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Plato's Euthydemus - Selections - Comments

Translator Benjamin Jowett [and W.H.D. Rouse, revised]. In classical times this dialog was also titled The Eristic and was classified as a "refutative" dialog (Diog. L. iii, 59).

Socrates argues that wisdom, and wisdom alone, is the good for man, ignorance the only evil, and he asks two professors of wisdom to counsel youths to philosophy and virtue; however, the professors' only wisdom appears to be knowledge of the sophistical art of eristic (logomachy).

Outline of this page ...

Introduction to Topics

In the Euthydemus there is a discussion, of sorts, between Socrates, various youths, and two representatives of logomachy or "word-wrestling" (271b-c). Eristic or "the art of wrestling in words" is spoken of by Diogenes Laertius (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers i, 17-18, tr. Hicks): "those who are occupied with verbal jugglery are styled Dialecticians ... dialectic goes as far back as Zeno of Elea". The two Sophists -- i.e. "professors of wisdom" -- will argue, for example, that if someone knows one thing then he must know everything (293b ff).

Their proofs do not quite take the form "Have you left off beating your father? -- Answer yes or no!" (Diog. L. ii, 135) -- i.e. answer without qualifying your answer, as if there were no other possibility -- but their method is similar, for they gain acknowledgement of a universally accepted principle, such as "The same thing cannot be and also not be" (293d) and "Things that have sense are alive rather than lifeless" (287d), and apply it thus: Everything is either A or not-A -- and there is no other possibility (see e.g. 295b ff).

But that is not what Socrates is seeking, for a even if someone were to master the sophistical art of eristic (278b), he would not thereby be any closer to knowing how man should live his life. Socrates therefore gives the youths an example of an exhortation to philosophy (278d-282a), to seeking to know and therefore practice virtue, with the conclusion of the discussion being that: Wisdom, and wisdom alone, is the good for man, and ignorance the only evil. And Socrates asks the two Sophists, who claim to be able to teach virtue, to offer the youths a demonstration of this ability.

Using Plato's method of "definition by division", we could say that the creatures cross-questioned in this dialog are of the genus Sophist, species Know-all ... although they are unwilling to demonstrate that they know specific things -- only that they know everything.

Whether the Euthydemus has any philosophical points of interest, I don't know (There are a few deductive-logic riddles to figure out), but it is certainly a delightfully amusing dialog to read -- and there are in it very Socratic exhortations to the study of philosophy.

The Setting of the Euthydemus

Crito says that the day before he saw Socrates talking to a stranger in the Lyceum, and he asks who this was (271a). Socrates says there were two, the brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus [Socrates knows these men from some time ago (273c)] and that both took part in the conversation. (271b) Crito says he imagines that they were Sophists, and he asks Socrates, "what is their line of wisdom?" (271b-c) Socrates says that their wisdom is even more all-round than the pancratiast's [The pancratium was a very violent athletic contest between two men that combined fist fighting and wrestling, and might end in the death of one of them], for they are able to fight not only with their bodies, but also with words.

SOCRATES: [They] are invincible in every sort of warfare; for they are capital at fighting in armour, and will teach the art to anyone who pays them; and also they are most skillful in legal warfare; they will plead themselves and teach others to speak and to compose speeches which will have an effect upon the courts.

And this is only the beginning of their wisdom, but they have at last carried out the pancratiastic art to the very end, and have mastered the only mode of fighting which had been hitherto neglected by them; and now no one dares even to stand up against them: such is their skill in the war of words, that they can refute any proposition whether true or false. (271c-272b)

And so Socrates has prepared his old friend Crito to hear of something special. Indeed, quite special.

SOCRATES: Now I am thinking, Crito, of placing myself in their hands; for they say that in a short time they can impart their skill to anyone.

Socrates, as an older student of the harp

CRITO: But, Socrates, are you not too old? There may be reason to fear that.

SOCRATES: Certainly not, Crito; as I will prove to you, for I have the consolation of knowing that they began this art of disputation which I covet, quite, as I may say, in old age; last year, or the year before, they had none of their new wisdom. I am only apprehensive that I may bring the two strangers into disrepute, as I have done Connus the son of Metrobius, the harp-player, who is still my music-master; for when the boys who go to him see me going with them, they laugh at me and call [Connus] grandpapa's master. (272b-272c)

Crito now asks Socrates to "give me a description of their wisdom", and Socrates says that he will tell Crito "the whole story". (272d)

SOCRATES: Providentially I was sitting alone in the dressing-room of the Lyceum where you saw me, and was about to depart; when I was getting up I recognized the familiar divine sign [Rouse's translation: "divine presentiment"]: so I sat down again, and in a little while the two brothers ... came in ... (272d-273a)

As to warfare and the courts, however, the brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus laugh when Socrates says that they can teach these. (273c-d)

EUTHYDEMUS: Those, Socrates, are matters which we no longer pursue seriously; to us they are secondary occupations ... The teaching of virtue ... is our principal occupation; and we believe that we can impart it better and quicker than any man. (273d)

In Protagoras 328b, Plato has Protagoras make a similar claim about his ability to teach virtue better than anyone else.

SOCRATES: But are you quite sure about [having this knowledge]? the promise is so vast, that a feeling of incredulity creeps over me. [But if you do have this wisdom, then] I think you happier in having such a treasure than the great king is in the possession of his kingdom. (274a)

The two brothers say that not only do they have this vast wisdom, but that they are able to teach virtue to "anyone who likes to learn" (274a-b).

SOCRATES: But I promise you ... that every unvirtuous person will want to learn. I shall be the first ... (274b)

Socrates asks the Sophists to demonstrate their skill in making men turn to philosophy and the study of virtue

Will the two brothers exhibit [Rouse: "demonstrate"] their wisdom to those present?

SOCRATES: There may be some trouble in giving the whole exhibition; but tell me one thing, can you make a good man of him only who is already convinced that he ought to learn of you, or of him also who is not convinced, either because he imagines that virtue is a thing that cannot be taught at all, or that you are not the teachers of it? Has you art power to persuade him, who is of the latter temper of mind, that virtue can be taught; and that you are the men from whom he can best learn it?

DIONYSODORUS: ... our art will do both.

SOCRATES: And you and your brother ... of all men who are now living are the most likely to stimulate him to [Rouse: "to incline a man toward"] philosophy and to the study [Rouse: "practice"] of virtue?

DIONYSODORUS: Yes, Socrates, I rather think that we are.

SOCRATES: Then I wish that you would be so good as to defer the other part of the exhibition, and only try to persuade the youth whom you see here that he ought to be a philosopher and study virtue [Rouse: "that he must love wisdom and practice virtue"]. (274d-275a)

The youth Socrates is referring to is Cleinias, the young son of Axiochus (271a-b), who is sitting beside him. Cleinias had come in shortly after the two Sophist brothers and others who appeared to be their students had; the brothers and their followers were walking about in the covered court [Rouse: "round in the cloisters"] of the Lyceum. Along with Cleinias came Ctesippus the Paeanian [Rouse: "from Paeania"], whom Socrates characterizes as "having the wildness of youth" [Rouse: "rather wild as young men are"]. The brothers had taken no notice of Socrates before Cleinias appeared. (273a-b)

"Turn the young man's mind towards philosophy"

SOCRATES: [Persuade Cleinias] that he ought to be a philosopher and study virtue ... for the fact is that I and all of us are extremely anxious that he should become truly good ... He is quite young and we are naturally afraid that someone may get the start of us, and turn his mind in a wrong direction, and he may be ruined.

I hope that you will make a trial of the young man, and converse with him in our presence, if you have no objection.

