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Socrates and Apollo's Oracle at Delphi

... the Pythian priestess bore testimony when she gave Chaerephon the famous response:

Of all men living Socrates most wise.

That is the form of the oracle's statement in the chapter about Socrates in Diogenes Laertius (ca. A.D. 200-250), Lives and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers, ii, 37. But written some six hundred years earlier, the words in Plato's dialog, "No man is wiser than Socrates", may suggest a different meaning.

Plato's Apology 21a-d

The following is from C.E. Robinson's Zito Hellas (1946) (Hellas (1955), ix, 1, p. 136).

When he was forty, there came a curious but crucial episode which changed Socrates' whole life. What happened shall be told in the words which, by Plato's account, he himself used at his trial [by which time Socrates was 70 years old (Apology 17d)].

"Everyone here, I think, knows Chaerephon," he said, "he has been a friend of mine since we were boys together; and he is a friend of many of you too. So you know the eager impetuous fellow he [was]. Well, one day he went to Delphi, and there he had the impudence to put this question -- do not jeer, gentlemen, at what I am going to say -- he asked, "Is anyone wiser than Socrates?" And the Pythian priestess answered, "No one."

Well, I was fully aware that I knew absolutely nothing. So what could the god mean? for gods cannot tell lies. For some time I was frankly puzzled to get at his meaning; but at last I embarked on my quest. I went to a man with a high reputation for wisdom -- I would rather not mention his name; he was one of the politicians -- and after some talk together it began to dawn on me that, wise as everyone thought him and wise as he thought himself, he was not really wise at all. I tried to point this out to him, but then he turned nasty, and so did others who were listening.

So I went away, but with this reflection that anyhow I was wiser than this man; for, though in all probability neither of us knows anything, he thought he did when he did not, whereas I neither knew anything nor imagined I did."

The meaning of the oracle's words according to Plato: "Socrates as everyman" (Apology 23a-b): the wisest among you is the one who, like Socrates, knows that he knows nothing of importance. "... to that extent I am inclined to believe that I am wise" (ibid. 20d, tr. Jowett).


Outline of this page ...


"That I don't think I know what I don't know"

To "think you are wise when you are not" -- is to think you know what you don't know (Plato, Apology 29a). Plato's own expression for this presumption is "conceited ignorance" (Sophist 229c-230d). It contrasts with "Socratic ignorance".

Conceited ignorance is the great obstacle to philosophy, because no one seeks to know what he thinks he already knows (Meno 84). This is why it is better to be ignorant but aware that you are ignorant than to think you know what you don't know (Apology 22d-e). Furthermore, that state of awareness is the sum of human wisdom as Socrates came to understand Apollo's words to mean (Apology 23b).

Ignorance and Madness

[Socrates] did not identify ignorance with madness, but not to know yourself, and to ... think that you know what you do not, he put next to madness. (iii, 9, 6)

... those who [think they know what they] do not know are misled themselves and mislead others. (Xenophon, Memorabilia, iv, 6, 1, tr. E.C. Marchant)

The character Euthyphro in Plato's dialog named Euthyphro is an example of someone who thinks he knows what he does not know. On the grounds of his imagined knowledge of holiness, Euthyphro seeks to have his own father tried for murder. But Euthyphro is unable to explain to Socrates what holiness is. If Euthyphro is misled by his own ignorance in this case, his mistake is indeed next to madness.

Another example of conceited ignorance is thinking one knows what death is. It is also an example of the unexamined life Socrates spoke of.


Xenophon's Apology (Defense of Socrates)

Unlike Plato, Xenophon was not present at Socrates' trial but based his defense (Xenophon's Apology) of Socrates on (1) what he learned from the Hermogenes who, O.J. Todd notes, appears in Xenophon's Memories of Socrates (Memorabilia) and Symposium and also in Plato's Phaedo 59b, and (2) what Xenophon thought Socrates could have said or would have been justified in saying.

