (which for Socrates is the worst thing someone can do in philosophy (ibid. 22d-e)), and the same would apply to thinking you know what the soul is. Socrates does not speculate about what man's psyche is, whether it is matter or spirit, whether it is mortal or immortal. He seeks only to discover what can be known by the natural light of reason about man's nature and condition, and to found ethics, or how to live the life that is the good for man, on that knowledge alone.

Socrates' thesis (which must be tested by questioning its meaning and truth in discussion, because philosophy is "discourse of reason") is that the good for man is to live in agreement with the specific excellence that is proper and unique to man, which Socrates identifies as the life of rational moral virtue, because man is a being uniquely endowed with reason and an awareness of good and evil. That is Socratic ethics, which is Socrates' response to the Delphic precept Know thyself. Whatever the Platonic soul may or may not be does not affect Socratic ethics.

Query: which philosopher holds that at death our mind will free itself from the body?

In ethics, by 'soul' (or 'mind' or 'spirit', all renderings of the Greek word psyche) Socrates means the rational soul or mind only, because Socrates held that moral virtue is knowledge, and knowledge is the possession of the rational soul alone. If man does what is wrong, it is because he is ignorant of the good.

But by 'soul' Plato means not only the rational soul, but also the animal part of the "rational animal" -- i.e. the irrational appetites and impulses (bad habits and instinct) -- of man, the part that belongs to the body and which is the cause of man's wrong-doing. Plato held that the rational soul is freed from those irrational things with the body's death.

Virtue is knowledge of the good. The trouble is that we very seldom have that knowledge, but are instead confused, our vision unclear.

To make one's soul as good and wise as possible (Apology 36c)

I went [to each man privately] to do him, as I say, the greatest of benefits, and tried to persuade him not to think of his affairs until he had thought of himself and tried to make himself as good and wise as possible, nor to think of the affairs of Athens until he had thought of Athens herself ... (Plato, Apology 36c, tr. Church, rev. Cumming)

The greatest good Socrates could do anyone was to show him that he did not know what he thought he knew, specifically about moral virtue, and therefore that he needed to seek knowledge of it, because before he thought about the care of his body, he ought to think about the care of his soul. Likewise with the city of Athens, that he should first think of the moral improvement of its citizens before thinking of its material prosperity (cf. Gorgias 517b).

Socrates' interest in ethics was to become as morally good (brave, just, pious, self-controlled, and wise) as possible, which is what he sought both for himself and for his companions. His method was to put all things to the tests of reason and experience in discussion both with himself alone and with his companions, because Socrates' standard of truth was this: that if a man knew anything, he could explain and defend what he knew to others (Xenophon, Memories of Socrates iv, 6, 1; cf. Plato, Laches 190c). In this way knowledge was public and therefore objective.

My brother has wronged me

"My brother wrongs me." I don't think he will change; and I don't think you can change that. "But the injustice of it angers me." That I think you can change.

"My brother ought not to have treated me thus." True: but he must see to that. However he may treat me, I must deal rightly by him. This is what lies with me ... (Epictetus, Discourses iii, 10, tr. Crossley)

... we do worse to ourselves when we do to others the evil that they themselves have done to us. (Marshall, To Every Man a Penny)

The only moral evil that can happen to a man is the evil he does to himself (Apology 41c-d). And returning evil for evil comes at a very high cost -- namely, the cost of making oneself an evil man.

Query: the man of virtue rights the wrongs that are done to him.

"... and if you wrong us, shall we not revenge?" (The Merchant of Venice iii, 1). To return evil for evil, "to benefit one's friends and harm one's enemies", was the mistaken view of moral virtue before the argument of Plato's Republic 335b-335e. The man of virtue harms no one; harm is what the vicious man does. The man of virtue rights the wrongs that he himself has done.

Care of the ethical aspect of oneself

Note: The following continues the discussions "Moral virtue is knowledge", the relation between virtue and self-control, and the power of reason and mythology to change man's life.