EUTHYDEMUS ["in a manly and at the same time encouraging tone"]: There can be no objection, Socrates, if the young man is only willing to answer questions.

SOCRATES: He is quite accustomed to do so ... for his friends often come and ask him questions and argue with him; and therefore he is quite at home in answering.

EUTHYDEMUS: O Cleinias, are those who learn the wise or the ignorant? (275a-d)

Cleinias looks in perplexity at Socrates for help, and Socrates knowing that the youth is disconcerted, says: "Take courage, Cleinias, and answer like a man whichever you think; for my belief is that you will derive the greatest benefit from their questions." (275d-e) Part of the benefit may be that he learns to recognize the eristic trick/technique of equivocation. (Note, nonetheless, that, as Socrates himself does, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, follow the correct technique of dialectic, eliciting step-by-step agreement for their propositions and cross-questions before moving on in the discussion.)

The Eristic Art of Equivocation

DIONYSODORUS [learning forward to catch Socrates' ear]: Whichever he answers ... I prophesy that he will be refuted, Socrates.

CLEINIAS: [Those who learn are the wise.]

EUTHYDEMUS: There are some whom you would call teachers, are there not?... And they are the teachers of those who learn -- the grammar-master and the lyre-master used to teach you and other boys; and you were the learners?

CLEINIAS: Yes.

EUTHYDEMUS: And when you were learners you did not as yet know the things which you were learning?

CLEINIAS: No ...

EUTHYDEMUS: And were you wise then?

CLEINIAS: No, indeed ...

EUTHYDEMUS: But if you were not wise you were unlearned [Rouse: "ignorant"]?

CLEINIAS: Certainly.

EUTHYDEMUS: You then, learning what you did not know, were unlearned ["ignorant"] when you were learning?... Then the unlearned ["ignorant"] learn, and not the wise, Cleinias, as you imagine.

DIONYSODORUS: Yes, Cleinias; and when the grammar-master dictated anything to you, were they the wise boys or the unlearned ["ignorant"] who learned the dictation?

CLEINIAS: The wise ...

DIONYSODORUS: Then after all the wise are the learners and not the unlearned ["ignorant"]; and your last answer to Euthydemus was wrong. (275e-276c)

Following the two brothers' display of the sophistical art, their followers laugh with approval (276d), and further displays follow (276d-277c). But none are of the kind to persuade Cleinias "that he ought to be a philosopher and study virtue", which is what Socrates has asked the two Sophists to demonstrate (275a).

Socrates describes the equivocation

SOCRATES: You must not be surprised, Cleinias, at the singularity of their mode of speech: this I say because you may not understand what the two strangers are doing with you ... you have gone through the first part of the sophistical ritual, which, as Prodicus [of Ceos] says, begins with initiation into the correct use of terms.

The two foreign gentlemen perceiving that you did not know wanted to explain to you that the word 'to learn' has two meanings, and is used, first, in the sense of acquiring knowledge of some matter of which you previously have no knowledge, and [second] also when you have the knowledge, in the sense of reviewing this matter, whether something done or spoken by the light of this newly-acquired knowledge; the latter is generally called 'knowing' rather than 'learning', but the word 'learning' is also used; and you did not see, as they explained to you, that the term is employed of two opposite sorts of men, of those who know, and of those who do not know. (277d-278b)

... and the worth of the Sophist's art

SOCRATES: These parts of [sophistical] learning are not serious, and therefore I say that the gentlemen are not serious, but are only playing with you. For if a man had all that sort of knowledge that ever was, he would not be at all the wiser; he would only be able to play with men, tripping them up and oversetting them with distinctions of words. He would be like a person who pulls away a stool from someone when he is about to sit down, and then laughs and makes merry at the sight of his friend overturned and laid on his back. (278b-c)

But, now, Socrates says to Cleinias, Socrates is "certain" that Euthydemus and Dionysodorus "will exhibit to you their serious purpose, and keep their promise (I will show them how); for they promised to give you a sample of the hortatory philosophy ..." (278c)

Socrates' exhortation to philosophy and virtue

SOCRATES: I think we have had enough of this. Will you let me see you explaining to the young man how he is to apply himself to the study of virtue and wisdom? And I will first show you what I conceive to be the nature of the task, and what sort of a discourse I desire to hear ...

SOCRATES [questioning Cleinias]: Do not all men desire happiness?... for what human being is there who does not desire happiness?

CLEINIAS: There is no one ... who does not.

SOCRATES: Well, then ... since we all of us desire happiness, how can we be happy? -- that is the next question. Shall we not be happy if we have many good things?... And what things do we esteem good? [Socrates lists what he suggests "everyone will say" we esteem good: wealth, health and beauty "and other personal gifts", good birth, power, honors in one's own land. (279a-b)] And what other goods are there?... What do you say of temperance, justice [Rouse: "uprightness"], courage: do you not verily and indeed think, Cleinias, that we shall be more right in ranking them as goods than as not ranking them as goods? For a dispute might possibly arise about this. What then do you say?

CLEINIAS: They are goods ...

SOCRATES: Very well ... and where in the company shall we find a place for wisdom -- among the goods or not?

CLEINIAS: Among the goods.

SOCRATES: And now ... think whether we have left out any considerable goods.

CLEINIAS: I do not think that we have ...

SOCRATES: I am afraid that we have left out the greatest of them all ... Fortune ... which all, even the most foolish admit to be the greatest of goods.

On second thoughts ... we have already spoken of good-fortune, and are but repeating ourselves.

CLEINIAS: What do you mean?

SOCRATES: Surely wisdom is good-fortune; even a child may know that ... Amid the dangers of the sea ... are any more fortunate on the whole [Rouse: "as a general rule"] than wise pilots; [and likewise, with a wise rather than a foolish (un-wise) general, and a wise rather an ignorant physician?] You think ... that to act with a wise man is more fortunate than to act with an ignorant one?

CLEINIAS: [Yes.]

SOCRATES: Then wisdom always makes men fortunate: for by wisdom no man could ever err, and therefore he must act rightly and succeed, or his wisdom would be wisdom no longer. (278d-280a)

Plato here has jumped from empirical questions to tautology. For he begins by saying "on the whole" (279e), because surely however wise (i.e. knowledgeable) a sea pilot, a general or a physician may be, there remains much in this trade about which he is ignorant, and therefore he may sometimes err. Plato's tautology is this: that if a man is fully wise (i.e. if there is nothing about which he is ignorant), then he will -- i.e. cannot -- err.

Be that as it may, Socrates and Cleinias agree that "he who has wisdom has no need of fortune" [Rouse: "needs no more good fortune than that"]. (280b)

The grammar of 'fortunate'

The "grammar" (in Wittgenstein's jargon) of the word 'fortunate' is most peculiar, the concept 'fortune' -- I want to say, singular -- although it isn't singular (Cf. 'virtuous', for peculiar ≠ singular). But it is peculiar. It is, I think, an example of a word about whose meaning we are "at variance" (Phaedrus 263a-b), because if we are going to call examples of good fortune -- if we are going to say that these examples belong to (or are) the definition of 'fortunate', different people might make different lists of things that are and things that are not fortunate, might they not (Give examples!)?

Do such lists define the word 'fortunate' or is there a general definition of that word, a definition so general that it is possible (grammatically) for different people to make different lists and nonetheless not be misdefining the word 'good-fortune' -- i.e. misdescribing our actual use of that word (which is "what anyone knows and must agree" to (Z § 211))? And to call/classify different things fortunate would not be to talk "nonsense" (i.e. make "sounds without sense"), that is, creating nonsense propositions of the form 'Good-fortune is x' -- rather than making true or false propositions, or propositions which are neither but which have a different use in the language (cf. the parts-of-speech 'precepts', 'commands').