Is Xenophon concerned to portray the historical Socrates whereas Plato (maybe excepting his Apology) is not? Plato's dialogs are literature, and so are Xenophon's writings. But, even if only in a few incidents, in Xenophon maybe there is an effort to write history, as history was written according to classical lights. (Was Plutarch not an historian?)

Once on a time when Chaerephon made inquiry at the Delphic oracle concerning me, in the presence of many people Apollo answered that no man was more free than I, or more just, or more prudent [sophronesteron (self-controlled or temperate)].... And would not a person with good reason call me a wise man, who from the time when I began to understand spoken words have never left off seeking after and learning every good thing that I could? (Xenophon, Apology 14-17, tr. Todd)


Chaerephon and Socrates

Chaerephon appears at the beginning of Plato's Charmides and also at the beginning of the Gorgias. In Charmides 153b it says, "Chaerephon, who behaves like a madman", as in "madcap", in which role he appears in the Apology. [Entry for Chaerephon in the OCD]

"They make the worse appear the better argument"

In Aristophanes' The Clouds [423 B.C. (original lost)], tr. B.B. Rogers, (l. 104), Socrates and Chaerephon are referred to as "rogues", "rank pedants", "barefoot vagabonds". "That Socrates, poor wretch, and Chaerephon". Chaerephon is referred to as Socrates' student (l. 503). They both dwell in "the thinking-house" (l. 94), and "in their Schools they keep two Logics" (l. 112) (or logoi). The Unjust Logic teaches, like Protagoras (Aristotle, Rhetoric 1402a), how to make the worse argument appear to be the better, the weaker reason to be the stronger.

The Clouds is alluded to in Apology 19c, but in the context of "physics" (metaphysics), not dialectic (logic).

In The Birds [414 B.C.], Aristophanes refers to Chaerephon as "the bat" (nukteris), which Rogers renders "the vampire". In line 1564 he -- "the dried-up, ghost-like Chaerephon" (p. 273 note e) -- drinks the blood of an animal Socrates has killed (to call forth the shades of the dead as in Odyssey xi, 35-51). Maybe the idea is that students of philosophy are like the shades of dead men, or maybe only that Chaerephon is.

The index to the Loeb Classical Library edition (1924), identifies Chaerephon, who is named in lines 1296, and 1564 (with Socrates, who is called there "unwashed", 1558), as "a philosophical student, pale and sickly, avoiding the light" (p. 440).

The sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi, 39 KB

Image source: C.E. Robinson [Hellas, Plate III, opp. p. 58]: "Scene of ruins at Delphi under an olive-tree with typical mountain scenery beyond."


The Church translation of Plato's Apology 21a-d

The following translation is by F.J. Church, revised by Robert D. Cumming.

You remember, too, Chaerephon's character -- how impulsive he was in carrying through whatever he took in hand. Once he went to Delphi and ventured to put this question to the oracle -- I entreat you again, my friends, not to interrupt me with your shouts -- he asked if there was anyone who was wiser than I. The priestess answered that there was no one. Chaerephon himself is dead, but his brother here will witness to what I say.

... When I heard of the oracle I began to reflect: What can the god mean by this riddle? I know very well that I am not wise, even in the smallest degree. Then what can he mean by saying that I am the wisest of men? It cannot be that he is speaking falsely, for he is a god and cannot lie.

For a long time I was at a loss to understand his meaning. Then, very reluctantly, I turned to investigate it in this manner: I went to a man who was reputed to be wise, thinking that there, if anywhere, I should prove the answer wrong, and meaning to point out to the oracle its mistake, and to say, "You said that I was the wisest of men, but this man is wiser than I am." So I examined the man -- I need not tell you his name, he was a politician -- but this was the result, Athenians. When I conversed with him I came to see that, though a great many persons, and most of all he himself, thought that he was wise, yet he was not wise. Then I tried to prove to him that he was not wise, though he fancied that he was. By so doing I made him indignant, and many of the bystanders.

