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'Meaning' = 'Explanation of meaning'
If you want to know how the word 'meaning' is used (by a particular philosopher), ask for the method the philosopher uses to explain the meaning of words (PI § 560). That method is a logic of language, i.e. a way of distinguishing language with meaning from language without meaning. Most philosophers ignore this question, presuming that "The meaning of a word (e.g. 'mind' or 'time') is the thing the word stands for. And that philosophy is talk about those things, not about their names."
How you explain the meaning of a word shows what you mean by the word 'meaning'. This page is exploratory, i.e. often confused and often wrong.
Outline of this page ...
- The Fallacy (false presumption) of the Frameless Picture
- 'The grass is green really' (Russell). Eyes and Language
- Concepts and Categories
- Grids and Nets of Reference
- Kant: Categories of Thought and Reality
- Appropriate frames of reference
- Does this quality belong to the picture, or to the frame around the picture?
- Points of Reference and Idealism
- Appropriate frames of reference
- What is the meaning of a word? and the possibility of metaphysics, a reply to the Epilogue of Copleston's A History of Philosophy, Volume VIII
- Unexemplified = Undefined
- George Berkeley and Immanuel Kant
- Berkeley on the reification of general terms
- The grammar of 'thing-in-itself'
- Berkeley on the reification of general terms
- Aristotle and Kant: Realism versus Criticism
- Phenomenology
- 'There are objects'
- Contradiction versus "first principles"
- Innate Ideas
- Grammar is (like) the setup for a game (arranging the chess pieces on a chessboard)
- The possibility of metaphysics
- The two possible meanings of 'meaning' (in contrast to nonsense) according to Wittgenstein
- Is the explanation of meaning the meaning of a word?
- The common names in philosophy
- Factual (metaphysical) Principles versus Rules for Reasoning
- "Concepts are dictated by extra-mental nature: they are dictated by the picture; they are not part of the picture frame" (Ockham)
- Endnotes
- Kant, geometry, philosophy, and grammar
- "Philosophical definitions" versus grammatical clarifications (Kant)
- Kant and 'grammar'
- Berkeley's Criticism of Locke's Distinction between Primary and Secondary Qualities
- Kant, geometry, philosophy, and grammar
The False Presumption of a Frameless Picture
Concepts -- i.e. rules for using words -- define -- i.e. set the limits of -- phenomena, not vice versa. [The contrary view.] Trying to find the limits of a concept (e.g. 'mind', 'time', 'love'), by grasping the essence of a phenomenon is like trying to capture a cloud with a butterfly net.
It may be possible to explain the formation of the concepts of natural language on the basis of the facts in plain view (which are the conceived facts (cf. "conceived percepts"; Goethe: "all fact is already conceived fact")) (OC § 617) or metaphysically (as in Plato or in the theory of abstraction), but both kinds of explanation are speculative.
[The status of knowledge: the fundamental importance of Nominalism versus Realism | Aristotle versus Kant: Realism versus Criticism]
Does x belong to the picture or to the picture frame? Not making that distinction, but attributing to the picture what belongs to the frame, might be called the fallacy of the unframed picture. (The comparison: as an unconceived sense perception is unintelligible ("percepts without concepts are blind"), so an unframed picture is unintelligible ("a picture without a frame is blind".)
What a squirrel thinks is something we cannot -- i.e. it is logically impossible ('logically possible' means describable (Schlick)) -- imagine: human thought without concepts is impossible, but concepts without language, also unimaginable, appear more than possible ("If one sees the behavior of a living thing, one sees its soul" (PI § 357); "We only say of a human being and what is like one that it thinks" (ibid. § 360)). "... and what is like a human being": we see the squirrel's anatomy and its behavior.
Do definitions of the word 'meaning' belong to the frame or to the picture? If the concept 'meaning' is one we have selected from among the many others in the language, then the concept we choose must prove useful for resolving questions of language meaning in philosophy (e.g. by distinguishing sense from nonsense, although there are many things called meaning, e.g. the meaning of religious or literary symbols). But that does not answer the question. (Metaphors in philosophy are often only fog.)
'The grass is green' (Russell). Eyes and Language
Percepts without concepts are blind. (Kant)
One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing's nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it. (PI § 114)
For [Kant] experience is not something which is simply given; it is constructed. (Copleston, History of Philosophy, Volume VI, XVI, 1, )
An unframed picture would be "reality in itself" which, although not entirely unknowable, is only relatively knowable. Not that relative knowledge ("framed knowledge") isn't really knowledge.
The book of nature is not written in mathematics (Galileo), but it can be read in mathematics. The proposition 'The grass is green' (Russell) is only true in human eyes and language; nonetheless, it is true in those eyes and language. Is "the thing in itself" simply reality independent of human perception-conception (independent of any frame of reference) -- or is the grammar of those words very different than "name of object"?
Concepts and Categories
"Concepts without percepts are empty." But we normally mean many things by the word 'concept' besides the conceptualization of a sense perception. And although the concepts of logic and speculation are without sense content, they are not without meaning. But I think Kant is speaking of e.g. the concept 'causality', saying that unless causality is applied to percepts (sense perceptions), then it is empty of content (This I don't understand).
"the concepts of reality, substance, causality, and even of necessity in existence lose all meaning and become empty signs of concepts, without any content, if I venture to employ them outside the field of the senses". (Critique of Pure Reason B, 707, in Copleston, History of Philosophy, Volume VI, XIII, 7)
Grids and Nets of Reference
A frame of reference is like a grid placed around a picture, providing reference points, like a Cartesian graph; it is a way of organizing what is pictured. (Philosophical work is conceptual investigation (Z § 458), i.e. trying to understand our own tools of thought, namely concepts. A concept -- i.e. the use of a word in the language -- is a way of framing something.) Although in some contexts the expression "nets of reference" will be clearer. (Obviously, Wittgenstein not withstanding, this is not the only thing we call philosophical work.)
"Grids, nets ..." Comparisons (similes) without illustrations produce only a worrying feeling of not understanding, of blackness before the mind's eye. Therefore, for example, Cartesian graphs and the grids on atlas pages (Map 6, B5) give the elements of a picture addresses, as do the lines on a political map. But if the land is viewed from above, no lines are seen: the lines belong to the frame around or the net laid over the picture. (These graphs and grids are concepts, or, in other words, rules.) Relationships between elements, e.g. 'A is to the left of B', require the concepts 'element', 'point', 'location' and 'direction' and so forth; although the relationship is a fact, the concepts used to conceive it belong to the perceiver, not to the things perceived, and there is more than one way to look at things (and sets of concepts to use), to organize, to make sense of things (the various kinds of maps in an atlas and the heliocentric and geocentric models are examples).