But it does seem that there must be a general definition of 'fortunate' or 'good-fortune', because if different lists are given of what is and what is not fortunate, and if there is no general definition, then wouldn't we have to say that it was a case of same sign, different grammars, so that we could say that the use of the same word, namely 'fortunate', was an accident as it were? Two different lists would not be two different definitions of the word. But if the meaning of a word is its application -- or is there a difference in meaning between the word 'application' and the word 'use' in cases where we say that "the meaning of a word is its use in the language" (PI § 43)?

And so it may seem -- indeed, it may be -- that I am trying to fit (as if writing to a thesis), to find a place for, every phenomenon of language in the category 'grammar'. But the question is: -- What other tool have I for trying to distinguish/maintain an objective distinction between sense and nonsense. "Just describe." Yes, that is half or more of what we/I mean by 'grammar' in logic of language. But a bare description can be like a percept without concept -- it is blind. But in this case -- Look and see (i.e. to see how it is in this particular case)!

We might say this: That to say what is good-fortune is to say what the good is for man. And about what that is, men are at variance. And the same may -- or may not -- be the case with the various moral virtues: "What is modesty?" for example. (It is not the same for the English word 'beautiful', however, not if beauty is not a moral virtue.)

Maybe the answer lies in asking: Why do you think this is fortunate/good-fortune? That is, the compilation of a list is not irrational (not if it is compiled by an rational man) -- there are reasons for each of its various members. Because that's part of the "language game" too, maybe a defining/essential part of it.

What men regard as desirable things are not good in themselves but only made so by knowledgeable (wise) use

SOCRATES: Then ... a man who would be happy must not only have the good things, but he must also use them; there is no advantage in merely having them?... Well, Cleinias, but if you have the use as well as the possession of good things, is that sufficient to confer happiness?

CLEINIAS: Yes, in my opinion.

SOCRATES: And may a person use them either rightly or wrongly?

CLEINIAS: He must use them rightly [if he is to be happy].

SOCRATES: That is quite true ... And the wrong use of a thing is far worse than the non-use; for the one is an evil, and the other is neither a good nor an evil. You admit that?

CLEINIAS: [Yes.]

SOCRATES: [Having given examples, Socrates now draws this conclusion.] Then in every possession and every use of a thing, knowledge is that which gives a man not only good-fortune but success?... And tell me ... what do possessions profit a man if he have neither good sense nor wisdom? Would a man be better off, having and doing many things without wisdom, or a few things with wisdom? (280a-281b)

[Are there no goods that we possess and count it good to possess despite our not being able to make use of them? Suppose e.g. that someone's father had been a violinist and that when the father died his child kept that violin as a remembrance of its father although the child was itself unable to play the instrument. Would that not be a good despite it being a good unusable by the child? Or are we to say that the use the child makes of the instrument is that of serving as a remembrance? That is how tautologies are made -- i.e. the concept 'make use of' is quite ill-defined, so that we can always find some way to apply it. Suppose we said: make use of for the sake the good was originally intended, the violin's e.g. being to be played? That would be refutation of the thesis, would it not, for is not the virtue of filial piety, in this case the act of remembrance of one's parents, a moral good for man? And might we not value a friend's love for us, despite our not being able to make any use to our benefit of that friendship?]

There next follows a series of questions and answers which are "mutually allowed" -- i.e. agreed to -- by Cleinias and Socrates. (281c-d)

In sum: wisdom is the only good, ignorance the only evil

SOCRATES: Then ... the sum of the matter appears to be that the goods of which we spoke before [(279a-b)] are not to be regarded as goods in themselves, but the degree of good and evil in them depends on whether they are or are not under the guidance of knowledge: under the guidance of ignorance, they are greater evils than their opposites, in as much as they are more able to minister to the evil principle which rules them; and when under the guidance of wisdom and prudence, they are greater goods: but in themselves they are nothing?

CLEINIAS: That ... is obvious.

SOCRATES: What then is the result of what has been said? Is not this the result -- that other things are indifferent and that wisdom is the only good, and ignorance the only evil?

CLEINIAS: [Agreed.] (281d-e)

What is apparently presumed here is that the virtues such as "temperance, justice, courage" (279b) are themselves only species (or, members of the class {wisdom}) of wisdom, and therefore to be wise is to be temperate, just, and brave, and vice versa.

SOCRATES: Let us consider a further point ... Seeing that all men desire happiness, and happiness, as has been shown, is gained by a use, and a right use, of the things of life, and the right use of them, and good fortune in the use of them is given by knowledge, -- the inference [i.e. what can be inferred] is that everybody ought by all means to try [to] make himself as wise as he can? (282a)

And, presumably, therefore Socrates says that "it is not at all dishonorable" for the man who thinks that he ought to seek wisdom to seek it from whomever, and likewise that no one is to be blamed "for doing any honorable service ... if his aim is to get wisdom". And Socrates asks Cleinias if the youth agrees.

"... if only it is possible for wisdom to be taught"

CLEINIAS: Yes ... I agree, and think you are right.

SOCRATES: Yes ... if only wisdom can be taught, and does not come to man spontaneously; for this is a point which has still to be considered, and is not yet agreed upon by you and me --

CLEINIAS: But I think, Socrates, that wisdom can be taught ...

SOCRATES: [Socrates is pleased to hear that answer because it has saved him] from a long and tiresome investigation as to whether wisdom can be taught or not [cf. Protagoras 319a ff. where that investigation is undertaken]. But now, as you think that wisdom can be taught, and that wisdom only can make a man happy and fortunate, will you not acknowledge that all of us ought to love wisdom, and you individually will try to love her?

CLEINIAS: Certainly, Socrates ... I will do my best. (282b-d)

Socrates says that he is pleased to hear Cleinias say this. And he now turns to the Sophist brothers Dionysodorus and Euthydemus and says, "That is an example ... of the sort of exhortations which I would have you give", and that he hopes the two brothers will "take up the enquiry where I have left off, and proceed to show the youth whether he should have all knowledge [The Sophist brothers claim to be "know-alls"]; or whether there is one sort of knowledge only which will make him good and happy, and what that is. For, as I was saying at first [(275a-b)], the improvement of this young man in virtue and wisdom is a matter which we have very much at heart." (282c-e)

Of course "the one sort of knowledge alone" that makes man "both good and happy" Socrates has in mind is virtue, the word 'virtue' in the sense of ethical excellence (areté).

There is no such thing as contradiction, "for no one can affirm that which is not"

DIONYSODORUS: Tell me ... Socrates and the rest of you who say that you want this young man [Cleinias] to become wise, are you in jest or in real earnest?

SOCRATES: [We are] in profound earnest.

DIONYSODORUS: Reflect, Socrates; you may have to deny your words.

SOCRATES: I have reflected ... and I shall never deny my words.

DIONYSODORUS: Well ... so you say you wish Cleinias to become wise?... And he is not wise as yet?... You wish him ... to become wise and not to be ignorant?

SOCRATES: That we do.

DIONYSODORUS: You wish him to be what he is not, and no longer to be what he is?