So when I went away, I thought to myself, "I am wiser than this man: neither of us knows anything that is really worth knowing, but he thinks that he has knowledge when he has not, while I, having no knowledge, do not think that I have. I seem, at any rate, to be a little wiser than he is on this point: I do not think that I know what I do not know."

Jowett's translation of Apology 20d-21a, 21a-d

... a certain sort of wisdom which I possess. If you ask me what kind of wisdom, I reply, wisdom such as may perhaps be attained by man [which is the wisdom of every man who is wise], for to that extent I am inclined to believe that I am wise ... the word which I will [now] speak is not mine. I will refer you to a witness who is worthy of credit; that witness shall be the God of Delphi -- he will tell you about my wisdom, if I have any, and of what sort it is. (20d-21a)

The translation is by Benjamin Jowett [Notes in brackets are mine].

You must have known Chaerephon; he was early a friend of mine, and also a friend of yours, for he shared in the exile of the people [the 5,000 democrats who were exiled from Athens during the reign of The Thirty (Tyrants)], and returned with you. Well, Chaerephon, as you know was very impetuous in all his doings, and he went to Delphi and boldly asked the oracle to tell him whether -- as I was saying, I must beg you not to interrupt -- he asked the oracle to tell him whether there was any one wiser than I was, and the Pythian prophetess answered, that there was no man wiser. Chaerephon is dead himself; but his brother, who is in court, will confirm the truth of this story.

Why do I mention this? Because I am going to explain to you why I have such an evil name [see below (21c-d), but Plato cites also Aristophanes' play The Clouds (19b-c)]. When I heard the answer, I said to myself, What can the god mean? and what is the interpretation of this riddle? for I know that I have no wisdom, small or great. What then can he mean when he says that I am the wisest of men? And yet he is a god, and cannot lie; that would be against his nature.

After long consideration, I at last thought of a method of trying the question. I reflected that if I could only find a man wiser than myself, then I might go to the god with a refutation in my hand. I should say to him, "Here is a man who is wiser than I am; but you said that I was the wisest." Accordingly, I went to one who had the reputation of wisdom, and observed him -- his name I need not mention; he was a politician whom I selected for examination -- and the result was as follows: When I began to talk with him, I could not help thinking that he was not really wise, although he was thought wise by many, and wiser still by himself, and I went and tried to explain to him that he thought himself wise, but was not really wise; and the consequence was that he hated me [This was because he was more attached to self-love (vanity) than to the truth], and his enmity was shared by several who were present and heard me.

So I left him, saying to myself, as I went away: Well, although I do not suppose that either of us knows anything really beautiful and good, I am better off than he is, for he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows. I neither know nor think that I know. In this latter particular, then, I seem to have slightly the advantage of him.

The god Apollo, truth and philosophy

"... that would be against his nature." Apollo cannot lie, but can Apollo be mistaken? Being all-rational does not mean being all-knowing. But, on the other hand, the gods, being fully rational (as the philosophers picture them to be), never think they know what they don't know. And so, if Apollo says that no man is wiser than Socrates, Apollo must know that to be true, and therefore the oracle's statement must in some sense be true.

And note that according to the poet Pindar, the god Apollo is all-knowing and indeed is the god of truth. Thus if Apollo has said that Socrates is wisest, it must be because Socrates is. But in what sense is it true? Socrates does not presume he knows, but that he must put the oracle's words to the tests of reason and experience to discover their meaning; that's what makes him a philosopher. (Socrates contrasted with Abraham.)

Rouse's translation of Apology 21a-d, 20d-e

This translation is by W.H.D. Rouse [Notes in brackets are mine].

I suppose you know Chairephon. He has been my friend since I was young, and a friend of your people's party, and he was banished with you lately and with you was restored. And you know, doubtless, what sort of man he was, how impetuous in all he tried to do. Well, once he went to Delphi and dared to ask this question of the oracle -- don't make an uproar, gentlemen, at what I [am about to] say -- for he asked if anyone was wiser than I was. The priestess answered, then, that no one was wiser. His brother is here, and he will bear witness to this, as Chairephon is dead. But let me tell you why I say this; I am going to show you where the calumny came from.

