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J.M. Keynes' Anthology of Frank Ramsey's Notes

Maynard Keynes made a short anthology (or selection) of Frank Ramsey's -- "none of them polished for the [printing] press" -- notes for his essay "F.P. Ramsey, 1903-1930". These had been published after Ramsey's death in Ramsey's The Foundations of Mathematics (1931), ed. Braithwaite. Keynes characterizes Ramsey's notes as "some aphorisms and fragmentary essays" (p. 118-119).

I have made selections from Keynes' selections [which already have "small omissions here and there which" Keynes has "not in every case indicated" (p. 338n3)], and in doing this I may have somewhat [possibly further] distorted Ramsey's views, because I have excluded almost anything he says about psychology, introspective psychology having no place in logic (where its role is only as a misapprehension of the logic = grammar (in Wittgenstein's jargon) of our language, as well as psychology's not much interesting me).

Source: Keynes' essay "F.P. Ramsey, 1903-1930" from Essays in Biography (1951) reprinted in Essays and Sketches in Biography (1956), which came briefly from Interlibrary loan.

Outline of this page ...

1. Philosophy

Philosophy must be of some use and we must take it seriously; it must make clear our thoughts and so our actions. Or else it is a disposition we have to [hold in] check, and an inquiry to see that this is so; i.e. the chief proposition of philosophy is that philosophy is nonsense. And again we must then take seriously that it is nonsense, and not pretend, as Wittgenstein does, that it is important nonsense!

Essentially a philosophy is a system of definitions ... Moore would say ... that philosophy does not change what anyone meant by "This is a table". It seems to me that it might ... sometimes philosophy should clarify and distinguish notions previously vague and confused, and clearly this is meant to fix [as in concrete] our future meaning only.

Logic issues in tautologies, mathematics in identities, philosophy in definitions ... (From The Foundations of Mathematics, p. 263, 264))

Wittgenstein says in TLP 4.112 that a work of philosophy "consists essentially of elucidations" rather than of "philosophical doctrines". But, on the other hand, he says that, although its propositions are nonsense, the TLP is "important nonsense", because its philosophical propositions convey the meaning that philosophical propositions are nonsense [6.54]. What is "shown" (e.g. God, value) is also nonsense (it cannot be "said", i.e. put into words that are not nonsense) [6.522], but it too is "important nonsense", indeed more important than what isn't nonsense. (Wittgenstein's eccentric definition of the word 'nonsense' in the TLP.)

"Philosophy issues in definitions", that is, in the clarification of concepts. Then it does not aim to redefine = revise concepts: if a word is ill-defined, a concept vague, philosophy leaves it ill-defined. That is one way to clarify philosophical problems, to show that the tools in use are too blunt for the work an inquiry demands of them. I don't think that was quite what G.E. Moore was talking about, but if you are only going to use words the way they are normally used, then you may have to do a lot of explaining (and this, for me, makes Moore's essays almost unreadable) in order to make what you wish to say clear. Jargon tries to introduce new tools -- by redefining forms of expression already in common use, e.g. Wittgenstein's 'grammar' (or sometimes by adding new forms, as e.g. Wittgenstein's 'language game' or indeed 'logic of language') -- but that was not Moore's method. Ramsey seemed to agree with Wittgenstein: philosophy sometimes assigns meanings to words.

"Mathematics issues in identities." Identity -- that is, A = A -- is a tautology. However, not all tautologies are identities. Does what Ramsey says make something clearer; is it true? If we look at the equals-sign of an equation, e.g. '4 + 3 = 7', the '4 + 3' does not have the same meaning as '7'; it is not defined the same way [by the same technique] as '7', although there is an essential relationship (A child can be taught to count to seven without being taught addition). The equals-sign of the equation is not an identity (but either a rule or a calculation): '4 + 3 = 7' ≠ '4 + 3 DEF.= 7'. Do I understand what Ramsey is talking about? No, I don't think so.