Kant: Categories of Thought and Reality
Note: I know no more about Kant than a few slogans (to which I may have given my own meaning) and hearsay (lectures, histories of philosophy). As I recall, I read, or tried to read, very little of his work either at school or later. Nevertheless, Kant's effect on my thinking, however vague its connection to Kant, is deep.
According to Kant, if I understand, metaphysical knowledge -- i.e. knowledge of what is not perceptible to the senses -- is impossible because the categories of perception cannot be applied to anything but the perceptible. These categories belong to apparently inescapable way of perceiving things rather than to things as they exist independently of being perceived. In other words, if I understand, the categories as 'space', 'time' and 'cause and effect' belong to the frame within which we perceive the picture (the picture being "the thing as it exists independently of being perceived" or "the thing-in-itself"), and the qualities of the picture frame cannot be attributed to the picture itself.
We must never forget that for Kant the object must conform to the mind rather than the other way about. (Copleston, History, Volume VI, XII, 5)
Rather than 'the mind' I would say 'frame of reference' (or 'conceptual frame of reference'). That is how I understand (or misunderstand) Kant, or how I would apply his ideas.
But by the word 'category' Kant seems to mean only the categories that are both necessary and universal, i.e. without which it is impossible to perceive and reason about what is perceived. So by 'category' Kant does not mean simply 'class-name' or 'concept' -- although not only the categories Kant says are essential, but all concepts belong to the frame, not to the picture framed. The categories of perception cannot be known independently of (or without the need for) experience, Kant says, but this is not because the categories are themselves perceived; the categories are contributed by the human mind.
What is the relation between Kant's categories of perception and the question of the relation between facts of nature and concept-formation? Besides which, there is flexibility, for some frames -- i.e. some concepts -- may be more appropriate for a picture than others for the work we want to do. The various definitions of 'meaning' are again an example. (Poverty in examples is poverty in understanding.)
Which categories are known independently? I cannot think of any category-words that have meaning independently of experience except the categories belonging to logic and mathematics (and even these must be explained: we are not born understanding them). But, according to Kant, because these categories do not belong to the world (the picture), but only to the human mind (the frame), nothing about any reality that is outside our experience can be deduced from them.
Question: does outside our (possible) experience = outside the picture? Then unless experience = reality, the picture ≠ the whole of reality (cf. the TLP's "world").
"I can't imagine the world without space" -- is that evidence that space is a category of the frame, a Kantian category? For if I cannot describe a "spaceless" world, then such a world is not even logically possible, and if that is so, then the proposition 'There is space' cannot be "significantly negated" (i.e. its negation is nonsense). But a proposition of fact cannot have less than two possible values: true and false. So what is the sentence 'There is space'? Here is one possibility: Grammar and the setup of a game.
Appropriate frames of reference
What is the relation between frame and picture (between concept and percept): is a frame that is not serviceable soon discarded (religious belief often excepted): a map must make a territory navigable? For example? If the concepts 'time', 'space', 'cause and effect' are serviceable -- doesn't this tell us something important about the picture-in-itself (the picture independent of any frame, if there is such a thing except as a thing abstracted) -- that our categories of thought are "the categories of reality"? (Correspondence.) Serviceable ≠ necessary; and indeed it seems impossible to prove that an alternative set of categories might not be just as or even more serviceable. As for example? Theses without examples are empty promises. (Is Wittgenstein's example of weighing goods an example of a "serviceable concept" or "frame of reference"?)
Is the claim that the categories we have are not only categories of human perception, but also the categories of a reality independent of human perception a metaphysical thesis (unverifiable speculation) or is it not nonsense? Is an unverifiable hypothesis anything more than a possible picture? Logically possible does not mean plausible; logical possibility can be quite fanciful.
Kant seems to say that time and space belong to the frame of reference and that there is only one frame of reference. (This is metaphysics: the essence of human sense perception.) Then why do we think that time and space are features of the picture, i.e. of the world rather than of the way we perceive the world? (Wittgenstein says the proposition 'The world is objects in space' is a rule of grammar -- isn't that the same as saying it belongs to the frame rather than to the picture?) Does Kant say that "whatever is universal and necessary" (as he says time and space are) must belong to the subject rather than to the object, to the frame rather than to the picture framed?
To the picture or to the picture frame?
'Are there objects?' 'Is there space?' 'Does time exist?' 'Do events have causes?' Is the answer Yes or No, or are these questions either nonsense or answered by rules of grammar? (There are contexts, original homes, for these questions: Is there enough space on the shelf for the book? Has the storm thrown any objects onto the roadway? Do you have enough time for a drink? What caused the window to break?)
"Man is the measure or measurer of all things." But aren't things as they are and don't things happen as they do regardless of man's judgments about them? Protagoras seemed to deny this. Can you say, common experience speaks against this? Well, but common experience says "there are physical objects", too, and that "language follows thought, and thought follows things". (Aristotle not withstanding, the view of philosophy is very often not that of common experience.)
Besides categories of sense perception there are principles of thought (or of investigation), e.g. "Every event has a cause" and "Ex nihilo nihil", which belong to the frame, not to the picture, and so from these principles we cannot deduce that the "picture" (the world-in-itself) had no beginning (because if there is now something, then there can never have been nothing). In other words: metaphysics is a way of thinking that mistakes the frame for the picture.
Points of Reference and Idealism
From the point of view of what I call 'logic of language', Kant's "thing-in-itself" is no more than recognition of a point of logic, namely that the combination of words 'absolute point of reference' is undefined; that 'All points of reference are relative' is a rule of grammar; and therefore that man's perspective of reality, i.e. man's point of view, is relative to man.
The question of what the relation of man's perspective is to the absolute perspective is nonsense: both the proposition 'space and time are real (i.e. qualities of the world-in-itself)' and the proposition'space and time are not real' are nonsense. There is no "absolute perspective"; there is no absolute "thing-in-itself". The word 'nonsense' signifies that some combinations of words are undefined, that not everything that looks like a statement of fact is one.
And so I think that what the idealists hold is that there is an absolute point of reference, that they can define and know it, and which I think they call "the Absolute" (or sometimes "God", in which case they think it is possible to see reality through the eyes of God, the absolute perspective or truth). And so for the idealists, in Kant's terms, reality is not an unknowable reality-in-itself. Reality is knowable.