Well, when I heard that reply I thought: "What in the world does the god mean? What in the world is his riddle? For I know in my conscience that I am not wise in anything, great or small; then what in the world does he mean when he says I am wisest? Surely he is not lying? For he must not lie."

I was puzzled for a long time to understand what he meant; then I thought of a way to try to find out, something like this: I approached one of those who had the reputation of being wise, for there, I thought, if anywhere, I should test the revelation and prove that the oracle was wrong [Note that Socrates does not try to prove that Socrates is wise, but rather, to test whether no one else is wiser than Socrates]: "Here is one wiser than I, but you said I was wiser."

When I examined him, then -- I need not tell you his name, but it was one of our statesmen whom I was examining when I had this strange experience, gentleman -- and when I conversed with him, I thought this man seemed to be wise both to many others and especially to himself, but that he was not; and then I tried to show him that he thought he was wise, but was not. But of that he disliked me and so did many others who were there ...

... but I went away thinking to myself that I was wiser than this man [and therefore that this man was not wiser than Socrates]; the fact is that neither of us knows anything beautiful and good, but he thinks he does know when he doesn't, and I don't know and don't think I do: so I am wiser than he is by only this trifle, that what I do not know I don't think I do.

Apology 20d-e, tr. Rouse

I will tell you the whole truth: a sort of wisdom has got me this name [of Sophist], gentlemen, and nothing else. Wisdom! What wisdom? Perhaps the only wisdom that man can have. For the fact is, I really am wise in this wisdom; but it may be that those I just spoke of [namely, the Sophists] are wise in a wisdom greater than man's [the title 'sophist', i.e. 'wise man', Plato says, seems proper only to a god (Phaedrus 278c-d)], or I can't think how to describe it -- for I don't understand it myself, but whoever says I do, lies, and speaks in calumny of me.

Hugh Tredennick's translation of Apology 21a-d

You know Chaerephon, of course. He was a friend of mine from boyhood, and a good democrat who played his part with the rest of you in the recent expulsion and restoration. And you know what he was like, how enthusiastic he was over anything that he had once undertaken. Well, one day he actually went to Delphi and asked this question of the god -- as I said before, gentlemen, please do not interrupt -- he asked whether there was anyone wiser than myself. The priestess replied that there was no one. As Chaerephon is dead, the evidence for my statement will be supplied by his brother, who is here in court.

... When I heard about the oracle's answer, I said to myself, What does the god mean? Why does he not use plain language? I am only to conscious that I have no claim to wisdom, great or small. So what can he mean by asserting that I am the wisest man in the world? He cannot be telling a lie; that would not be right for him.

After puzzling about it for some time, I set myself at last with considerable reluctance to check the truth of it in the following way. I went to interview a man with a high reputation for wisdom, because I felt that here if anywhere I would succeed in disproving the oracle and pointing out to my authority, You said that I was the wisest of men, by here is a man who is wiser than I am.

Well, I gave a thorough examination to this person -- I need not mention his name, but it was one of our politicians that I was studying when I had this experience -- and in conversation with him I formed the impression that although many people's opinion, and especially in his own, he appeared to be wise, in fact he was not. Then when I began to try to show him that he only thought he was wise and was not really so, my efforts were resented by him and by many the other people present.

However, I reflected as I walked away, Well, I am certainly wiser than this man. It is only too likely that neither of us has any knowledge to boast of, but he thinks that he knows something which he does not know, whereas I am quite conscious of my ignorance. At any rate it seems that I am wiser than he is to this small extent, that I do not think I know what I do not know.

G.M.A. Grube's translation of Apology 20d-21e

What has caused my reputation is none other than a certain kind of wisdom. What kind of wisdom? Human wisdom, perhaps. It may be that I really possess [human wisdom] ... [But] wisdom more than human ... I certainly do not possess .... I shall call upon the god at Delphi as witness to the existence and nature of my wisdom, if such it be.