2. Philosophical Thinking

It seems to me that in the process of clarifying our thought we come to terms and sentences which we cannot elucidate in the obvious manner by defining their meaning. For instance, theoretical terms we cannot define, but we can explain the way in which they are used, and in this explanation we are forced to look not only at the objects which we are talking about, but at our own mental states.

First, to describe the way a term is used is to define its meaning, in the only sense of the word 'meaning' that concerned Wittgenstein -- namely, "grammar" (public rules, conventions). Second, therefore looking at "our own mental states" does not define words: it does not describe the use of words.

Introspection can never lead to a definition. It can only lead to a psychological statement about the introspector. (Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology i § 212)

The meaning of a word is not my mental state, nor Ramsey's either. If it were, then words might have any or no meaning, varying from one person's peculiar psychology to another's. Or in other words, that meaning of 'meaning' is of no use to philosophy-logic. (Were the meaning of a word tied to its author's mental state, then Ramsey's words would be meaningless now that he has died.)

We are driven to philosophize because we do not know clearly what we mean; the question is always "What do I mean by x?" And only very occasionally can we settle this without reflecting on meaning. But it is not only an obstacle, this necessity of dealing with meaning; it is doubtless an essential clue to the truth. (p. 267-269)

It was the view of both G.E. Moore and Wittgenstein that "philosophy begins in wonder" -- i.e. in perplexity, as Plato said -- but that philosophical perplexity is not caused by the nature of existence but by the language we use. And so philosophy has to talk about the meaning of language.

The chief danger to our philosophy, apart from laziness and woolliness, is scholasticism, the essence of which is treating what is vague as if it were precise and trying to fit it into an exact logical category. A typical piece of scholasticism is Wittgenstein's view that all our everyday propositions are completely in order and that it is impossible to think illogically. (ibid.)

Russell's "philosophical grammar" seems to say that not all our everyday propositions are "completely in order", but that the logical form of some is different from their syntax. Whether one can think illogically is determined by how 'logic' is defined. If, as in Wittgenstein's later work (or so I have claimed that it does), logic = grammar (in Wittgenstein's jargon), then it is impossible to think illogically -- because no one can think nonsense (i.e. undefined combinations of words, "mere sound without sense"), although anyone can utter it. On the other hand, it is possible to think illogically if we mean make invalid inferences; that type of thinking (informal fallacy) is not impossible.

(This is like saying it is impossible to break the rules of bridge, because if you break them you are not playing bridge but, as Mrs. C. says, not-bridge.) (ibid.)

What Ramsey has said parenthetically is what Wittgenstein wrote: Either you are playing the game wrong -- i.e. not following the rules of the game -- or you are playing a different game (OC § 446) -- or not playing a game at all (BB p. 25).

3. Is There Anything to Discuss? (28 February 1925)

Then there is philosophy; this, too [along with science, history, and politics], has become too technical for the layman. Besides this disadvantage, the conclusion of the greatest modern philosopher is that there is no such subject as philosophy; that it is an activity, not a doctrine; and that, instead of answering questions, it aims merely at curing headaches. It might be thought that, apart from this technical philosophy whose center is logic, there was a sort of popular philosophy which dealt with such subjects as the relation of man to nature, and the meaning of morality. But any attempt to treat such topics seriously reduces them to questions either of science or of technical philosophy, or results more immediately in perceiving them to be nonsensical....

So Wittgenstein believed at the time of the TLP, and it must have sounded as dogmatic then as now: "any attempt to treat such topics seriously ..." To dismiss Plato's discussions of "no small matter, but how to live" in the Republic and Gorgias and Socratic ignorance and Socratic ethics as mere nonsensical "popular philosophy" -- No, rather: we should use [the later] Wittgenstein as an antidote to philosophy and then philosophy as an antidote to Wittgenstein. There is "no such subject as philosophy " -- What I always wonder is this: was that Wittgenstein's view to the very end, or was it just a case of "That is just the sort of stupid remark I would have made in those days" (Recollections p. 98)? I don't know, but it seems he did. (The recovery of philosophy.)