"Healing the wounded understanding" in ethics

Most of what follows are only my own thoughts at one time and of course no one need find them useful. What is important is to see that with respect to "care of the soul" (i.e. the well-being of the ethical aspect of oneself), there is much to think about. Of the many illnesses of the intellect man must cure himself of, the most pressing are in ethics. Philosophical-logical-conceptual understanding is elusive, confusion not the exception -- but misperception of what it is important to know about our life, namely what the good is for man (Plato's "no small matter, but how to live"), is ruinous. "What does it profit a man to gain the whole world, but lose his soul?" (Matthew 16.26)

Summary of this account, which seems to be the view of Plato's very stoic Republic 496a-d (because of the limit to there being a good society): You mustn't be upset by ignorance, not by other people's or even by your own (Not to think you know what you don't know is not a lesson that is easily learned, and it is never learned once and for all). Your own ignorance you must remedy. That of others you must ignore: Do not be at war with the world; you cannot make peace with wrong-doing, but you must not let it upset your own peace. What is truly beyond your remedy should also be beyond your concern. See to your own soul (Memorabilia i, 2, 4; Plato, Apology 29e) by replacing your ignorance with understanding, not letting the acts of vicious men -- (the word 'vicious' contrasts with 'virtuous') -- lead you into vice as well (the word 'vice' contrasts with 'virtue'). For both Plato and Socrates, 'to care for one's soul' means 'to work to make oneself an ethical human being'.

There are various ways or methods by which to care for the soul, some philosophical, others not. Philosophy is rational ways of looking at things -- i.e. its standard is: the natural light of reason alone. And this was the way of Socrates. This was not because Socrates was not a religious man (he was). But he made ethics part of philosophy (Diog. L. i, 14, 18), something it had not been before him, and thus subject to the thoroughgoing use of the tests of reason and experience, in which there wasn't a place for things that are beyond man's natural understanding. That is the Socratic distinction between what I know and what I don't know, and Socrates sought only what can be known in ethics.

But ethics is practical. You must find the ways of looking at things that help you. Our aim through the study of ethics is, after all, to become good human beings, because otherwise the study of ethics is idle (this contra Aristotle's disinterested account of ethics: "Nothing too much" -- nothing to excess in either direction, neither over- nor under-estimating one's own ability -- was a Greek proverb, to which Aristotle gave his own application, although I don't see that pointing out that courage lies between cowardice and foolhardiness, which is a point of grammar which anyone who speaks the language knows, is helpful to ethics).

Various ways to care for the soul

One of the ways of looking at things that may be useful in ethics is that the morally good life is guided by thoughtfulness and self-watchfulness in order to forestall base instincts and reform the bad habits formed in the past through ignorance of the good. Another way is, in Augustine's words, to remember always that "whatever is not done from love is not done as it should be done" (it can be argued in natural theology that God is love). The sayings of Epictetus may also be very useful.

Most unserviceable ways of looking at things are: weakness of the will and an irrational "conscience" blown about by the wind. Questions to ask oneself: "What will be the consequences of my doing or not doing x? What kind of human being will I be then? Is that the kind of human being I want to be -- i.e. will I be a good human being?"

Query: a simple life devoted to virtue and reason.

To be like Plato's philosopher, a traveler in the midst of a storm of wrong-doing, sheltering himself behind a wall (Republic 496a-d), caring for his own soul, dedicated to not becoming vicious himself. That is the last hope of one disillusioned by man's native condition of ignorance and consequent wrong-doing. Remember that Stoicism traces itself back to Socrates. The philosopher Plato describes is of course stoical. (Plato's exhortation to philosophy and virtue.) But I question whether a stoical withdrawal from life is the good for man.

Ethics is practical

Ethics is practical -- its aim is to create virtuous (morally good or ethical) human beings. Nonetheless, ethics is a use of thoroughgoing reason. Ethics DEF.= philosophical reflection about how man should live his life. And if ethics were not rational, then ethics would not be part of philosophy. (By 'rational' we mean (negatively defined): cross-questioned to determine that it is not language that is without meaning (nonsense), and not contradictory in reasoning or of experience.)