You know Chairephon. He was my friend from youth ... You surely know the kind of man he was, how impulsive in any course of action. He went to Delphi at one time and ventured to ask the oracle ... if any man was wiser than I, and the Pythian replied that no one was wiser.

When I heard this reply I asked myself: "Whatever does the god mean? What is his riddle? I am very conscious that I am not wise at all; what does he mean by saying that I am the wisest?"

For a long time I was at a loss as to his meaning [i.e. the meaning of the god's riddle]; then I very reluctantly turned to some such investigation as this: I went to one of those reputed wise, thinking that there, if anywhere, I could refute the oracle and say to it: "This man is wiser than I, but you said I was." Then, when I examined this man ... my experience was something like this: I thought that he appeared wise to many people and especially to himself, but he was not. I then tried to show him that he thought himself wise, but that he was not ...

So I withdrew and thought to myself: "I am wiser than this man: it is likely that neither of us knows anything worthwhile [cf. Apology 23b], but he thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas when I do not know, neither do I think I know; so I am likely to be wiser than he is to this small extent, that I do not think I know what I do not know."

After this I approached another man, one of those thought to be wiser than he, and I thought the same thing ...

Grube's translation makes clear how the oracle's "Of all men living Socrates most wise" can be taken to mean that Socrates is indeed wise -- "wise", that is, in the limited sense that: when Socrates doesn't know something neither does he think he knows it.

It is wisdom to know oneself

Xenophon suggests that there is another way in which Socrates is wiser, namely that by not thinking he knows what he doesn't know, Socrates knows himself better than the man who thinks he knows what he doesn't know.

Apology 23b

He among you is the wisest who, like Socrates, knows that his wisdom is really worth nothing at all. (tr. Church, rev. Cumming) - That the wisest of you men is he who like Socrates has learned that with respect to wisdom, he is truly worthless. (tr. Tredennick) - He among you is the wisest who, like Socrates, knows that his wisdom is really worth nothing at all. (tr. Church, rev. Cumming) - He, O men, is the wisest who, like Socrates, knows that his wisdom is in truth worth nothing. (tr. Jowett) - This man among you, mortals, is wisest who, like Socrates, understands that his wisdom is worthless. (tr. Grube) - This one of you human beings is wisest, who like Socrates knows that he is in truth worth nothing as regards wisdom. (tr. Rouse)


The politician Anytus

Anytus in Plato's Meno is an example of someone who thinks he knows what he doesn't know, and who becomes angry at anyone who questions his claim to know. He is a misologist -- not from disillusionment with the apparent futility of argument (Phaedo 89c) but by temperament -- and taking offense, rather than learning from the discovery of his own ignorance, is the only result of Socrates' cross-questioning him. In Meno 90a, Plato says that Anytus is a well-thought-of politician.

ANYTUS: [Sophists are] the manifest ruin and corruption of anyone who comes into contact with them. (91c)

SOCRATES: Has one of the Sophists done you a personal injury, or why are you so hard on them?

ANYTUS: Heavens, no! I've never in my life had anything to do with a single one of them, nor would I hear of [i.e. allow] any of my family doing so.

SOCRATES: So you've had no experience of them at all?

ANYTUS: And don't want any either.

SOCRATES: You surprise me. How can you know what is good or bad in something when you have no experience of it?

ANYTUS: Quite easily. At any rate I know their kind, whether I've had experience or not.

SOCRATES: It must be second sight ["You must be a diviner" (Jowett), "Perhaps you are a prophet" (Rouse), "Perhaps you are a wizard" (Grube)], I suppose, for how else you know about them, judging from what you tell me yourself, I can't imagine. (Meno 92b-c, tr. Guthrie)

The menacing final remark Anytus makes in Meno 94e-95a suggests that he is the same Anytus whose advice to the jury is that Socrates be put to death (Apology 31a; he is first named in 23e). In response to that remark, Socrates says only, "Anytus seems angry, Meno ..." (Meno 95a)


Socrates in The Days of Alkibiades

C.E. Robinson in his "sketches ... intended to depict the manners, customs, and general atmosphere of the times" (p. ix) imagines an Athenian gentleman named Theodoros visiting the Agora (Chapter IX. The Market-Place).