We live our daily lives in such arrogant confidence that reality is confined to what is perceptible to the senses (which is the project or principle of investigation of natural science allowed to become, not merely metaphysical speculation, but a world-view) that a dream in which there really are more things in heaven and earth, etc., can be terrifying. A fourth spatial dimension has meaning only as an analogy made from our three dimensions, but in a nightmare one can be trapped in a farther dimension, unable to escape, unable to breathe. Age is second childhood.
What is the meaning of a word? and the possibility of metaphysics
This is a reply to the Epilogue of Copleston's A History of Philosophy, Volume VIII: Bentham to Russell, in which he speaks of Wittgenstein and "the reform of language" versus "ordinary language", which is a misunderstanding because it is not "ordinary language" but "the normal use of language". For in what way can everyday language -- which is also the language of philosophy (what other language would we use? There is no "technical use of a word" or "technical language" in philosophy; there is only normal use or jargon (or nonsense)) -- be "reformed" and for what purpose? Additional rules can be made for the purpose of clarity. And that is the only possibility. Although, of course, countless abstractions may be imagined (made) and given names, but those are not the names of new things (independent entities) to ask about the natures of.
The question is, What is the meaning of a word? If (1) the meaning of a word is the essence of the thing the word names, then we can speculate about what that essence (the true nature of the thing) is, and thus metaphysics is possible. If, however, (2) the meaning of a word is the conventions for its use, then traditional metaphysics (in contrast to what I call metaphysics) is not possible, because in that case defining a word is to state a verifiable description of the facts of language use in plain sight, not to say what the nature of the thing the word names is.
But then why is Plato not talking nonsense when he asks what the essence of man is? Because the word 'man' is an example of what we normally call a name-of-object, a word we define (explain the meaning of) by pointing to its bearer (PI § 43b). We don't first have to identify what thing we are talking about before we can ask what its nature is. Contrast that with words such as 'justice' and 'God' which are not names of objects. Metaphysics presumes that there are also "real definitions" of "abstract terms" like those.
When philosophers ask "what being really is", are they asking anything? It is not "ordinary language" (Copleston), but our normal use of language that we describe. If we describe how we normally use a word, then whatever is contrary to that is not speculation but nonsense (i.e. undefined combinations of words). What meaning have the words 'infinite and necessary being'? You owe us a definition of 'meaning'.
You can of course redefine a word (spoken sounds, marks on paper), assigning it a new use in the language. But that's all you can do, not discover the word's true "meaning" (i.e. the true nature of the thing the word names).
In other words, it is pointless in philosophy to try to use words in ways that conflict with their normal use (if we want to be understood). The exception is when a philosopher explicitly revises a concept, as Wittgenstein does with 'grammar'). But to change the rules for the use of a word in this way is admittedly to invent jargon (clarification by assigning a meaning), not to "reform language".
What can be done with language?
The big question is: Are there limits to what can be done with language? Is an unreadable sentence merely "hard to understand" or is it nonsense, unless it can be restarted in a readable way; cf. a metaphor can be restated in prose (or it is not a metaphor)? How elastic is language; does it have a breaking point? Is that question metaphorical? (This is a variation of the question: How is language without meaning distinguished from language with meaning?) Does an idling or holiday-making engine (PI §§ 132, 38) produce nonsense, for that's what an anormal (breaking the rules: either you are playing the game wrong, or you are not playing the game at all (OC § 446)) use of language is? Language's "original home" (PI § 116) = its normal use in the language = the normal "language game" (a comparison between using language and playing a game)? Is any attempted use outside that game nonsense; cf. trying to use the bishop in tennis or the tennis ball in chess?
Where do the limits lie to the normal "language game" e.g. with the word 'mind' -- because within those limits the word has sense, but outside it normally has none. Philosophical problems in Wittgenstein's view have their origin in failure to understand the limits of the normal "language game" (PI § 116).
Unexemplified = Undefined
Examples are the true masters to follow in philosophy, that is, in logic of language, language meaning or definition. The alternative is ill-defined -- i.e. undefined -- language.
"I am honestly disgusted with the other way of thinking." (LC iii § 37, p. 28)
The concept 'frame of reference' is deathly vague. When defining words Aristotle warned against ambiguity, metaphor, and words that are used neither literally nor metaphorically (Topics 140a). So far I have ignored all three -- and a further fourth, which Aristotle does not warn against, for I have given no examples to give 'frame of reference' meaning.
In his History of Philosophy Copleston gives few examples, and, as with Aristotle, the absence of examples to make his meaning clear limits the understanding of his work (that and its frequent prolixity). A worthwhile project for Veatch: The Illustrated Aristotle, not illustrated with drawings but with examples. If Voltaire's Letter is correct that "Aristotle [can be] explained a thousand ways, because he is unintelligible", this is why. Examples don't simply make the meaning clearer -- they determine the meaning (for all words whose the meaning is not an essential definition, which is most words).
Language that is obscure in meaning (Why else is anything "difficult to understand"? Well, it may be difficult, but language should not be the reason) is not a sign of profundity; it, like unreadable sentences ("professional philosophers" English), is a sign of incompetence: it is a sign of the inability of the writer to make his meaning clear, not the stupidity of his readers. On the other hand, however one writes, How is meaning made clear?
[Copleston says that the post-Kantian idealists were not concerned about possible criticism] that their profundity and obscure language were a mask for lack of clarity of thought. (History of Philosophy, Volume VII, I, 1) [About Hegel's work he says that] by no stretch of the imagination can The Phenomenology be described as an introduction to philosophy in the sense of a work of philosophy-without-tears [Russell's mocking expression, in contrast to the vocabulary and language of educated people; G.E. Moore about Russell: "too confident of insufficient explanations as to meaning of words"; Frege about the TLP: "from the very beginning I find myself tangled in doubt as to what it is [Wittgenstein wants] to say and can make no headway with it"]. On the contrary, it is a profound work and often extremely difficult to understand. (ibid. IX, 5)
Obscurity is not profound; it is nonsense (undefined language). Being able to talk in language that never comes down to earth and abuse words, i.e. not use them as they are normally used (imaging that one is identifying the true essences of things, as if those assumed-to-exist essences rather than conventions were the meaning of language), is not a sign of philosophical understanding, much less of wisdom (however "clever" one has to be to do it; Copleston's rather fatuous remarks about language meaning).