Where is happiness (the good for man) found?

This is what I think, that self-control or self-restraint is happiness for man, loss of self-control is unhappiness. And to this peace of mind testifies. So it is best not to think about my unrepentant brother; if he wrongs me -- "he must see to that" (Epictetus). I must see to myself, to the rational care of my own soul. And that may simply mean taking no notice of my brother's wrong-doing and the injustice done to me -- not for his sake, for he does not benefit from it, but for my own sake. For I recall my shame at my behavior when I become angry and impatient. Losing my self-control unsettles the entire day: I never recover my peace of mind afterwards: because I am fully aware that I have done something shameful. Self-control is a moral virtue, an excellence proper and unique to man.

On the other hand, it must be morally rational self-control

"... self-control is happiness for man." Not without wisdom -- i.e. knowledge of the good -- it isn't. This is why Socrates says that the good for man (or happiness) is rational (i.e. put to the tests of reason) moral virtue. That is the philosophical meaning of 'happiness', namely life in accord with the specific excellence that is proper to man. And it contrasts with the view that "happiness is a state of mind", for note that states of mind are as variable as the clouds.

Epictetus's motto

No man is free who is not master of himself. (Epictetus, Fragment, tr. Crossley)

"... if a man will have only these two words at heart, and heed them carefully by ruling and watching over himself, he will for the most part fall into no sin [wrong-doing] ..." He meant the words ... "Bear and Forbear" (Epictetus quoted by Aulus Gellius, tr. Crossley)

The ignorant man ... never looks to himself for benefit or harm, but to the world outside himself. (Epictetus, Manual 48, tr. Matheson)

Who can teach ethics?

Because ethics is practical, we may learn from many sources, we take wisdom [what works] wherever we find it, pushing nothing away from us in ethics, Socrates, the Stoics ... wherever what is serviceable is to be found. For our aim is not to become learned in goodness merely, but to become good men. (Virtue may be knowledge of the good, but we very seldom have the exact knowledge we would need.)

Reverence for Reason. Socrates. Epictetus

We do not share Socrates' world-picture with respect to Apollo's oracle at Delphi nor with respect to his daemon, nor do we live in the ancient city-state of Athens nor in any place like it. To us that is history. But Socrates' vision of life lived according to the thoroughgoing use of natural reason, once freed from history, can still show us the path to "Know thyself" and thereby to the good for man.

And likewise with Epictetus, for we cannot share his extreme Stoicism: for no one believes that merely by changing one's attitude toward every type of wrong that may be inflicted on one, e.g. rape and torture, one may overcome all fear and suffering, which was the view of most of the Greek Stoics. It is true that only to do wrong, not to be wronged is unethical, as Socrates says in Plato's Apology (41c-d), but it hardly follows from this that one's attitude can make one indifferent to extreme misfortune. Nor can we share Epictetus' pantheistic pictures of a benevolent Father, given our full experience of this world. But nonetheless Epictetus' words and vision of a life of bearing and forbearance based on devotion only to the good can still be a light in the darkness for us.

[His philosophy is] a work which is imbued with an unshakeable confidence -- worthy of Socrates himself -- in the power of that which has once been recognized as good ... (Oskar Kraus, Albert Schweitzer: his work and his philosophy [1925], tr. E.G. McCalman (1944), p. 30)

There is only one "the good" for man always and everywhere (for example, murder and exploitation, rape, and torture are always wrong-doing, whereas kindness, instruction and learning and conscientiousness in one's work are always good), because man is man always and everywhere, but there are many guides to it.

It is hard for me to set aside the bad habit of allowing myself to be angered by the ignorance and injustice that surrounds us -- because I think: But aren't I justified in my anger at it! If only I were half as outraged by my own ignorance and injustice, I might get somewhere.