DIONYSODORUS [rushing to take advantage of Socrates' bewilderment at that question]: You wish him no longer to be what he is, which can only mean that you wish him to perish. (283b-d)

Of course they do not wish Cleinias to perish, but only for Cleinias' ignorance to perish. But Ctesippus becomes angry at hearing it said that "Socrates and the rest" wish Cleinias to perish, and he confronts Dionysodorus. But Dionysodorus responds by entangling Ctesippus in word-wrestling, easily confounding him. Ctesippus, nonetheless, in his anger replies to Dionysodorus' proposition that "The good speak evil of evil things" by saying that the good also "speak evil of evil men ... and they speak coldly of the insipid and cold dialectician". To which Dionysodorus responds: "You are abusive, Ctesippus ...!" (283e-284e)

SOCRATES [seeing that both speakers are "getting exasperated with one another"]: O Ctesippus, I think that we must allow the strangers [i.e. visitors originally from Chios, but later from the colony of Thurii, from which, however, "they were turned out" (271c, 283e; cf. possibly Protagoras 316c-317c)] to use language in their own way, and not quarrel with them about words, but be thankful for what they give us. If they know how to destroy men in such a way as to make good and sensible men out of bad and foolish ones -- whether this is a discovery of their own, or whether they have learned from someone else this new sort of death and destruction which enables them to get rid of a bad man and turn him into a good one -- if they know this (and they do know this -- at any rate they said just now that this was the secret of their newly-discovered art) -- let them, in their phraseology, destroy the youth [Cleinias] and make him wise, and all of us with him ... I offer my own person to ["be the Carian [Rouse: "Carian slave"] on whom they shall operate", and Dionysodorus may kill me] if he will only make me good. (285a-c)

But Ctesippus interjects, saying that he too is willing to undergo that death, and he says that Dionysodorus has confounded "abuse and contradiction ... they are quite different things". (285d)

"Contradiction!" Dionysodorus replies, "why, there never was such a thing" as contradiction (a statement which itself appears to contradict the principle that Dionysodorus states in 286a), and again he uses the sophistical art of eristic to refute Ctesippus' claim that there is such a thing, and the young man is again reduced to silence. (285d-286b)

As with the first (283e-284e), this second confounding of Ctesippus depends on the principle that "No man can affirm a negative; for no one can affirm that which is not". (286a; see Parmenides on "The One and the Many"; Plato takes up the question of talk about "that which is not" in Sophist 257b-c.)

And there is no such thing as ignorance either

SOCRATES: What do you mean, Dionysodorus? I have often heard, and have been amazed to hear, this thesis of yours [i.e. "the dictum" of 286c], which is maintained and employed by the disciples of Protagoras, and others before them, which to me appears to be quite wonderful, and suicidal as well as destructive, and I think that I am most likely to hear the truth about it from you. The dictum is that there is no such thing as falsehood; a man must either say what is true or say nothing [Rouse: it "is impossible to tell a lie"]. (286b-c)

Dionysodorus' position is that a man can neither speak falsely nor think falsely, and he agrees to the thesis Socrates has stated, that there is "no such thing as a false opinion". (286d)

SOCRATES: Then there is no such thing as ignorance, or men who are ignorant; for is not ignorance, if there be such a thing, a mistake of fact?... And that is impossible?

DIONYSODORUS: Impossible ...

SOCRATES: Are you saying this as a paradox ... or do you seriously maintain no man to be ignorant?

DIONYSODORUS: Refute me ...

SOCRATES: But how can I refute you, if, as you say, to tell a falsehood is impossible [i.e. only a false, not a true, proposition can be refuted]?

EUTHYDEMUS: Very true ...

DIONYSODORUS: Neither did I tell you just now to refute me [Note: this statement cannot be a lie, if contradiction is impossible] ... for how can I tell you to do that which is not [namely, demonstrate that a proposition is false, given that there is no such thing as a false proposition]?

SOCRATES: O Euthydemus ... I have but a small conception of these subtlies and excellent devices of wisdom; I am afraid that I hardly understand them, and you must forgive me therefore if I ask a very stupid question: if there be no falsehood or false opinion or ignorance, there can be no such thing as erroneous action, for a man cannot fail of acting as he is acting [i.e. cannot fail because he cannot be misled by ignorance -- because there is no such thing as ignorance] -- that is what you mean?

EUTHYDEMUS: Yes ...

SOCRATES: And now ... I will ask my stupid question: If there is no such thing as error in deed, word, or thought, then what, in the name of goodness, do you come hither to teach? And were you not just now saying [274e-275a] that you could teach virtue best of all men, to anyone who was willing to learn?

DIONYSODORUS: And are you such an old fool, Socrates ... that you bring up now what I said at first -- and if I had said anything last year, I suppose that you would bring that up too -- but are non-plussed at [Rouse: "you don't know what to do with"] the words which I have just uttered?

SOCRATES: [I don't know] what to make of this word 'non-plussed' [Rouse: 'don't know what to do with']. [What do you mean by it?] You must mean that I cannot refute your argument. Tell me if the words have any other sense.

DIONYSODORUS: No ... they mean what you say. And now answer. (286d-287c)

Socrates asks whether he should answer before Dionysodorus answers the question Socrates has asked him. -- Is that fair? But Dionysodorus answers that it is "quite fair". (287c)

SOCRATES: Upon what principle [Rouse: "On what reasoning"]?... I can only suppose that you are a very wise man who comes to us in the character of a great logician [i.e. by which, Socrates' irony aside, he means: practitioner of the art of eristic], and who knows when to answer and when not to answer -- and now you will not open your mouth at all, because you know that you ought not [i.e. that your thesis will be refuted if you do].

DIONYSODORUS: You prate ... instead of answering. But if, my good sir, you admit that I am wise, answer as I tell you.

SOCRATES: Put the question. (287c-d)

The dialectician who is also a good companion

Note.-- It is only rarely that a companionable dialectician (cf. Plato, Protagoras 329b, 336b) rejects a question (e.g. by pointing out that the question is nonsense, i.e. an undefined combination of words; cf. PI § 47f) or that a companionable dialectician "answers a question with a question", and it is never that a companionable dialectician responds to a question by ignoring the question that was asked, posing instead a question that takes the discussion in a different direction from the question it replies -- or rather, doesn't reply -- to.

Refutation of the two sophistical theses

DIONYSODORUS: Are the things which have sense alive or lifeless?

SOCRATES: They are alive.

DIONYSODORUS: And do you know any word which is alive?

SOCRATES: I cannot say that I do.

DIONYSODORUS: Then why did you ask me what sense my words had? [Socrates: "Tell me if the words have any other sense." (287b-c)]

SOCRATES: Why, because I was stupid and made a mistake. And yet, perhaps, I was right after all in saying that words have a sense; -- what do you say, wise man [i.e. Sophist]? If I was not in error, even you will not refute me [because only a false proposition can be refuted], and all your wisdom will be non-plussed [Rouse: "you [will] not know what to do with my saying"]; but if I did fall into error, then again you are wrong in saying that there is no error [i.e. that there is no such thing as ignorance], -- and this remark was made by you not quite a year ago [cf. 287b].

I am inclined to think, however, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, that this argument lies where it was and is not very likely to advance: even your skill in the subtlies of logic [Note: the ancient Greek word logos has many meanings -- among which are "word", "discussion", and "meaning", thus from which: "wrestling in words" or logomachy], which is really amazing, has not found out the way of throwing another [as in wrestling, or in this case: word-wrestling] and not falling yourself, now any more than of old [cf. 286c]. (287d-288a)

And so the theses "There is no such thing as contradiction" and "There is no such thing as ignorance" are, or seem to be, refuted. -- But how or by what method refuted? Could we say: because they have been shown to have logically absurd consequences -- i.e. that the theses lead to contradiction? In what way? "If there is no such thing as error, then Socrates cannot have committed an error -- but Dionysodorus' argument has just shown that Socrates did err; but if Socrates erred, then there is such a thing as contradiction -- which Dionysodorus earlier demonstrated does not exist"? (Or are the two theses nonsense -- i.e. "sounds without meaning" -- because they strip the words 'ignorance' and 'truth' of their antitheses? It's a nice question.)