In one workshop which he passed he saw a sculptor engaged in shaping out a group of the Three Graces, while his slave was grinding the tools on a stone. Theodoros knew the man well, and gave him a hail in passing. No need to catch a glimpse of the snub nose and bulging sockets to recognize that sturdy figure. (The Days of Alkibiades (3rd. ed. 1925) p. 103)

Socrates was the son of Sophroniscus [of Alopece], a sculptor ... (Diog. L. ii, 18, tr. R.D. Hicks)

It does not follow that Socrates was also a sculptor (I don't think Euthyphro 11d is evidence that he was), because although stone-work is a skill that can be taught, being a sculptor is a gift. The story of "the draped figures of the Graces on the Acropolis" is told by Diogenes Laertius (ii, 19), but in the same breath he cites a source that says that Socrates had been a slave, so how shall we to decide which testimony to trust, which not?

"The historical Socrates"

Note that in Apology 22d, Plato says that Socrates has no artisan skills (no "wisdom" of the artisans, i.e. no knowledge of the arts). This may have been only for the sake of making Socrates' argument clear (The Fallacy of the Artisans is: thinking that because you know one thing (namely your craft), you also know other things which in fact you don't know (as your being unable to give an account of what you think you know that can stand against cross-questioning in Socratic dialectic shows) -- the argument being that it is better to be quite without knowledge than to think you know anything that you don't know.

The truth, I think, is that we cannot find the historical Socrates; we make a selection of the "facts" that seem right to us (In this way, our selection is partly autobiographical: it shows what we want Socrates to have been, not simply who we think he was; it is not that our selection need be wholly arbitrary, but neither does 'plausible' = 'necessary').

Then with respect to the title "The Days of Alkibiades", there is the question of the time-period (Socrates' age and activities). For Alcibiades we have c. 450-404 B.C. while for Socrates 469-339 B.C., so that even if we imagine Alcibiades as not much more than thirty (and he would have been older) Socrates would already have been fifty at the time of Theodoros' visit to the market-place. And by that time, Plato says, Socrates had already begun to devote his time exclusively to philosophy.

Would Socrates avoid a Discussion?

Theodoros saw that Sokrates was in no mood for conversation and left him at his carving. (The Days of Alkibiades p. 104)

That does not seem right. Rather than "Theodoros gave Socrates a hail in passing", Robinson ought to have written, "Catching sight of Socrates, Theodoros slipped past the doorway, taking care not to be seen, to avoid having Socrates draw him into discussion whereby Theodoros would discover his own ignorance, because discussion with Socrates would show Theodoros that he did not know what he thought he knew." Which Theodoros did not welcome, as he was a vain man (cf. Plato, Apology 21c-d), not a serious human being (philosopher).

According to Plato's Apology 37e, Socrates believed that questioning men's claims to wisdom was a responsibility that had been assigned to him by Apollo. Therefore to avoid a discussion would be to disobey the god, an act of impiety.


Craftsmen in Athens

You strolled past the open doors of the little workshops, crowded in friendly rivalry one next the other, and, if you were feeling contemplative or inclined for a chat, you could drop in and watch your friend the artist at his work.

Socrates, himself a stone-cutter by trade, was particularly fond of spending his abundant leisure in this way: while he was enticing his craftsmen friends into discussions and puzzling them with awkward questions, he was storing up in his mind that host of useful images and illustrations which we know so well from Plato's Dialogues.

One of his shoemaker friends, called Simon, took the trouble to write down his conversations ...

It was in these humble workshops that he learned what it is for a man really to "know his job", and realized how little the average politician really knew of his ...