George Berkeley and Immanuel Kant
To be is to be -- not perceived nor conceived -- but, rather, To be is to be a conceived (or conceptualized) percept. That is all we know about reality. Reality is reality relative to some reference point (in this case, a concept) or other, not reality as it really is, absolute reality, if there is such a thing, which there is not, because 'absolute point of reference' is undefined language. (In Wittgenstein's jargon, these are "grammatical" remarks, reminders about the use of words in the language.)
The role Berkeley assigns to God in his metaphysics may give a meaning to the expression 'absolute perspective' in contrast to 'relative (or relational) perspective' -- but in our normal use of the expression 'relative perspective' its antithesis is not 'absolute perspective'.
"The grass is green" (Russell) -- in human eyes with the concepts 'grass' and 'green' and 'proposition of fact', but to ask "what is it really?" is to ask a question which simply has no meaning. (This is an issue of modesty, of not thinking you know what you don't know. That is all I want to say about this, because I think it is all we know.)
George Berkeley on the reification of general terms
Further, as to all we know and no more than we know, Berkeley could say that we do not know that there is a thing-in-itself, because we have, of course, no experience of anything existing independently of our perceiving. We only presume -- or deduce -- that there is such a thing, following the grammatical rule (rule of language meaning) that perception is perception of something, that 'perceiver' and 'perceived' are complementary terms . And further, that a thing-in-itself is the difference between a perception and an hallucination (but this distinction presupposes the existence of an independently existing thing; it does not prove that there is such a thing).
But if we give up the thing-in-itself, i.e. discard the concept 'thing-in-itself', where does that leave us? For mustn't we then also discard the concept 'percept', again because a perception, if it is not an hallucination, is a perception of something? Or isn't it true that we have no experience of a thing-in-itself? We have relative-to-perception experience and knowledge of the thing-in-itself, for it is only because we do not have absolute experience and knowledge of it that we call it "the thing-in-itself" rather than just "the thing". (And to say that is not to say more than we know.)
When G.E. Moore holds up his hands and says "I know that I have two hands", the mistake is that Moore (like Galileo) speaks as though he were speaking from the absolute point of view. From the human, the relative point of view, his statement is either "true but trivial" (Veatch) or proof, say, that he speaks English. But it is not proof that he "really" knows that he has hands or that physical objects or material substances really exist, as if he saw reality through the eyes of God.
Is it like this, that "I must begin with the distinction between mental and extra-mental things; nothing is possible prior to that; I can't give it a foundation" (cf. the distinction between sense and nonsense (PG i § 81, p. 126-127)). Can the existence of extra-mental things be demonstrated? -- It is no use appealing to our normal use of language which assumes that they do exist: normal use is only a concept (rule for using a word), not a proof (cf. Z § 223). But can a "language game" be based on a false assumption and still be playable?
About the proposition 'physical objects exist (or don't exist)', Wittgenstein writes: "For them it is not nonsense" (OC § 37). It perplexes me why he says that, because if it is not nonsense for them, then it is also not nonsense for everyone else but instead a combination of words with a use in the language (and if that is so, then Wittgenstein's banishment of metaphysics appears arbitrary).
Logic and Metaphysics
A proper name, such as 'William', signifies a particular thing, while a general word [common name, universal] signifies indifferently a plurality of things of a certain kind ... If we once understand this, we shall be saved from hunting for mysterious entities [abstract general ideas] corresponding to general words .... if we suppose that because we can frame [a general word, e.g. 'material substance', that word] must signify an entity apart from the objects of perception, we are misled by words. [This Berkeley's nominalism.] (Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Volume V (1959) XII, 2)
An abstraction (the discarding of some aspects while retaining others), an abstract term, is not the name of an "abstract object". Language tempts us to reification (hypostatization) through the picture "words are names and the meaning of a name is the thing the name stands for" and "a noun is the name of a person, place, or thing".
Although, of course, Plato does not look at (conceive) the question of the meaning of common names ("abstract terms") that way: e.g. the concept 'man' is not merely notice taken of the similarities among men (as Ockham says), but the essence or archetype of man: it is what is unchanging and therefore what is absolutely real, although suprasensible. But 'suprasensible' or 'imperceptible' means unverifiable; and that is the difference between Plato's logic of language and e.g. Wittgenstein's, or the difference between metaphysics (theorizing or speculation) and "facts in plain view" philosophy (if that is a philosophy and not just a logic of language).
A "Limiting Concept"
Of course, the concept 'thing-in-itself' is an abstraction -- is Kant guilty then of reifying an abstraction? No, 'thing-in-itself' is only a "limiting concept" (Grenzbegriff, if I know what that means) for Kant: it marks the point at which knowledge stops; it is not possible to know more about what the thing-in-itself is (although that is a false account of the expression's meaning; I think we could simply call the concept 'thing-in-itself' a reminder). The question is which limit does it mark? For, according to Kant, it is not even possible to know that things-in-themselves exist, for "existence" is a category of the understanding (Copleston, History of Philosophy, Volume VI, XII, 8); it is a judgment and as such belongs to the subject, not to the object.
And (again if I understand, and I don't think I do) Kant's categories are the categories applicable to perceptible things only (which the thing-in-itself is not): there is no justification for applying them to imperceptible or suprasensible things (which the thing-in-itself is). Perception marks the limit of knowledge.
On the other hand, how does Kant know that the categories are not applicable to suprasensible (non-perceptible) reality? What we know is that they aren't necessarily, but may be.
Is there nothing in the mind that was not first in the senses?
And how does Kant know that all knowledge begins in sense perception, because that proposition is not itself a sense perception, and even if it were possible to reason (for it is not obvious) to that proposition, the principle of contradiction is neither perceived nor reasoned to.
We can say that this or that speculation is invalid (self-contradictory, fallacious or nonsense) -- but not that speculation as such is. Unless it is demonstrated that the application of Kant's categories to the imperceptible is nonsense -- i.e. "mere sound without sense" -- then metaphysical speculation is possible. Speculation is not knowledge, of course, but that is not my question here.
The theory of abstract general ideas
In the notebooks [ Berkeley] remarks that Locke would have done better to begin his Essay with the third book. [He thought that if Locke] had begun with an examination and critique of language, he might not have fallen into his theory of abstract general ideas, which, according to Berkeley, was largely responsible for the doctrine of material substance. (Copleston, History V, XIII, 5)
That seems related to saying that we hypostatize an abstraction if we imagine the expression 'thing-in-itself' to be the name of an independently existing thing. When in our thinking we set aside some aspect of a thing (or our perception of a thing), that does not turn what remains into a separately existing thing, e.g. a material substratum (Locke), the "matter" of materialism (Berkeley).