Ctesippus then says to Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, "I wonder at you, for you seem to have no objection to talking nonsense" [Rouse: "you don't seem to mind what nonsense you babble!"]. Socrates, however, fearing that there may be more "high words" [Rouse: "another bout of rudeness"] speaks to calm Ctesippus down. (288a-b)

The Protean Sophists and the form Socrates wishes them to take

SOCRATES: To you, Ctesippus, I must repeat what I said before to Cleinias -- that you do not understand the ways of these philosophers from abroad [Rouse: "you do not know ... the depths of our visitors' wisdom"]. They are not serious [Rouse: "they are not willing to demonstrate [their wisdom] in earnest"], but, like the Egyptian wizard, Proteus, they take different forms and deceive us by their enhancements [Rouse: "they are doing conjuring tricks with us like Proteus, the Egyptian Sophist"]: and let us, like Menelaus, refuse to let them go until they show themselves to us in earnest.

And I think that I had better once more exhibit the form in which I pray to behold them; it might be a guide to them. I will go on therefore where I left off ... in the hope ... that when they see me deeply serious and interested, they also may be serious.

You, Cleinias ... shall remind me at what point we left off. Did we not agree that philosophy should be studied [Rouse: "that one must love wisdom"]? and was not that our conclusion?

CLEINIAS: Yes ...

SOCRATES: And philosophy is the acquisition of knowledge? [Rouse: "And to love wisdom is to get knowledge?"] (288b-d)

Question: but should it not be: "seek to acquire knowledge" ["seek to get knowledge"]? Otherwise would not the inference from Plato here be that virtue can be learned, and therefore that, if it can be taught, then one should seek out teachers of it (cf. 282b)?

CLEINIAS: Yes ...

SOCRATES: And what knowledge ought we to acquire? May we not answer with absolute truth -- A knowledge which will do us good? [Rouse: "What knowledge then should we do right to get? Is not the answer simply the knowledge that shall benefit us?"]

CLEINIAS: Certainly ...

SOCRATES: And if there were a knowledge which was able to make men immortal, without giving them the knowledge of the way to use the immortality, neither would there be any use in that, if we may argue from the analogy of the previous instances? (288d-289b)

The "previous instances" (288e-289a) were the art of finding gold hidden in the earth, money-making, and medicine, where, as with the lyre-making and lyre-playing (289b-c), the art of how to make a thing is separate from the art of how to make use of it when made -- (cf. 280a-281b, where the contrast is between possessing and knowing how to make wise use of what one possesses) -- and Plato is looking for the art which is at once both, namely the art "that uses as well as makes" (289b). Socrates says to Crito that this art "ought to be useful" to us and "ought to do us some good" (292a), two theses to which Crito agrees.

Socrates and Cleinias now seek to find the kind of knowledge, or actually, the occupation of the one who has the kind of knowledge they are looking for. Does Plato's thesis that "the knowledge which we want is one that uses as well as makes" (289b) imply, conversely, that if we have knowledge of how to use without also having knowledge of how to make, then that knowledge is not beneficial to us? If what we seek is wisdom about how man should live his life, then it would seem quite strange if it does. In any case, it does not seem to benefit us to have knowledge of some art if we do not know how to put that art to wise use -- an example of that being knowledge of the art that would make men immortal.

There is a common saying: "A fool given eternity would not know what to do with it", which seems very Platonic, because without wisdom it would not be a benefit to have immortality, because one would not know how to use it rightly -- i.e. how one should live one's life.

Crito now asks Socrates, "did you find the art that you were seeking?" (291a)

Socrates replies that in their discussion Cleinias and Socrates decided that the kind of art (or knowledge) they are looking for is not the art of the "skillful lyre-makers, or artists of that sort ... for with them the art which makes is one, and the art which uses is another. Although they have to do with the same, they are divided: for the art which makes and the art which plays on the lyre differ widely from one another" (289b-c) -- i.e. someone may be skillful in the construction of the instrument without also being skillful in the playing of it. Likewise they decided that the art they are seeking is not the art of the "composer of speeches", because someone may be skillful in composing speeches without also being an orator, or, someone skillful in declaiming speeches (289c-d). Nor it is the art of "the huntsman or fisherman" because those arts of are distinct from the art of cookery (290b). And neither is it the art of "the geometricians and astronomers and calculators (... for they do not make their diagrams, but only find out that which was previously contained in them)", because those professions, "not being able to use but only catch their prey, hand over their inventions to the dialectician to be applied by him, if they have any sense in them" (290b-c).

I don't understand what Plato is saying here about the mathematicians. But I think we can in this context contrast the geometer with the philosopher of geometry, just as the mathematician and the philosopher of mathematics may be contrasted, because, although related, they are different arts and being skillful in one is distinct from being skillful in the other. Rouse's translation is: "Geometers and astronomers and calculators ... are not mere makers of diagrams, but they try to find out the real meanings -- so because they do not know how to use them, but only how to hunt, they hand over their discoveries ... to the dialecticians to use up" (290b-c). Which translation I also don't understand, but it seems (and therefore may also not seem) to have the opposite meaning to Jowett's translation.

To contrast geometry with the philosophy of geometry, the first creates and the other tries to understand the nature of what is created, as for example the geometer makes theorems using such words as 'point', 'line' and 'plane' but does not know e.g. the grammar of the word 'point' in geometry although he is able to use that word correctly; it is the philosopher of geometry who seeks to know such things.

Socrates in his account to Crito credits the words about the composers of speeches, the huntsman, fisherman, and mathematicians to Cleinias, but Crito does not believe that "the youngster said all this" (290e).

SOCRATES: All I know is that I heard these words, and that they were not spoken either by Euthydemus or Dionysodorus ... that I heard them I am certain.

CRITO: But did you carry the search any further, and did you find the art which you were seeking?

SOCRATES: Find! ... no indeed. And we cut a poor figure; we were like children after larks, always on the point of catching the art, which was always getting away from us ... then we got into a labyrinth, and when we thought we were at the end, came out again at the beginning, having still to seek as much as ever. (291a-c)

Knowledge of "the art of happiness"

And Socrates recalls to Crito that Socrates and Cleinias had earlier concluded "that knowledge [or, wisdom] of some kind is the only good" (281e), and specifically that the knowledge they are seeking is "the knowledge of the art or science of happiness" (292b-c), "the science which is likely to do us good, and make us happy" (292e). And so they have been examining various arts to see if they can find the art they are seeking, although it seems they have not found it (291b).

CRITO: Indeed, Socrates, you do appear to have got into a great perplexity.

SOCRATES: Thereupon, Crito, seeing that I was on the point of shipwreck, I lifted up my voice [like someone crying out to be rescued], and ... called upon the strangers [i.e. Euthydemus and Dionysodorus] to save me and the youth [Cleinias] from the whirlpool of the argument [and that] they should be serious, and show us in sober earnest what that knowledge was which would enable us to pass the rest of our lives in happiness.

CRITO: And did Euthydemus show you this knowledge? (292e-293a)

And so Socrates gives Crito an account of the discussions that followed.

"If someone knows any thing, then he knows all things"

EUTHYDEMUS: Would you rather, Socrates ... that I should show you this knowledge about which you have been doubting, or shall I prove that you already have it?

SOCRATES: What ... are you blessed with such a power as this?... Then I would much rather that you should prove [that I (already)] have such a knowledge; at my time of life that will be more agreeable than having to learn.

EUTHYDEMUS: Then tell me ... do you know anything?

SOCRATES: Yes ... I know many things, but not anything of much importance. [Rouse: "Oh yes ... plenty of things, but only small ones"; cf. Apology 21d: nothing "worth knowing"] (293b)

EUTHYDEMUS: That [admission] will do [i.e. will be sufficient agreement for the purpose of my thesis] ... And would you admit that anything is what it is, and at the same time is not what it is?