Strangely, as we know, Wittgenstein could discuss "popular philosophy" if he wanted to, as he did in his Lecture on Ethics, Lectures on Religious Belief, and indeed when he spoke with Drury ("I won't refuse to talk to you about God or about religion" (Recollections p. 89-90)). What I do not know -- and have not a clue to understanding -- is why he chose not to talk about those topics in the book he was trying to write for publication, namely, his Philosophical Investigations. And why rather than writing about what is most important in our life, he chose instead to write so much about the "philosophy of psychology". I think as Russell said: "a very singular man". A friend of logic of language and an enemy of philosophy.

Wittgenstein was forced to admit that the riddle [TLP 6.5] does exist [Even in the Notebooks 1914-1916 for his book, 11 June 1916, he said as much], and that we must recognize this, for "don't we have the feeling that someone who sees no problem in life is blind to something important, even to the most important thing of all?" (CV p. 27, remark from 1937). This may have belonged to the "all that I have not written" (Letter to Ludwig Ficker) -- maybe because, in the TLP's logic of language, it could not be "put into words". But Sraffa asked him, ironically: When is nonsense not nonsense? Is "a sort of inspired nonsense", then, not mere sound without sense? But if it is not, then it has a meaning (although its meaning may not be obvious).

I conclude that there really is nothing to discuss; and this conclusion corresponds to a feeling I have about ordinary conversation also.

If I were to write a Weltanschauung I [would] call it not "What I believe" [as Russell called his] but "What I feel". This is connected with Wittgenstein's view that philosophy does not give us beliefs, but merely relieves feelings of intellectual discomfort.... Not that one can really quarrel with a man's feelings; one can only have different feelings oneself ...

But what Ramsey or anyone else feels (which is irrational) is not philosophy (which is rational), and it cannot be a substitute for philosophy, the examined life. Feeling is not the excellence that is proper and unique to man, which is reason or rational moral virtue. If what Russell wrote is philosophy, it will have been about his rational beliefs -- i.e. his reasons for what he believed.

Science, history, and politics are not suited for discussion except by experts. Others are simply in a position of requiring more information, and ... cannot do anything but accept on authority the opinions of those better qualified. Then there is philosophy ...

But politics can be discussed and indeed must be discussed, as Protagoras argues in Plato's Protagoras [322d-323c], which may be summarized:

For although it is true that not all men possess knowledge of such things as architecture and painting, all men are capable of engaging in politics because every man is endowed with the "qualities of respect for others and a sense of justice [such qualities as fairness, piety, decency, and moderation]", qualities which must be shared among all men if they are to live in community with other men.

Politics, like economics and the other "social sciences", is not only the art of getting from point A to point B, but also of choosing what should be point B (in other words it is value-laden). We must discuss what the aim of our government, that is to say, of what we do together as a community, ought to be. That is democracy. What form of government was Ramsey advocating? Auguste Comte's government, like communism, means the end of all freedom:

When social and religious questions are given scientific treatment, liberty of conscience is as much out of the question as it is, e,g., in astronomy or physics. There are few people who consider themselves fitted to sit in judgment on an astronomical problem; can it be supposed that the most important and the most delicate conceptions, and those which by their complexity are accessible to only a small number of highly prepared understandings, are to be abandoned to the arbitrary and variable decisions of the least competent minds? ... The convergence of minds requires a renunciation by the greater number of their rights of individual inquiry, on subjects above their qualifications, and requiring more than any others a real and permanent agreement. (Rogers, A Student's History of Philosophy rev. ed. (1913), 40, 2, p. 484-485)

It is true that consensus is not a criterion of truth (Plato, Gorgias 473e; cf. Crito 44c-d). We do not determine the truth by taking a vote (that is not our concept 'truth'). But we don't determine the truth by accepting the word of authority unexamined either -- although to examine that word requires education (understanding). Which is why for politics we must study the philosophies of science (what is a scientific theory?) and historiography.

What is not discussed and cross-questioned, as in Socratic dialog, also cannot be known or understood to be clear and true. If man is to live a rationally examined life, which is the life in accord with the excellence that is proper to man, the life of reason, then all men must discuss politics and ethics (Plato's "no small matter, but how to live").