The grammar of 'thing-in-itself'
The "thing-in-itself" is not picturable; it is not a vague, gray something or other. It is not a shadowy thing, nor the shadow cast by a thing (Plato). The expression 'thing-in-itself ' is not the name of a thing at all. It is a grammatical shorthand, not a "extra-mental thing" category. (Kant, philosophy and grammar)
What Berkeley denies is that "something exists without a mind to perceive it", namely "matter or corporeal substance", something which is not an object of perception.
But as we normally use the word 'matter' it contrasts with 'mind', as 'physical' does with 'mental', which is not an hypothesis about what the "substance" (physis) of mind or matter is -- indeed, as we normally use language, the question 'What is matter?' is nonsense (i.e. undefined), as is 'What is mind?'
What needs to be eliminated is only the mistaken presumption that the proposition 'There is a thing-in-itself ' or 'There are physical objects' is a statement of fact or a metaphysical thesis rather than a rule of grammar. As explained above, the concept 'thing-in-itself' is shorthand for: there are only relative points of reference, or, in other words 'absolute perspective' is an undefined combination of words. Berkeley notwithstanding, that there is something to be distinguished from thought is a grammatical rule; rather than 'matter' it might simply be called 'non-thought'; that is not a thesis but only a concept (grammar) or frame of reference.
What would it be like if there were an absolute perspective which man could discover? Well, we haven't any idea, if idea = picture.
Aristotle and Kant (Realism versus Criticism)
From a logical viewpoint the Categories comprise the ways in which we think about things -- for instance, predicating qualities of substances -- but at the same time they are ways in which things actually exist: things are substances and actually have accidents. The Categories demand, therefore, not only a logical but also a metaphysical treatment.
Aristotle's Logic, then, must not be likened to the Transcendental Logic of Kant, since it is not concerned to isolate a priori forms of thought which are contributed by the mind alone in its active process of knowledge. Aristotle does not raise the "Critical Problem": he assumes a realist epistemology, and assumes that the categories of thought which we express in language, are also the objective categories of extramental reality. (Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Volume I (1946) XXVIII, 2)
"There are things which have qualities that change or can change; not every quality of those things is essential or defining." Is that like saying 'There are objects and there is space'? Do such propositions belong in the book "The World as I Found It" (TLP 5.631) as very general facts of nature? A fish might write 'There is water'. That is, in a different world it might be false that there is unoccupied space.
Is the proposition 'There are objects' a statement of fact -- in what context? About the proposition '3 + 4 = 7' we don't ask in what context. Is that because 'There are objects' is a statement of fact about the world (extra-mental reality) and therefore can be false? Is the proposition 'There are no objects' false or nonsense (an undefined combination of words)?
Is the proposition 'There are substances and accidents' -- a statement about "extra-mental reality" in contrast to a "form of thought which is contributed by the mind alone"? (What would it be like if it were or if were not "contributed by the mind alone"?) And the proposition 'Things change' or 'There are things that change'?
"Things are substances and actually have accidents" is a rule or model of grammar: it is a way of characterizing or classifying things, not a very general statement of fact. In contrast 'Socrates has bulging eyes' is a statement of fact. (The word "actually", if it has any function, would make the proposition false -- not as a statement of fact, but as a rule of grammar.)
Professor Henry Veatch called Aristotle "the philosopher of common sense" -- is that what "There are substances and accidents" is? I cannot remember the example of a metaphysical proposition Veatch said was "true though trivial", but he did say, "It's just common sense!" Was he mistaken? Can a sentence be both a rule of grammar and a "just common sense" statement of fact? Is there no necessary difference (i.e. necessary if a distinction is to be maintained between sense and nonsense) between grammatical rules and statements of fact? Does Veatch make no distinction? In which case 'There are objects ', 'Two is a number' and 'Blue is a color' state extra-linguistic facts (i.e. facts about something other than the English language), as does 'There are no round squares'.
Is Aristotle's "realist epistemology" this: that man's conceived facts are nature's own truth? Russell's example of naive realism: "The grass is really green" [Note].
The "Critical Problem": do we know anything more about reality than our conceived percepts? Or is the mind of man the mind of nature: is the book of nature written in the language of mathematics (Galileo), which is a human language?
[Berkeley: Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities is an illusion dependent "on that strange doctrine of abstract ideas" (Copleston, History V, V, 4; Principles of Human Knowledge 1, 11). And certainly, abstract ideas (i.e. abstract objects) do not exist in our world (Plato, Parmenides 133c). There is not in this world any such thing as solidness, size or motion "in general" (largeness, quickness, solidness). Size and motion are just as dependent as color, scent and sound on the perspective of the perceiver.]
Phenomenology
What the phenomenologist wants, if I understand (and I often don't), is to have unmediated access to reality; but to perceive bare, i.e. unconceptualized, things, is an impossibility: anything so perceived would be unintelligible (a completely unintelligible reality would be the only result, chaos; even to see shapes and colors requires the concepts 'shape' and 'color'). An indescribable (i.e. cannot be put into words) reality is outside the purview (remit) of philosophy, because (Socratic) philosophy is "discourse of reason".
The "thing-in-itself" and Idealism
The [idealist] transformation of the Kantian theory of knowledge into a metaphysics of reality carries with it, of course, certain important changes. For example, if with the elimination of the thing-in-itself [by Fichte] the world becomes the self-manifestation of thought or reason, the Kantian distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori loses its absolute character. And the categories, instead of being subjective forms or conceptual moulds of the human understanding, become categories of reality; they regain an objective status. (Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Volume VII (1963) I, 2)
The expression 'thing-in-itself' is not the name of something, but its only meaning is instead that (1) all perception is concept-laden and (2) relative to a particular, but neither necessary nor exclusive, conception, and (3) any perception must, if it is not an hallucination, be the perception of something independent of the perceiver. But the expression 'thing-in-itself' is not the name of an "unknowable substratum" that someone might deny the existence of. (It functions as a grammatical reminder only.)
Can it be that idealism denies that there are hallucinations? To eliminate the distinction between "before experience" (or "independently of experience") and "after experience (or "verified by experience") is to eliminate all objectivity but formal logical objectivity.
[Of course there would still be a way to distinguish between mental and extra-mental reality, namely: whatever is independent of my will belongs to extra-mental reality (or the world). That would be one way to make the distinction, and to maintain objectivity. Of course, the criterion for making the distinction is not perfect, e.g. because I can somewhat control my body and yet my body belongs to extra-mental reality. (A basic description of consciousness or awareness.)]