SOCRATES: Certainly not.

EUTHYDEMUS: And did you not say that you knew something?

SOCRATES: I did.

EUTHYDEMUS: If you know, you are knowing?

SOCRATES: Certainly, of the knowledge which I have.

EUTHYDEMUS: That makes no difference [i.e. that is sufficient agreement for my thesis]; -- and must you not, if you are knowing, know all things?

SOCRATES: Certainly not ... for there are many other things which I do not know.

EUTHYDEMUS: And if you do not know, you are not knowing?

SOCRATES: Yes ... of that which I do not know.

EUTHYDEMUS: Still you are not knowing, and you just said now that you were knowing; and therefore you are and are not at the same time, and in reference to the same things. (293b-d)

And so it seems that the contrary (or, contradiction) of Euthydemus' thesis that "If a man knows anything, then he knows all things" has been refuted. Or, in other words, Euthydemus' thesis has been proved, and Socrates' implicit counter-thesis, namely that "Socrates knows some things but not all things", has been refuted. And so, too, it appears that common belief is overthrown ... if, that is, Socrates' counter-thesis is a question of belief rather than of grammar and sense and nonsense: if the word 'not-know' has no use in the language -- and therefore has no reason to exist in the language -- then what use (or, meaning) has the word 'know'? Because 'know' (have sufficient grounds) and 'not-know' (not have sufficient grounds) are antitheses, dependent on the contrast between them for their meaning: If it is impossible to have insufficient grounds, because it is impossible to not-know, then it is also impossible to have sufficient grounds -- and therefore to know.

Note the consequence of Euthydemus' thesis: that it is impossible to describe what not-knowing, or, not having sufficient grounds, would look like -- and that means that both 'not-know' and 'not have sufficient grounds' are undefined -- i.e. are "sounds without meaning". Further, if there is no not-knowing, then the words 'true' and 'false' lose their meaning, because if a proposition is false, then one does not know it, and since one cannot not-know, all propositions are true and contradiction is impossible. Thus if Euthydemus says 'It is three o'clock' and Socrates says 'It is four o'clock', both statements are known and true, and then -- and then there is no end to absurdities of this kind. Our language is a complicated system of interconnected concepts: pull one thread and the garment starts to unravel.

This refutation appears not to be of the same kind as that played with the word 'sense' (287d-e) which simply uses the eristic technique of equivocation. And it is not, apparently, refutable if the principle that "Anything is what it is, and at the same time is not what it is" is held to state an impossibility. (Of course, if that proposition does state an impossibility, then it is a logical impossibility -- i.e. 'A is both A and not-A' is an undefined combination of words; but the distinction between a real and a logical possibility is not here made by Plato; cf. RPP i § 949 and Z § 458.)

Recognizing the Protean character of the Sophist brothers, the first alternative, namely to let them show Socrates the knowledge itself ("Would you rather that I should show you this knowledge about which you have been doubting"), might seem to have been the wiser choice ... were it not that Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, like the devil, never offer anything with one hand without taking it back with the other (although, also like the devil, they do occasionally outwit themselves, as in 287d-288a).

Socrates now seeks to define Euthydemus' thesis and what follows from it.

SOCRATES: Do you mean to say that the same thing cannot be and also not be; and therefore, since I know one thing, that I know all, for I cannot be knowing and not knowing at the same time, and if I know all things, then I must have the knowledge for which we are seeking -- May I assume this to be you ingenious notion [Rouse: "your word of wisdom"]?

EUTHYDEMUS: Out of your own mouth, Socrates, you are convicted [Rouse: "you are refuting yourself"] ...

SOCRATES: Well, but, Euthydemus ... has that [i.e. refuting yourself] never happened to you? [The allusion is to the brothers' theses about ignorance in 287e-288a, where Socrates shows that the brothers are refuted by the very same theses they put forward.]

Tell me, then, you two, do you not know some things, and not know others?

DIONYSODORUS: Certainly not, Socrates ...

SOCRATES: What do you mean ... do you know nothing?

DIONYSODORUS: Nay ... we do know something.

SOCRATES: Then ... you know all things, if you know anything?

DIONYSODORUS: Yes, all things ... and that is as true of you as of us.

SOCRATES: And do all other men know all things or nothing?

DIONYSODORUS: Certainly ... they cannot know some things, and not know others, and be at the same time knowing and not knowing.

SOCRATES: Then what is the inference?

DIONYSODORUS: They know all things ... if they know one thing.

SOCRATES: I see now that you are in earnest; hardly [i.e. with difficulty] have I got you to that point. And do you really and truly know all things, including carpentry and leather-cutting? [and] stitching?

DIONYSODORUS: Yes, by the gods, we do, and cobbling, too.

SOCRATES: And do you know such things as the number of the stars and of the sand?

DIONYSODORUS: Certainly; did you think we would say no to that? (293d-294b)

At this point again Ctesippus breaks into the discussion, saying, "I only wish that you would give me some proof which would enable me to know whether you speak truly." (294b-c) (For note that, whatever the criterion for our admitting that a man knows something, it certainly isn't simply his saying that he does (cf. OC § 137), because by 'to know' we mean 'to have sufficient grounds' (cf. ibid. § 243) and we wish to see that a man has those grounds -- as when Socrates demands an account of what you know -- before we concede that he knows the thing he says he knows.)

DIONYSODORUS: What proof shall I give you?

CTESIPPUS: Will you tell me how many teeth Euthydemus has? and Euthydemus shall tell how many teeth you have.

DIONYSODORUS: Will you not take our word that we know all things?

CTESIPPUS: Certainly not ... you must further tell us this one thing, and then we shall know that you are speaking the truth; if you tell us the number, and we count them, and you are found to be right, we will believe the rest. (294c)

Well, I think, we may or may not grant the rest, but we may perhaps find the proposition that they know all things slightly less implausible? I doubt it. Note, however, that a proposition's simply striking us as implausible does not refute that proposition. And also that if a thesis is a point of logic, then its refutation must also be a point of logic (which actually Ctesippus' demands are -- namely a reminder of how we normally use the word 'know', a reminder which describes what gives meaning to that word and without which that word is nonsense -- although Plato appears unaware of that kind of point of logic). The refutation the disputants seek is one that would show that the proposition 'It is and it is-not' can be true.

But Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, according to Socrates' account, fancy "that Ctesippus [is] making game of them, and they [refuse to demonstrate that they know any particular thing] and [will] only say in answer to each of his questions, that they [know] all things" (294d).

SOCRATES: At last, Crito, I too was carried away by my incredulity, and asked Euthydemus whether Dionysodorus could dance.

EUTHYDEMUS: Certainly ...

SOCRATES: And can he vault among swords, and turn upon a wheel, at his age? has he got to such a height of skill as that?

EUTHYDEMUS: He can do anything ... [Implicit proposition: 'If someone knows how -- i.e. is able -- to do one thing, he knows how to do all things.']

SOCRATES: And did you always know this?

EUTHYDEMUS: Always ...

SOCRATES: When you were children, and at your birth?

DIONYSODORUS and EUTHYDEMUS: [Yes.]

EUTHYDEMUS: You are incredulous, Socrates?

SOCRATES: Yes ... and I might well be incredulous, if I did not know you to be wise men. [Rouse: "Do you not believe it, Socrates?" -- "I can only say [Socrates replies] that you must be a wise pair."]

EUTHYDEMUS: But if you will answer ... I will make you confess to similar marvels.

SOCRATES: Well ... there is nothing that I would like better than to be self-convicted of this [Rouse: "I shall be very glad to be shown up like that"], for if I am really a wise man, which I never knew before, and you will prove to me that I know and have always known all things, nothing in life would be a greater gain to me.