Reviewing Trotsky's book (March 1926: "Trotsky on England") Where is Britain Going?, Keynes writes that it is "clouded by his inevitable ignorance of what he is talking about" -- i.e. Trotsky's ignorance of the actual conditions in Britain. (p. 275) And this is of course the danger whenever we attempt to discuss science, history, and politics. The difficulty is to say no more than you know, not to think you know what you do not know, not to become dogmatic on the basis of "a little learning" (but to recognize that your slight acquaintance is no justification for making unskeptical assertions; it is very easy for us when we are ignorant of the facts to nonetheless become dogmatic about what they are: we become sure "It just must have been that way!", "It just must be that way!", where "must" is irrational because unjustified).

Remarks by Keynes (October 1931)

His [Ludwig Wittgenstein's] Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was mainly worked out before the war, but it was not published until 1922, by which time Frank Ramsey was on the scene, aged nineteen, to assist in the preparation of an English version and to expound its obscure contents to the world.... Wittgenstein is wondering if his next book will be finished before [his death]. (p. 116. Keynes' essay was published in 1951, the year Wittgenstein died)

Impression of the Principia Mathematica

The first impression conveyed by the work of Russell [and Whitehead, Principia Mathematica] was that the field of formal logic was enormously extended. The gradual perfection of the formal treatment at the hands of himself, of Wittgenstein and of Ramsey had been, however, gradually to empty it of content and to reduce it more and more to mere dry bones, until finally it seemed to exclude not only all experience, but most of the principles, usually reckoned logical, of reasonable thought. Wittgenstein's solution was to regard everything else as a sort of inspired nonsense, having great value indeed for the individual, but incapable of being exactly discussed. (p. 117)

Comment: it was a logical calculus. It was mathematical logic.

Ramsey's reaction was towards what he himself described as a sort of pragmatism ... "The essence of pragmatism," he says, "I take to be this, that the meaning of a sentence is to be defined by reference to the actions to which asserting it would lead ..." Thus he was led to consider "human logic" as distinguished from "formal logic". Formal logic is concerned with nothing but the rules of consistent thought. But in addition to this we have certain "useful mental habits" for handling the material with which we are supplied by our perceptions and by our memory and perhaps in other ways, and so arriving at or towards truth; and the analysis of such habits is also a sort of logic. The application of these ideas to the logic of probability is very fruitful. (p. 117-118)

It is not getting to the bottom of the principle of induction merely to say that it is a useful mental habit. (p. 118)

Aristotle credits Socrates with the method of induction in logic of language. What is another example of a "useful mental habit"? The "test for consistency" (non-self-contradiction) belongs to half the method of refutation (namely, reason, the other half being verifiable experience) in Socratic dialog. Another example: The test of experience: "This has always happened in the past." "This normally or usually happens".

... information about the past ... that something would happen in the future ... here grounds are not propositions which logically imply what is believed... the question here is not one of an approximation to logical inference. (PI § 481)

I can be as certain ... But this does not make the propositions 'He is much depressed', '25 x 25 = 625' and 'I am sixty years old' into similar instruments ["Look at the sentence as an instrument, and at its sense as its employment" (ibid. § 421)]. The explanation suggests itself that the certainty is of a different kind ... The kind of certainty is the kind of language-game. (ibid. II, xi, p. 224)

There is no essence of certainty, no essence of knowledge, but that we call various different things 'certainty' and 'knowledge' (Plato, Philebus13e-14a), and not only logical or mathematical [inferential] certainty. Either Ramsey does not recognize this, or he has set up an unreasonable ideal. "A useful mental habit" -- as if apologizing for something that wasn't really justified [an unjustified method], as if nothing less than logical inference would do. [Yet logical inference is not knowledge, not unless tautologies are knowledge.]

Other Essays:

John Maynard Keynes also wrote biographical essays about the economist Alfred Marshall, 1842-1924 and the scientist-magician Isaac Newton, 1642-1727, as well as his own cautionary memoir "My Early Beliefs", from all three of which I have taken selections and made comments.

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