For there to be objectivity, idealism seems to require that there be an "absolute perspective", which for Berkeley belongs to God, for Fichte, Schelling and Hegel either belongs to or is the Absolute. But the presumption of the phenomenologist doesn't reach so far as the idealist's: the former only wants to deconceptualize the things -- i.e. to see without preconceptions, to experience an "unconceptualized thing". The idealist has no need of that: for idealism the concepts we have belong not only to the individual human mind, but also to the supra-individual Absolute Mind. The grass really is green. The Absolute has no mis-conceptions.
That account seems too fantastic to be anything but a misunderstanding.
Comment: "the Absolute" seems an abstraction (and maybe a "composition" (Boethius) as well, for consciousness is abstracted from the individual, then consciousness and universality are composed into a supra-individual Consciousness); is this particular taking apart and putting together various elements of experience and thought nonsense?) of dubious meaning. Anyway, it is madness to hypothesize it.
'There are objects'
The question is: what is the logic of language (the verifiable distinction between sense and nonsense) here? Is the proposition 'There are no objects' nonsense, an undefined combination of words or is it a false statement of fact? Does it belong to grammar (an explanation of the use of language) or to common sense -- i.e. common experience? I can describe the proposition 'There are substances and accidents' as grammar (I can explain the meaning of Aristotle's jargon). But can I describe a use for it as a statement of fact?
And its negation? The proposition 'There are no objects' seems related to "Why is there something rather than nothing?" Both want to wipe the slate clean. When Wittgenstein says "[the language game] is there -- like our life" (OC § 559), is he talking nonsense? 'There is our life.' 'There is a world: objects, space, motion, memory, ideas.'
Here the understanding seems to run into a wall. Here, I'd say: If there is to be a distinction between sense and nonsense, we have to make a distinction between rules of grammar (definitions) and statements of (extra-linguistic) fact. The proposition 'There are round squares' is not false; it is nonsense, i.e. it is a combination of words with no use in the language (It is nonsense because it is a contradiction in sense, however, not because it is a contradiction in form). The contrary account -- the account that does not make that distinction -- supposes that every combination of words with the form statement-of-fact states a fact. It is the absence of a logic of language.
"Statements of fact are informative." Can you say the proposition 'There are objects' is uninformative about extra-grammatical reality? What you can say is that it is not a move in any "language game"; normally it has no use in the language. Compare the propositions 'There are cats' or 'There are fairies', for these may be true or false statements about the world of experience. Can we describe a context in which the proposition -- i.e. combination of words -- 'There are objects' has a use? (Maybe, if there is a metaphysical use of language.) In that context it is not nonsense.
Contradiction versus "first principles"
"I have to distinguish between a definition and a statement of fact, as I have to distinguish between concepts (ideas) and things (objects, phenomena), and as I have to distinguish between sense and nonsense in language. Prior to that philosophy, or discourse of reason, is impossible." (cf. PG i § 81, p. 126-127) Like the principle of contradiction.
Or unlike it. For if anything might claim to be innate or knowable a priori it is the principle of contradiction; certainly it isn't learned by experience, for as Aristotle says, all learning and knowledge presuppose it (Metaphysics 1005b (IV, 3)). Whereas in contrast, the distinction between meaning (sense and nonsense) and truth (true or false) does have to be learned, as witnessed by our presumption that all propositions are statements of fact, e.g. that 'Blue is a color' is a statement of fact about blue.
it is impossible for the same man at the same time to believe the same thing to be and not to be; for if a man were mistaken on this point he would have contrary opinions at the same time. It is for this reason that all who are carrying out a demonstration reduce it to [the principle of contradiction] as an ultimate belief; for this is naturally the starting-point even for all the other axioms. (ibid. tr. W.D. Ross)
I think the three distinctions (or "first principles") I mention above are axioms. And it seems correct that all assume the principle of contradiction, e.g. that the same proposition is not both true and false, both sense and nonsense, that a thing is not both a percept and a concept, at the same time and in the same sense.
The principle of contradiction was not born in the cradle of logic. It is the parent of logic.
Contradiction isn't the unique thing philosophers think it is. It isn't the only inadmissible form ... (Wittgenstein to Moore)
But that is the point, that it is not a contradiction in form (syntax) which must be rejected, but only a contradiction in sense. And Aristotle, who Wittgenstein said he had never read a word of (Recollections p. 158), says as much, emphasizing "the same thing".
Is the distinction between sense and nonsense as fundamental as the principle of contradiction? But don't we have to learn that, not only are there propositions whose meaning we do not understand, but also propositions (combinations of words) that are nonsense (mere scribble or noise)?
Innate Ideas
You cannot say that the principle of contradiction prius fuerit in sensu ("was first in the senses"), because you cannot say that the principle is or ever was in the senses (in sensu)? Why? because the claim is meaningless, an undefined combination of words.
When was Augustine's "If I doubt, I am" in the senses? The principle of contradiction is the basis of rationality (reasonableness): it is something man brings with him into the world, not something he learns in the world. If this principle were not innate to man, he would not be rational.
What would it even mean to say that the propositions of logic were -- or were not -- in the senses?
The principle of contradiction is an innate idea -- unless you are simply unwilling to call anything an innate idea. What criterion must an idea meet to be classified as innate? What would an example of an innate idea be?
If you give a dog contradictory commands it looks at you in confusion. Does that show that the dog is rational? Was the principle of contradiction first in the dog's senses?
"Nothing is known of extra-mental reality other than by sense perception"? A dog will seek out running water, avoiding drinking standing water -- is that not a priori knowledge of extra-mental reality? Should instinct be called innate knowledge? A dog's thoughts are not, what man's mostly are, namely language, but a dog nonetheless has knowledge.
Grammar is (like) the setup for a game
Saying 'There are objects' is like putting the pieces on a chessboard (That's what grammar is); so far you are not playing the game, i.e. stating an extra-linguistic fact; the same for 'There are substances and accidents'; cf. 'There are subjects and predicates'. It is a grammatical proposition, an explanation of the meaning of language, I think Wittgenstein says. Grammar is like the setup for a game, e.g. the marking of a field, the raising of nets, in contrast to playing the game (cf. rules of the game); it is a preparation of language for use, not a use of language. (Cf. designating a gold bar in Paris as a standard of length is not to take a measurement; it is only to make it possible to take measurements by comparison to that standard.)
There are different kinds of rules in chess, e.g. the rule for moving the bishop is of a different kind from the rule for where to place the bishop when setting up the chessboard. Nonetheless both these are rules of grammar = rules for playing the game.