(Alfred Zimmern, The Greek Commonwealth: politics and economics in fifth-century Athens, 5th ed. 1931, Ch. 7 (Modern Library, 1956), p. 271-272; see Xenophon, Memorabilia iii, 10-11, "for Socrates in the workshop ... he goes successively to a well-known painter, a sculptor, and a breastplate-maker. Compare Plato, Apology 22. The vase-paintings often show visitors in the workshop ..." (ibid. p. 272n1))

About Simon, a citizen of Athens and a cobbler, we know only the titles of his thirty-three dialogs in one volume, that he "was the first, so we are told, who introduced the Socratic dialogues as a form of conversation", and that he refused Pericles' offer of patronage, saying, "I will not part with my free speech for money." (Diog. L. ii, 122-123)

The freedom of the ancient Greek artisans

Socrates, like any Greek who could, did not work for wages, and as a self-employed craftsman he had freedom of action "to work when he felt inclined [and] to break off his work when his friends called him out to go to the market place or the wrestling school" (Zimmern, p. 276).

On the other hand, if the sculpture in the story were a state commission then it would have to be worked on "continuously" and if he injured "any sound stone in the course of his work", he would be required to replace it "at his own expense without interruption to the work" (ibid. p. 265).


Slavery in Attica

In any case, whether a sculptor or stone-cutter, would Socrates, as many Athenian citizens apparently did, have owned a slave (at least one)? When Socrates himself was a workman, to have a fellow worker, maybe (Xenophon, Memorabilia ii, 3, 3). But when he became a philosopher? Would not a slave then have been one of the "How many things I can do without!" (Diog. L. ii, 25; variation: "How many things I do not need!"), as Socrates could do without shoes. What would a philosopher need a slave for -- to share in his philosophical work?

Socrates might have had a female slave to help his wife Xanthippe at home -- but we find a furious Xanthippe scolding Socrates in the market-place (ibid. ii, 36-37), which suggests that there was "myriad poverty" at home -- if he could afford one, which is doubtful, because at his trail he says that a fine of one mina = 100 drachmas is the most he is able to pay (Apology 38b; however, Diog. L. ii, 41, states 25 drachmas), even when the alternative was death (ibid. ii, 40).

According to Herodotus (6.137) the early Athenians had not had household slaves; the family's boys and girls had been sent to draw the water from the spring (Zimmern, Ch. 7, p. 280n1).

In 415 B.C. a male slave cost on average 166 drachmas, or, 996 obols, a female 170 drachmas, or 1,020, obols (ibid., Ch. 15, p. 410n1). Regardless of their level of skill, everyone who worked building the Erechtheum on the Acropolis was paid 1 drachma, or, 6 obols, per day from the state treasury (ibid. Ch. 7, p. 267). C.E. Robinson states the price of a slave as from 100 to 1,000 drachmas.

Menial labour was paid 3 obols, or half a drachma, a day -- presumably a bare subsistence; jurors were paid at the same rate. An ordinary workman got one drachma a day. A highly skilled artisan as much as two and a half drachmae a day. (Everyday Life in Ancient Greece, p. 94)

None of that suggests that buying a slave was cheap. Some slave owners rented their slaves out and lived on that income, but Socrates refused Plato's uncle Charmides' offer of a gift of slaves for that purpose (Diog. L. ii, 31). But that "the father of philosophy" did or had owned a slave is possible because that was the way of life and thought of the classical world; if Socrates had been kidnapped by pirates at sea or been captured in war he would have been made a slave himself (ibid. ii, 31; Xenophon, Memorabilia iii, 12, 2). So that If Socrates had needed a reason to practice the moral virtue of courage either at Potidaea or Delium, then fear of the loss of freedom would have been one.

Slaves at Athens were not allowed to be too ill-treated (In Plato's Euthyphro a son prosecutes his own father for his father's part in the death of a slave); nonetheless, even the artisan slaves (such as the one in Robinson's story) ran away in the Decelean War, according to Thucydides [7.27.5], when they were offered their freedom (Hammond, History of Greece, 2e (1967), p. 524 [524n2]).