EUTHYDEMUS: Answer then ...

SOCRATES: Ask ... and I will answer. (294d-295b)

More of the Methods of Eristic

In the discussion that follows, Euthydemus forces the question-and-answer of dialectic to take the form of a variation of the eristic method of "Answer yes or no!" -- i.e. without qualifying your answer in any way --, not allowing distinctions to be made in answering, and refusing to give explanations of the meanings of his questions.

EUTHYDEMUS: Do you know something, Socrates, or nothing?

SOCRATES: Something ...

EUTHYDEMUS: And do you know with what you know, or with something else?

SOCRATES: With what I know; and I suppose that you mean with my soul?

EUTHYDEMUS: Are you not ashamed ... of asking a question when you are asked one? [Euthydemus has himself done this in 287c-d -- but to avoid rather than clarify the question that he was asked.]

SOCRATES: Well ... but then what am I to do? for I will do whatever you bid; when I do not know what you are asking, you tell me to answer nevertheless, and not ask again [Rouse: "When I am not clear what you are asking, do you tell me to answer all the same, and not to ask anything myself"]?

EUTHYDEMUS: Why, you surely have some notion of my meaning ...

SOCRATES: Yes ...

EUTHYDEMUS: Well, then, answer according to your notion of my meaning.

SOCRATES: Yes ... but if the question which you ask in one sense is understood and answered by me in another, will that please you -- if I answer what is not to the point?

EUTHYDEMUS: That will please me very well; but will not please you equally well, as I imagine [Rouse: "Enough for me ... but however, not enough for you, as I take it"].

SOCRATES: I certainly will not answer unless I understand you ... [Rouse: "I won't answer ... before I find out."]

EUTHYDEMUS: You will not answer ... according to your view of the meaning [i.e. the sense you assign to my words], because you will be prating, and are an ancient [i.e. a garrulous old man, going on about things of no importance; Rouse: "because you are more of an old fool than you need be"]. (295b-c)

It is as if Euthydemus' presumption were: "If the meaning of a word is the thing the word stands for, then a word has only one meaning", despite, -- and here is shown the shamelessness (i.e. indifference to truth) of the eristic game --, his recognizing that words may have more than one sense.

Eristic as the enemy of distinctions. And vice versa.

Socrates says to Crito that Euthydemus "was getting angry with me for drawing distinctions, when he wanted to catch me in his springes [snare or trap] of words [Rouse: "his net of words"]. And I remembered that Connus [272c] was always angry with me when I opposed him, and then he neglected me, because he thought that I was stupid", and "I reflected that I better let [Euthydemus] have his way, as he might think me a blockhead". (295d-e)

SOCRATES: You are a far better dialectician [although not a companionable dialectician (See note to 287c-d)] than myself, Euthydemus, for I have never made a profession [Note.--Socrates has never charged a fee to teach, although his method of teaching is dialectic] of the art [Rouse: "have only the skill of an outsider"], and therefore do as you say; ask your questions once more, and I will answer.

EUTHYDEMUS: Answer then ... again, whether you know what you know with something, or with nothing.

SOCRATES: [With something] ... I know with my soul.

EUTHYDEMUS: The man will answer more than the question; for I did not ask you ... with what you know, but whether you know with something.

SOCRATES: Through ignorance [i.e. of the art of dialectic; Rouse: "from want of education"] I have answered too much, but I hope that you will forgive me. And now I will answer simply that I always know what I know with something.

EUTHYDEMUS: And is that something ... always the same, or sometimes one thing, and sometimes another thing?

SOCRATES: Always ... when I know, I know with this [same thing].

EUTHYDEMUS: Will you not cease adding to your answers?

SOCRATES: My fear is that this word 'always' may get us into trouble.

EUTHYDEMUS: You, perhaps, but certainly not us. And now answer: Do you always know with this [one thing]?

SOCRATES: Always; since I am required to withdraw the words 'when I know'.

EUTHYDEMUS: You always know with this, or, always knowing, do you know some things with this, and some things with something else, or do you know all things with this?

SOCRATES: All I know ... I know with this.

EUTHYDEMUS: There again, Socrates ... the addition is superfluous.

SOCRATES: Well, then ... I will take away the words 'that I know'.

EUTHYDEMUS: Nay, take nothing away; I desire no favors of you; but let me ask: Would you be able to know all things, if you did not know all things?

SOCRATES: [It would be] Quite impossible.

EUTHYDEMUS: And now ... you may add on whatever you like, for you confessed [See: "if you did not know all things?"] that you know all things. (295d-296a)

This might also be the skeleton of Euthydemus' argument: that Socrates knows with something, that he always knows with the same thing, and that he knows all things with this thing -- i.e. if he knows all things with this, then he knows all things. Those are the three parts of the "confession". Socrates tries to qualify his answer by saying that "I know all the things that I know (which contrasts with all the things that I do not know) with the same thing (namely, my soul)", but that distinction is dismissed by Euthydemus as superfluous to Euthydemus' line of reasoning.

SOCRATES: I suppose that [i.e. that I know all things] is true ... if my qualification implied in the words 'that I know' is not allowed to stand; and so I do know all things.

EUTHYDEMUS: And have you not admitted that you always know all things with that which you know, whether you make the distinction of "when you know them" or not? (296c)

It seems, on Euthydemus account, that if Socrates includes the expression 'know all things' in any positive proposition he states, then, regardless of context, that is the same as Socrates' saying that he knows all things.

Socrates now asks a question of Euthydemus: "where did I learn that the good are unjust?"

DIONYSODORUS: Nowhere ...

SOCRATES: Then ... I do not know this [i.e. that the good are unjust].

EUTHYDEMUS [to Dionysodorus]: You are ruining the argument ... he will be proved not to know, and then after all he will be knowing and not knowing at the same time. (296e-297a)

(I don't know why Plato has included the conditional "at the same time". Nothing was made of that before. Why isn't it simply "He will be knowing and not-knowing"? Or maybe 'He will be knowing and not knowing at the same time' = 'He will be both knowing and not-knowing', for as we also say 'He will be at once both knowing and not-knowing' -- as in, stated barely, 'Socrates is and is-not'. Something like this?)

Now Dionysodorus blushes at his brother's words. And Socrates asks Euthydemus, "Does not your omniscient [all-knowing] brother appear to have made a mistake?" However, Dionysodorus quickly recovers from his confusion -- and changes the line of questioning, by asking, "am I the brother of Euthydemus?" Relying on the general principle that 'Nothing is both A and not-A', Dionysodorus uses such propositions as 'A man cannot both be and not be a brother' and 'A man cannot both be and not be a nephew' to demonstrate any number of absurdities, and depending on what we mean by the word 'logic' (e.g. deriving/deducing one proposition from other propositions), they are all logically valid demonstrations. (297a ff.)

Socrates' father Sophroniscus is not the father of Socrates half-brother Patrocles (whose father was Chaeredemus), and, because no man can both be and not be a father, Sophroniscus is not a father, and therefore Socrates has no father

We do learn in the midst of this foolishness that Socrates has a brother named Patrocles [Jowett's translation adds: "[the statuary]", i.e. the sculptor], or rather, they have the same mother although different fathers. Socrates' father was named "Sophroniscus", and Patrocles father was named "Chaeredemus" ... or so Socrates says, but apparently that is impossible. (297e)

DIONYSODORUS: But can a father be other than a father? or are you the same as a stone?

SOCRATES: I certainly do not think that I am a stone ... though I am afraid that you may prove me to be one.

DIONYSODORUS: Are you not other than a stone?

SOCRATES: I am.