"Strength to amend one's life"

Wittgenstein gave Drury a copy of Samuel Johnson's Prayers and Meditations, in which are found "Johnson's repeated appeal that he might have grace to amend his life" (Recollections p. 94-95). But Wittgenstein also said to Drury, "There is nothing I dislike so much as a sponger" (ibid. p. 124). Would he have approved if the "sponger" had prayed for the "grace to amend his life" but nonetheless had not changed his way of life, as Samuel Johnson had not changed his own way of life? (The distinction of cases seems to me arbitrary.) We don't have to do what is wrong because we are "weak". We must think things though, not to utter words into the air, asking for help as if we were helpless. Because we are not: man has been endowed by nature with the ability to keep watch (forethought) over his base instincts and bad habits -- and therefore the ability to control and amend them.

Amending one's life is an ability that belongs to man. And man has the right to change, and no right is more fundamental.

Can man become good through [the] Socratic [notion] "care of the soul"? At the very least he has a rational chance. But if becoming a good man is a question of "grace" or "strength of will" -- i.e. of the irrational -- then I wonder if there is even a chance (For me that there certainly isn't).

Paul says (Romans 7.15) "I am a mystery to myself. I do the very things I hate." But that gets us no further. Like Plato, Paul blames our very nature as human beings (the flesh is weak and temptation great) for this, but must it be so? Must the body have more power over the life of man than his mind? That the body is more powerful is neither a logical nor a real necessity.

"... then I might get somewhere, in my self-control." Not only saying I know, but as it were also believing I know -- i.e. but also believing what I say.

How to "care for the soul"?

Of methods there are many. For example. On the wall of the room where I write, I have placed a copy of a painting by Jeans Jacques Henner titled "Alsatian Girl" (The copy is from the National Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C., where I long ago once lived). Henner, like Albert Schweitzer, was from Alsace, as was one of my rather distant ancestors; I would guess that the girl is about ten years old -- and now I come to the point: Every time I look up from my desk I see that painting and am reminded that I must never say anything that I would be ashamed to have a child hear me say. For instance, muttering "blue" language when there's a lot of aggro caused by (my attitude toward) events in our life, a bad habit I formed in the time of ignorance of the good which I want to cure myself of (This is a way of caring for the soul). The painting is a help to self-watchfulness, saying: always behave as if a child were watching you, for if you do you will never do anything you need be ashamed of.

... set before your mind the thought, "What would Socrates ... have done?" and you will not fail ... (Epictetus, Manual 33, tr. Matheson)

In other words, look up. Always look up to what is higher.

Assessing one's motives -- by asking What is the most noble reason for doing this? What is the most ignoble reason for doing this? It needn't be one way or the other, but it is an interesting way of looking at motives..

The forgiveness of ignorance

A prayer a philosopher might pray, if philosophers prayed philosophically:

Forgive me my ignorance as I have forgiven others their ignorance.

But I ask, Does not our forgiveness of the ignorance of others amount to this: to not allowing ourselves to be upset, our self-control disturbed, by the ignorance of others? "Bear and forbear." But that is a philosophical attitude; it is not kindness, for it is done only for the good of our own peace of mind, for the self-respect that is found in self-control. (Needless to say, if each of us were held to account for his ignorance -- and the harm that we have done because of it, things would go very badly indeed for all of us.) Ignorance and responsibility for wrong-doing.

What work do we want to do with the ill-defined word 'forgive'? If someone does not think that what they have done to you is wrong, then what would you forgive? Their ignorance? But then isn't what they have done best regarded as a natural phenomenon like a damaging thunder storm, not as an offense to be forgiven, but nonetheless something to be wary of?