The condition of agricultural slaves was worse than that of medieval serfs because serfs could not be sold off the land; and to countenance the treatment of slaves in the --

Silver mines at Laurium

... 80 to 100 miles of [more or less horizontal] galleries have been discovered.... These galleries are winding, following the vein of the ore, and were kept very narrow [so that they would not need to be propped up; mining was cheaper that way] ... generally 2-3 feet high and 2-3 feet broad; ventilation was provided by occasional air-shafts [Some 2,000 vertical shafts have been found, generally deep, some as deep as 250 feet (p. 412)]....

the miners worked with small clay lamps [set in niches, which] remained alight for ten hours, and almost certainly marked the length of a daily shift....

a workman [i.e. slave] could dig out about 12 yards of rock in a month of daily shifts [Aside: the Athenians did not have a seventh day of rest (Everyday Life in Ancient Greece, p. 225) or indeed any kind of "week" to regulate their life; instead, their mental calendar was based on the annual religious festivals (and the seasons of the year, of course). Numbering of the days (of which there were 29 or 30) of the month, of which there were 12 in Athens, was determined by the phases of the moon (Seyffert, Classical Dictionary)].

They worked in chains and almost naked, and were branded with their master's stamp. [There were about 20,000 mine-slaves (All were adult males) in Attica in 431 B.C. (p. 412n1).] (Zimmern, Ch. 15, p. 412-413)

-- would demand the sensibility of a savage, not of an educated human being ... yet, nonetheless, Thucydides, Plato and Aristotle did approve of it. Lead was also mined in Attica (ibid. p. 410) and that must have poisoned the slaves. Nonetheless, Zimmern writes that no Greek would have echoed the mercilessness of Marcus Cato (De Agri Cultura 11, 7) (p. 414n1), which Plutarch censures in his Life of Cato (Paul Harvey, Oxford Companion to Classical Literature (1937)), who advised selling off slaves before they became too old to be useful for work, thereby avoiding the expense of having to care for them in old age.

(However, if one says, as Aristotle does, that slaves are "human instruments" or "living tools" [Politics 1254a~15], what does the factory owner do with worn-out tools? Something far crueler than Cato suggested.)

According to a note to Grube's translation of Plato's Apology (38b), in late 5th century B.C. one mina = 100 drachma, and one drachma was a day's wage for a laborer. However, in a society of artisans, the laborer held the poorest station in life, only higher than the slave. And so maybe one hundred days of wage-labor -- but fifty or fewer days for an artisan -- doesn't seen much for "the price of a ransom" (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1134b21) -- i.e. freedom -- for anyone other than a laborer, much less for an enemy of the state (The people of Athens' democracy themselves constituted the state), as the jurors who convicted Socrates judged him to be.


About C.E. Robinson

Cyril Edward Robinson was born in 1884 at Bury St. Edmunds, Suffolk, England; he studied at Marlborough College, a public school for Church of England clergymen's sons, and Magdalen College, Oxford University. He taught at Winchester College (another boy's public school) from 1909 to 1945 [I do not know what he did after his retirement]; the title pages of The Days of Alkibiades and Everyday Life in Ancient Greece refer to him as "assistant master". He died in 1981. Clergymen's sons often have their own ideas about "holy things". But Robinson was to write:

Socrates and psyche (soul or mind)

The conception of "Soul" as a moral entity -- i.e., as something of supreme importance to the individual man -- was certainly Socrates' discovery ... (Hellas, ix, 1, p. 136n1; cf. Plato, Apology 30a-b, 36c)

What does Socrates mean by the word 'soul'? Does he not mean the ethical aspect of man -- i.e. man looked at as a moral being? The relation between the concepts 'body' and 'soul' can be compared to the relation between a sign and its use: by the first we name an object (e.g. marks on paper, spoken sounds) but by the second we do not name an object of any kind.


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