DIONYSODORUS: And being other than a stone, you are not a stone ... And so Chaeredemus ... being other than a father [because Socrates has said the Chaeredemus is not Socrates' father], is not a father?

SOCRATES: I suppose that he is not a father ...

EUTHYDEMUS: ... then Sophroniscus, being other than a father [because Socrates has said that Sophroniscus is not the father of Patrocles] is not a father; and you, Socrates, are without a father. (298a-b)

... whereas Ctesippus' dog is his father, whom he beats

CTESIPPUS: ["taking up the argument" and directing a question to Euthydemus]: And is not your father in the same case, for he is other than my father?

EUTHYDEMUS: Assuredly not ...

CTESIPPUS: Then he is the same [i.e. your father is also my father]?

EUTHYDEMUS: He is the same.

CTESIPPUS: ... is he the father of all other men?

EUTHYDEMUS: Of all other men ... Do you suppose the same person to be a father and not a father? (298b-c)

And, indeed, by applying that principle thoroughgoingly, Euthydemus' father is the father of everything that has a father, including of all the various animals. And, Dionysodorus says, if Ctesippus' dog is the father of puppies, then the dog is Ctesippus' father and the puppies are, therefore, Ctesippus' brothers. And when Dionysodorus asks Ctesippus if he beats this dog, and the youth answers that he does, for the dog is "a villain of a one", Dionysodorus points out that Ctesippus beats his father. (298b-299a)

Ctesippus himself now becomes the questioner and, using a play on Greek words which the footnote to Jowett's translation says "cannot be perfectly rendered in English", Ctesippus catches Dionysodorus in his own snare with the question of "whether all things are silent or speak?" and Dionysodorus replies "Neither and both ..." At which Ctesippus laughs and says to Euthydemus, "That brother of yours ... has got into a dilemma; all is over with him." (300c-d)

If we let "silent = A" and "speak = not-A", then, according to Dionysodorus, all things are both A and not-A and neither A nor not-A, which is, as a rule (i.e. in the absence of counter-examples), logically impossible (I imagine).

Socrates tells Crito that "I cannot help thinking that the rouge [i.e. Ctesippus] must have picked up this answer from [Euthydemus and Dionysodorus]: for there has been no wisdom like theirs in our time. (300d)

Socrates and Ctesippus concede defeat: they cannot escape from the net of the two Sophists' arguments

SOCRATES [to Ctesippus and Cleinias]: Why do you laugh ... at such solemn and beautiful things?

DIONYSODORUS: Why, Socrates ... did you ever see a beautiful thing?

SOCRATES: Yes ... I have seen many.

DIONYSODORUS: Were they other than beautiful, or the same as beautiful? (300e-301a)

Socrates says to Crito, "Now I was in a great quandary at having to answer this question, and I thought that I was rightly served for having opened my mouth at all." The quandary (or, dilemma) is that Socrates cannot say that beautiful things are other than beautiful, but if he admits that beautiful things, being not "other than beautiful", are "the same as beautiful", then any beautiful thing is beauty itself (or, "beautifulness", or "absolute beauty") -- which Socrates does not wish to agree to. (301a)

SOCRATES: They are not the same as absolute beauty, but they have beauty present with each of them. [Rouse: "they [are] different from the beautiful itself, but each of them [has] some beauty with it."]

DIONYSODORUS: And are you an ox because an ox is present with you, or are you Dionysodorus, because Dionysodorus is present with you? [Rouse: "Then ... if you have an ox with you, you are an ox, and because I am with you now, you are Dionysodorus?"] But how ... by reason of one thing being present with another, will one thing be another? (301a)

Socrates tries avoids this snare/net by answering Dionysodorus' question by himself using the eristic response of answering a question with a question; he asks Dionysodorus, "Is that your difficulty?" (Socrates tells Crito, "I was beginning to imitate their skill ...") (301b)

DIONYSODORUS: Of course ... I and all the world are in a difficulty about the non-existent [Rouse: "about that which is not"]. (301b)

And so the question-and-answer goes on with Socrates being forced by Dionysodorus' arguments to agree to any number of absurd propositions, until in the end both Socrates ("I have no way of escape [i.e. I have been caught in your net]" (302e)) and Ctesippus admit that they are bested by the two Sophists' wisdom (i.e. the two brothers' skill in their particular kind of dialectic, namely eristic). (301a-303a) And then, Socrates tells Crito, "there was a universal applause of the speakers [Euthydemus and Dionysodorus] and their words ..." Socrates says that he himself was moved to make a speech "in which I acknowledged that I had never seen the like of their wisdom". (303b-c)

SOCRATES: What marvelous dexterity of wit ... enabled you to acquire this great perfection in such a short time? There is much, indeed, to admire in your words, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, but there is nothing that I admire more than your magnanimous disregard of any opinion ... you regard [i.e. take notice of; Rouse: "concern yourselves with"] only those who are like yourselves. And I do verily believe that there are few who are like you, and who would approve of such arguments; the majority of mankind are so ignorant of their value, that they would be more ashamed of employing them in the refutation of others than of being refuted by them. I must further express my approval of your kind and public-spirited denial of all differences, whether of good and evil, white or black, or any other ... But what appears to me to be more than all this is, that this art and invention of yours has been so admirably contrived by you, that in a very short time it can be imparted to anyone. I observe that Ctesippus learned to imitate you in no time. (303c-e)

Philosophy herself in contrast to the professors of philosophy

Crito now gives his response to Socrates' account of Socrates' and the youths' discussion with the two Sophists.

CRITO: I fear that I am not like-minded with Euthydemus, but one with the other sort, who, as you were saying, would rather be refuted by such arguments than use them in refutation of others. (304c-d)

Crito says he met a "professor of legal oratory" outside the crowd that were gathered about the two Sophists in the Lyceum (271a), and he tells Socrates what this professor said to Crito. (304d)

What did I think of them? ... theirs was the sort of discourse which anybody might hear from men who were playing the fool, and making much ado about nothing ... philosophy is nought; and I think that if you had been present you would have been ashamed of your friend -- his conduct was so very strange in placing himself at the mercy of men who care not what they say, and fasten upon every word. And these ... are supposed to be the most eminent professors of their time. But the truth is, Crito, that the study itself and the men themselves are utterly mean and ridiculous. (304e-305a)

But Socrates says of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus that, "O Crito, they are marvelous [Rouse: "amazing"] men" (305b), and he does seem to have been impressed by the two Sophists' skill in their type of dialectic, despite his regarding their type of dialectic as not being of serious worth (278b-c). But Crito tells Socrates that he, Crito, is concerned about his, i.e. Crito's, own son who is about the same age as Cleinias (271b); he is anxious about his son's education, because Crito says about "those who pretend to educate others" -- that "they all seem to be such outrageous beings: so I do not know how I can advise the youth to study philosophy." (306d-307a)

"But think only of philosophy herself"

SOCRATES: Dear Crito, do you not know that in every profession the inferior sort are numerous and good for nothing, and the good are few and beyond all price ... do you not see that in each of [the] arts the many are ridiculous performers?

CRITO: Yes, indeed, that is very true.

SOCRATES: And will you on this account shun all these pursuits yourself and refuse to allow them to your son?

CRITO: That would not be reasonable, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Do you then be reasonable, Crito, and do not mind whether the teachers of philosophy are good or bad, but think only of philosophy herself. Try and examine her well and truly, and if she be evil seek to turn away all men from her ... but if she be what I believe that she is, then follow her and serve her ... (307a-c)

Eristic might well turn someone who is unaware of any other method or purpose, of any other philosophy or "wisdom", into a misologist (a "hater of argument"), i.e. one who believes that "there is no truth/validity in argument" (Phaedo 90e).

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