The story is told about Socrates, that when a man did not respond to his greeting, someone asked if Socrates was not offended by this rudeness. Socrates answered, "If I met a man in poorer health than my own, should I be offended." (Xenophon, Memories of Socrates iii, 13, 1)

When you are going to meet any one ... set before your mind the thought, "What would Socrates or Zeno [the Stoic] have done?" and you will not fail to make proper use of the occasion. (Epictetus, Manual 33, tr. Matheson)

"An impartial spectator"

Adam Smith suggested that we submit ourselves to an imaginary judge (Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Volume V, xviii, 2). This would help us to see ourselves as others see us, as would imagining our seeing someone else doing what we have done or propose to do. What would we think of ourselves as moral personalities then? What may appear innocent in your eyes may not appear so in the eyes of others -- and indeed in the eyes of a disinterested judge it may not be innocent.

God may say to me: "I am judging you out of your own mouth. You have shuddered with disgust at your own actions when you have seen them in other people". (CV (1998 rev. ed.) [MS 175 56r: 15.3.1951])

"It seems that some men have nothing to offer God except their hatred of their fellow men" (I have forgotten who said this). Why would this be? -- I think because it is so difficult to see oneself, to as it were physically stand outside oneself to look at oneself. Here is a sound rule: for every criticism you make of someone else, make two of yourself. -- Because it is not as easy to find things to be critical of in oneself as it is to find them in others. Thus in the words of Plutarch: "... and, possibly, if it were a thing obvious and easy for every man to know himself, the precept had not passed for an oracle". Plato has Socrates say in Phaedrus 230a "I study myself to know what manner of being I am". What manner of man am I?

"Come back!" the Caterpillar called after her. "I've something important to say! .... Keep your temper." Remember: it's not only you who suffer from the presumption of others -- others also suffer from your presumption. If you could see yourself as in a mirror, for if you wish to criticise something the best place to have it is before your eyes, not in back of them.

For man to do justice, he would need to see through the eyes of God, which of course he cannot do. Why? Because man knows only relative points of reference, not God's absolute point. (Well, that is the analogy, but it is a religious picture, not an hypothesis.) Man can judge deeds, ideologies (if he takes care to know what they are), but that is all. "How God judges a man is something we cannot imagine at all" (CV p. 86). No one has the right to judge someone else, because no one knows what anyone else suffers or has to do about it. No one but God alone. To judge someone is to suffer from the delusion that one is oneself God. It is profoundly to not know oneself, not to know one's own limits.

But what does it mean -- 'to forgive'?

Terrible things are done in this world, not only to ourselves but to those we love. To forgive can be very hard. It's also hard to know what 'forgiveness' would mean. Words and feelings seem unsound criteria.

It is remarkable that according to the Lord's Prayer, only one thing is required for our wrong-doing to be forgiven, namely we must forgive those who have wronged us. But what exactly is required? Just try to say what is meant by 'forgiveness'.

And so like Plato in the Euthyphro I am looking for a universal standard that will tell me what I must do in any particular case. In some cases, e.g. in the forgiveness of debt, if someone owes you a sum of money, it seems easy to say what the forgiveness of a debt would be. In other cases you would not return harm for harm-done. Not seeking revenge. Remaining silent. Bear and forbear. But what if there is nothing whatever that you can do? Well, at the very least, however, can't you refuse to follow a line of thought, not dwelling on the wrong and condemning the wrong-doer? So, answerable to the context, we might mean different things by 'forgiveness'.

But there is no essence of forgiveness

And like Plato in the Euthyphro I would be just as mistaken, just as much chasing a will-o'-the-wisp.

When we speak of forgiveness of a debt, it is clear what the word 'forgive' will mean in this case. But if we asked if someone had forgiven the man who murdered their child, would the word 'forgive' have any meaning in this context? Or is the question nonsense? "Have you forgiven?" -- "I don't understand what you are asking me." We follow an analogy, that because it is possible to forgive a wrong-doing in one context (set of circumstances), it is logically possible to forgive a wrong-doing in all contexts. From "has meaning in some contexts" does not follow "has meaning in all contexts" where we speak of wrong-doing or sin.

One way to forgive -- i.e. one meaning we might give the word 'forgive' -- might be to amend one's own life by becoming more merciful, less concerned with "what is fair". I am looking for some other criterion of 'forgiveness', something other than words (which are too easily mouth honor, shallow breath) and sentiment (which waxes and wanes, all too variable).