Either that or Veatch is right, but I think Veatch is wrong because he makes no distinction between statements about the extra-linguistic world and statements about language: thus 'Mary has a little lamb' and 'The name 'Mary' has four letters' are not distinguished -- because every proposition is treated as a statement of fact about the world. (What is Professor Veatch's logic of language -- how does he distinguish sense from nonsense, i.e. language with determinate meaning from "mere sound without sense"?)
'There are physical objects'
'A is a physical object' is a piece of instruction which we give only to someone who doesn't yet understand either what 'A' means, or what 'physical object' means. Thus it is instruction about the use of words, and 'physical object' is a logical concept. (Like color, quantity, ...) And that is why no such proposition as: 'There are physical objects' can be formulated. (OC § 36)
In other words, if 'meaning' is defined as 'use in the language', then the only meaning = use in the language 'There are physical objects' has is as a tool for "instruction about the use of words". In no context does it function as a statement of fact if a statement of fact is informative (except possibly as a fact about the English language). (The proposition 'The table wobbles' might be used to define the word 'wobbles', but it might also be used to state a fact about the table. That is not the case with 'A is a physical object'.)
The Possibility of Metaphysics
But is it an adequate answer to the skepticism of the idealist, or the assurances of the realist, to say that 'There are physical objects' is nonsense? For them after all it is not nonsense. (ibid. § 37)
Well, this is it: either there is a "metaphysical use" of language or there is not, i.e. there is nonsense. Is there a language in which the proposition 'Physical objects do not exist' is not nonsense (an undefined combination of words)? If Plato says that the essence of man is his soul -- it is not Plato's intention to state a verbal definition, a rule for using the word 'man'. Could he say that this is not a grammatical remark about the word 'man' ("what I mean by the word 'man'"), but a statement of fact about the thing or phenomenon man?
'There are physical objects.' (cf. 'There are solid objects.') Does that combination of words have a use in the language? Can you describe that use, explain the meaning of that proposition to other people? And in what context would you give that explanation? Isn't that proposition simply a rule of grammar? But the proposition 'Men have souls that can exist independently of the body'?
The two possible meanings of 'meaning' (in contrast to 'nonsense') according to Wittgenstein
"... that this way or the other must be right", that either, as the TLP has, (1) the meaning of a word is the thing the word names (and thus that to know the meaning of the word one must examine the nature of the thing named, regardless of whether that thing is an object, phenomenon or abstraction), or, as the Philosophical Investigations has, (2) the meaning of a word is its use in the language (a convention, a more or less arbitrary rule).
But did Wittgenstein later mean that it was exclusively one or the other? For see the second part of Wittgenstein's remark (PI § 43) -- "... and the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer", and it would seem that 'bearer' = 'the thing the name stands for'.
'Meaning' and 'explanation of meaning' -- are these different concepts or only one concept? The meaning of a name is explained by pointing, but the thing pointed to is not the name's meaning. Pointing to Mopsy, Flopsy and Cottontail may be how we learn it use the word 'rabbit', and how we explain its meaning to others (ibid. § 208). But Mopsy, Flopsy and Cottontail are not the meaning of the word 'rabbit'. For if all rabbits were to stop existing, the word 'rabbit' would not thereby be rendered meaningless (ibid. § 40). (Although we might say that the meaning of that word would change -- because its explanation of meaning would change, as we explain the meaning of the word 'dodo' differently from the way we explain the meaning of the word 'rabbit'.)
Is the explanation of meaning the meaning of a word?
Could we say that the words 'meaning' and 'explanation of meaning' are synonyms in our logic of language, that we might have the slogan, "Don't ask for the meaning -- Ask for the explanation of meaning": the meaning is the explanation of meaning?
Could we say that (1) "the meaning of the word 'dog' is its use in the language", and (2) its use in the language (its category of language use or "part of speech") is "common name", and (3) the use in the language of a common name is explained by pointing to the bearer (or some of the bearers) of that name? The definition "meaning = use in the language" is meant to distinguish names from words that are not names, not to destroy all distinctions.
The common names in philosophy
Are Plato's words 'justice', 'courage', 'piety', 'self-control', and 'wisdom' common names if by 'common name' we mean the common nature (a defining common quality or essence) named by the common name? According to the first account above, the common nature would by the "thing" the word names and therefore the word's meaning, an essence, at least in the context of Plato, is a thing. But what if there is or were no common nature -- would that make those words nonsense (meaningless)? How do we in fact explain the meaning of the word 'justice'? We talk about law and equity or fairness -- and we give examples. Plato's essential definition "Justice is correct conduct towards men, as Piety is correct conduct towards God" (Gorgias 507b) is too vague to provide the universal standard Socrates was looking for in ethics.
The philosophical reason for rejecting the first account of language meaning (namely that the meaning of a word is the any-thing the word names) is that it creates a problem but offers no solution to it (cf. BB p. 19-20), for it makes it impossible to define -- and not only apparently impossible to define -- many basic notions of philosophy, questions such as Plato asked, e.g. "What is knowledge?" Wittgenstein: Philosophical investigations = conceptual investigations (Z § 458), i.e. investigations, not of "unapparent" phenomena, but of rules for using words based on the facts in plain view; and thus, as in the second account, "the meaning of a word is its use according to rules in the language". Rules are guides. And if the rules are indefinite?
"We are frequently puzzled and at a loss in obtaining clear and determined meanings of words commonly in use." (Berkeley, Philosophical Commentaries § 591; quoted by Copleston, History V, XII, 1)
Non-existent rules are no more guides than non-existent ("unidentifiable") essences.
If the meaning of word is presumed to be the thing (object or phenomenon) the word names, then discussions of the meaning of abstract terms like 'justice' or 'goodness' are mere guesses trying to lasso a cloud. Asking what the essence of (the phenomenon of) justice is leads only into perplexity (but maybe an abstract term can be defined).
The meaning of a word is the explanation of the meaning of the word in the particular case at hand. Seeking general definitions in philosophy, especially without examples, is a misconception of the logic of our language with respect to the words that concern philosophy.
"I answer you are abused by the [word] 'thing'; [this is a] vague, empty [word] without a meaning." (Berkeley, Philosophical Commentaries § 581; quoted by Copleston, History V, XII, 1)
Not two different ways of looking at the same thing (?)