Forgiveness if wrong-doing is ignorance. How does one forgive ignorance, for if we take a man's ignorance into account, then are we forgiving him or simply not holding him accountable for his wrong-doing? What would we mean by 'forgive ignorance'?

If someone betrays our trust, what does it mean to say that we have forgiven that person -- that we are willing to trust them again, that we no longer distrust them? That does not seem to be the answer to our question.

"Others' sins you see, but not your own, for them you place behind your back." (Tolstoy, Quench the Spark, tr. unnamed)

And that is important, I think, because would it not be far easier to forgive others their wrong-doing if we were as pained by our own wrong-doing as we are by theirs?

Wrong-doing is ignorance in contrast to Christianity's forgiveness of sins

Maybe only love can forgive serious sins. But how is one to love those who have wronged or indeed may still be wronging one? This simply changes the question from the meaning of 'to forgive' to the meaning of 'to love'.

Holding others responsible for their wrong-doing is very different from dismissing wrong-doing as ignorance of the good by saying that someone doesn't know any better. Because that is treating that person as if they were simply a natural phenomenon like the elements of the weather rather than as a human being -- i.e. as a moral agent ("ethical personality") -- and that is not forgiveness.

Christianity sees the human being as a moral agent, knowing both good and evil and choosing between them. Socratic philosophy sees the human being as only wise or ignorant, because no one chooses wrong-doing unless he believes it to be right-doing: no one intentionally does harm to his soul.

And both views have consequences for the way man lives his life, because sin may be punished as being a vicious choice, but it is folly to punish ignorance as if it were a moral fault rather than to replace it with wisdom. (And our life is very different if a community selects one view rather than the other.)

"But if vice is ignorance, then how can you yourself be held accountable for your wrong-doing?" And yet you do hold yourself accountable and you do hold others accountable.

"Philosophy cannot improve your life"

Note: words that follow "Query" are search queries that were misdirected to pages of this site, and to which I am responding here.

A related query is "Is studying philosophy important to human life?", which arises when philosophy's Socratic origins are forgotten.

Query: care for the soul is all that matters. Socrates.

What does the query mean by the word 'soul'? If it means the rationally ethical aspect of a human being, the 'Socratic mind', then Yes, Socrates said that. (But, according to the nineteenth century scholar Eduard Zeller, if it means the picture of the soul as an immortal spirit, as Orphism and Plato mean, then No, because the latter is foreign to Socrates, because it is metaphysical speculation.)

Query: the Apology, Socrates, health of the body.

That the health of the body is secondary to the health of the soul (Apology 30a-b) is the foundation of all Socrates' thought. But although secondary, the body cannot be neglected either (Memorabilia i, 2, 4), even if for no other reason than that control of the body's passions is an essential part of caring for the soul.

Socratic ethics and death

... if the soul is really immortal, what care should be taken of her, not only in respect of the portion of time which is called life, but of eternity! And the danger of neglecting her from that point of view does indeed appear to be awful. (Phaedo 107c, tr. Jowett)

That there is a judgment after death at which the soul will be held accountable for its wrong-doing is Plato's view, but for Socratic ethics ("no small matter, but how to live"), whether there is an afterlife or there is not an afterlife -- which is something Socrates doesn't think he knows (Apology 40c-41c) -- does not affect ethics: the good for man is to live in accord with the specific excellence that is proper to man, and if man lives that way, then he lives the life of the good man -- i.e. of one who himself does no wrong even in return if he is wronged by others -- and therefore who has nothing to fear "either in life or after death" (ibid. 41c-d). (In the Crito, Plato argues that Socrates' death sentence does not refute the wisdom of Socrates' life.)

Query: "if the soul is immortal we must care for it not only in respect this time which we call life but ..."

"... And the danger of neglecting her from that point of view does indeed appear to be awful" (Phaedo 107c). But what is more awful is the materialist view that care of the soul is not of much importance, because "this time which we call life" is the only time [existence] our soul will ever have. And that is the danger of Plato's view, that the materialist will draw that conclusion from it, and decide if that if there is no reward or punishment, then "everything is permissible" (Dostoyevsky). In contrast, Socrates' ethics is independent of whether there is an afterlife or not; care of the soul is the only life proper to man, who is a being endowed with reason and, knowing good and evil, is endowed with the ability to seek and find what is the good for him.

Query: care of the soul. Plato.

Is the Platonic the same as Socratic care of the soul? What one must do is the same -- but Socrates did not live in order to die, as Plato says the philosopher does live (Phaedo 67e-68a).

Query: the improvement of the soul, the care for wisdom or truth, is the highest good.

These acts are the same according to both Socrates and Plato: care for wisdom is care for (i.e. improvement of) the soul, and contrariwise, neglect of wisdom is harmful to the soul.

The garden, and the soul

Query: Socrates tend your soul.

Voltaire: tend (i.e. work in) your garden. Socrates: attend to your soul before and above all else.

Query: Voltaire: "Let us take care of the garden" (Candide) versus Socrates: "Let us take care of our soul"?

There are two aspects of ethics: one personal, one public (which is called politics). Man has responsibilities in both. Justice, as Plato defines 'justice', is right conduct or doing one's duty towards other men.

But the philosopher in Plato's Republic 496a-d desires, as it were, to "tend the garden" of the whole Greek city-state, but he concludes that, because he finds himself in the midst of men intent only on vice, he must either perish at their hands or withdraw into himself like a traveler sheltering from a storm, and there try to preserve himself as an ethical human being; that seems to him all he can do to "take care of his soul". But most men can tend a small garden, however small, and that too is a way of "taking care of one's soul"; it is practicing justice. Athens was Socrates' garden.

Query: Socrates wants people to think about good and evil. Virtue is knowledge of good and bad.

But can we define 'good' and 'evil' except by pointing to examples and their counter-examples? Because there is no essence of good, no Platonic "the Good".

Questions such as this are what Socrates "wants people to think about". (The reason Plato seeks a "definition of good in the abstract" -- i.e. an absolute or essential definition -- is that he seeks a universal standard of judgment in ethics, so that he always knows "how to go on" (PI § 123), i.e. what to do, in any particular case. But he does not find one.)

Query: Plato's Apology, death, relation to care for soul.
Query: death and care of the soul. Socrates.

Plato writes that he himself is convinced "by these stories" (Gorgias 526d-e) -- i.e. by the myths he recounts -- that the soul comes to judgment after death, but he says that even if someone is unconvinced by them, the way of life he describes (which is the way of life of Socrates) is the way we should live our life -- although it "is plainly of benefit also in the other world" (ibid. 527a-b). For Socrates, the good for man in this life is the same regardless of whether there is or is not an afterlife or in that afterlife a last judgment -- and about an afterlife, according to Socrates man does not know if there is or is not one, nor if there is one what its nature is (Apology 40c-41c), and any man who thinks he knows thinks that he knows what he does not know. And therefore despite Plato's statement that this way of life is "plainly of benefit" in the afterlife, Socrates would not claim to know whether it is or is not; and the form of expression which Plato uses, namely, "... know this of a truth -- that no evil can happen to a good man, either in life or after death" (ibid. 41c-d, tr. Jowett), is either of eccentric meaning ("Given that the only evil that can happen to a man is for the man himself to do evil, then no evil can happen to a good man") or inconsistent with the previously stated Socratic cardinal principal of not thinking one knows what one does not know (e.g. ibid. 22d-e and 29a).

That is, in any case, one way of responding to these queries, but not the only way. That way depends on a particular way of looking at Socrates, not the only possible way.

Query: how is philosophy a way of the soul in the Apology?

If by 'soul' we mean man in his ethical aspect -- [There are many ways to be interested in a phenomenon (PI § 108), e.g. in the phenomenon of man [man's soul: thoughts, emotions, dreams], many viewpoints from which to look at it] -- then the way of life of a philosopher [i.e. Socrates' way of life], being the ethical life for man par excellence, is the wisest path for the soul to take.

Query: shift in your thinking about ethics.

That is what I think must be done: to shift away from the notions of "weakness of the will" and the "remedy of the helpless" -- i.e. the help [grace or favor] of gods -- towards virtue is knowledge gained by reasoning [i.e. knowledge of the good]. Which way is most useful to someone who wants to become a fully ethical human being -- i.e. to live the life that is the good both for man and for each individual given his individual limits?

Is that change helpfully compared to a Gestalt shift? Given how elementary the change is to one's whole way of thinking about ethics when one shifts from Kantian to Socratic ethics, it is maybe as apt to compare that shift to a Gestalt shift as it is to compare the shift from the old way of thinking about language in philosophy to (what I have called) "Wittgenstein's logic of language" to a Gestalt shift.

Query: what is the difference between virtue and knowledge?
Query: virtue is knowledge. Socrates.

These (sc. 'virtue' and 'knowledge') are different concepts, and, as most of us were schooled to think, not inter-connected -- and indeed not connected at all, virtue being a question of "conscience" or "willing", full stop, knowledge having nothing to do with it.

The old view, the view of Socrates, is quite foreign to the spirit of our age (for centuries now), and quite forgotten.

[Normally by the word 'virtuousness' we mean deeds rather than knowledge, but that is a nominal definition (types of definition).]

Ethics versus Religion

... we are all miserable sinners, put here for a moment, knowing the good, choosing the evil, standing naked and ashamed in the eye of God. (R.L. Stevenson, Prince Otto iii, 2)

Although it is true that each of us has much wrong-doing to ask forgiveness for, I do not believe the novella's account of our life to be useful ("knowing good, choosing the evil"). Because although that is indeed a possible way to look at our wrong-doing, it is not serviceable to ethics to look at our wrong-doing that way -- i.e. it does not in any way show us how we may amend our lives to stop doing what is evil -- whereas the aim of curing ourselves of ignorance does.

Looked at from the "virtue is knowledge" point of view, no one willingly chooses to do evil unless he believes that he is actually doing good. And he believes this because his ignorance, which has its source in misology (i.e. lack of confidence in reason), allows him to think there is a justification where, if he reasoned things out, he would see and know that there is none.

Query: Wittgenstein. Philosophy cannot improve your life.

Sometimes when Wittgenstein stood under the clouds [Aristophanes, The Clouds circa lines 330-357] they formed themselves into a donkey (to indicate the nature of the man standing below them), sometimes. I think we are, as I wrote before prisoners of our own thought-worlds, each of us trapped in his own thought-world such that normally we cannot break out to think a new thought, and in this particular instance Wittgenstein -- who was indeed able to break out in logic of language, i.e. to think new thoughts (revise concepts) -- was no better off than anyone else, the prisoner of a preconception, namely that Wittgenstein's view of life was religious rather than philosophical, and religion seeks grace, not reason.

Contra Wittgenstein's world-view, which elevates the irrational above the rational, Socratic philosophy is the way of life of thoroughgoing reason applied to man's life; it is Socrates' legacy to those who will receive it; and unlike whinging about the presumed irrationality of ethics or the grace of God, it does have the power to change men's lives. It can show man how to amend his life by thinking questions in ethics through to the very end.

Query: the rational soul guides the human being to the good and ethical.

To the extent that the soul is rational. Because it is rational to seek to know the good; and indeed man has no other tool but reason with which to do this. (Sometimes, as the query suggests, the practical good -- i.e. good for something, as a hat may or may not be for protecting the head -- is contrasted with the ethical good -- i.e. moral virtue.) But the human soul is not fully rational but is instead subject to habits and instincts (both of which impulses are often morally bad or evil), and that is why ignorance (i.e. absence of knowledge of the good) is not the only obstacle to virtue; although knowledge is essential to virtue, self-control is also needed.

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