When in his later account of language meaning Wittgenstein says that (1) meaning is not a matter of form -- (i.e. a function of syntax alone -- If it were there would be no false syntactic analogies: there would be rules of syntax and the only nonsense would be the breaking of those rules; the meaning of a name would be the thing the word named, and the meaning of a proposition would be the order in which those names and their modifiers were arranged) -- but that (2) meaning is a matter of use in the language (If it has no use, it is meaningless), he is stating the conclusion, not presumption of his investigation -- it is a post-conception, not a pre-conception of the logic of our language.
An account DEF.= an explanation; the explanation may be a description or it may be a (metaphysical) theory. For example, "There are common names in our language, but the meaning of most common names is not a common nature" is an account that describes only the acknowledged facts, the facts in plain view (Z § 211; PI § 599). In contrast, Plato's account is a theory: "There are common names because the soul became acquainted with the archetypes named by common names when it dwelled in the realm of absolutes before the soul was embodied; and the meaning of common names is these archetypes." Wittgenstein says that philosophy can only describe, not explain -- but, then, isn't Plato's work philosophy? Wittgenstein could only say what he wanted philosophy (his logic-philosophy) to be, not what it is or can be.
The historical Socrates asks for an account of what you know, or think you know: "If a man knows anything, he can explain what he knows to others" (Xenophon, Memorabilia iv, 6, 1), and if it is clear and not self-contradictory, then, even if the account is not proved and therefore not knowledge, it is not dismissed as idle. Wittgenstein request is possibly more limited: "The difficulty in philosophy is to say no more than you know" (BB p. 45), and by 'know' Wittgenstein means only 'know about the facts in plain view', which are the facts that "anyone knows and must admit" (Z § 211). Plato, however, found those facts inadequate for explaining language meaning (concept-formation), and therefore Plato chose to speculate (theorize) about what can be inferred from those facts. (Plato's work is thus metaphysical, while Wittgenstein's work is (what I call) "logic of language".)
For clarity I have used the word 'account' here rather than the ambiguous word 'view', because these are not two different frames of reference ("views" = ways of looking at things) -- but two different accounts of the picture ("reality") found within the same frame. On the other hand, I don't know about that, because Plato's frame of reference (derived from Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Socrates) seems to have, indeed has, more (or different) elements (principles) than Wittgenstein's frame of reference has.
And I wrote apparently the opposite elsewhere, for I said that (1) although there are many meanings of 'meaning', (2) Wittgenstein chose to use only one for his logic of language -- and (3) that choice was the reference point (i.e. view or way of looking at things).
And now which account, if either, is correct? Does Plato define the word 'meaning' differently from Wittgenstein, or do they merely disagree about what the meaning of language is? About the "what" of language? The word 'meaning' has no meaning apart from a definition. Is a frame of reference a definition? Do definitions belong to the frame? (Without examples, the metaphor 'frame of reference' is very far too vague.) But now, obviously if Wittgenstein defines 'meaning of a word', except for names of objects, as use in the language, and Plato defines 'meaning of a word' as the absolute archetype the thing named by the word imitates, then they define 'meaning of a word' differently.
But is it obvious? Why do we use the same expression, namely 'meaning of a word', for both if the definitions are different -- for shouldn't we use different expressions? Ockham and Wittgenstein say that we call them both 'meaning' because of the similarities between them. Which are?
Copleston writes that "language follows thought and thought follows things", from which it should follow that "things" are the cause and explanation of concept-formation, e.g. of the grammar of the word 'mind', and so 'The word 'mind' is the name of a thing' would be a rule of grammar (But of what kind of grammar -- a metaphysical grammar? That is what Copleston denies here. And yet, if that rule is not the result of false analogy and reification, then that is what it must be, for otherwise it is a false account of the normal use of the word 'mind' in our language). Ockham thought that language is the clothing of thought about experience and thought itself, that experience and thought are the foundation of all knowledge, that to perceive is spontaneously to conceive, our concepts arising naturally from our percepts. But false analogy and hypostatization too are foundations of thought: both arise from presuming that all words are the names of things, and thus the word 'mind' must be the name of a thing, or at least of something.
It is easy to confuse yourself with your own vocabulary, especially in philosophy where there is nothing but vocabulary (language and logic). According to Wittgenstein (Z § 458), that is.
Factual (metaphysical) Principles versus Rules for Reasoning
If the first account above of language meaning is correct, then metaphysics (i.e. the discovery of knowledge through the investigation of our concepts) is possible; but if the second is correct, then it is not.
If the first principles of Thomas Aquinas are "Archimedean" (i.e. factual, or maybe they are metaphysical since they claim to be universal), then the existence and quality of suprasensible things, such as the existence of God, can be deduced from them (According to Gilson, this was the view before Kant), but if they are only principles of reasoning (i.e. if they belong to the frame rather than to the picture it frames), then this is not possible.
Concepts are dictated by extra-mental nature: they are dictated by the picture, not part of the picture frame (Ockham)
Ockham says that concepts arise naturally from sense perception ("intuition"): to perceive is simultaneously to conceive (He calls these concepts "natural signs"). But if that is so, then isn't metaphysics possible for Ockham -- because is there effectively any difference between innate first principles and "natural concepts"? If both are Archimedean (factual rather than merely conventional or methodological), then from both it should be possible to deduce things about reality, because in both cases concept-formation is imposed by reality. But Ockham says that although propositions (a concept only has meaning in a proposition) based on sense perception are composed of natural concepts, they are only probable, and therefore whatever we infer from them is also only probable.
For Ockham, if metaphysics is to be knowledge of imperceptible things, its premises must be certain; but if only tautologies (i.e. propositions the negations of which are self-contradictory) are certain, then unless tautologies are informative, metaphysical knowledge is impossible. Concepts that do not arise from [begin in] sense perception are intra-mental only. Nothing metaphysical [i.e. about extra-mental, suprasensible reality] can be deduced [derived] from them. Why? Because all knowledge begins in experience, i.e. sense perception.
Which is a proposition that cannot be demonstrated. But if man is a product of nature, then knowledge of the first principles of reasoning is implanted in him by nature (like a bird's knowledge of how to build a nest), and so why shouldn't those principles have universal application? Even if they had or have, the limitation here is that there are two tests to truth: reason and experience; and metaphysics is pure reason.
There really is something to what Schlegel says. In philosophy we work by guessing, and then try to make something of our guesses. But you're always guessing at the next step. Contra Schlegel, however, you don't know whether you've got anything sound until logic approves it and experience doesn't contradict it. And it strikes you as plausible.
"... a leap, in which one does not know where one is going to arrive, and after which, when one looks back, one does not really see the point of departure." (Kant, Nachlaß, in Copleston, History, Volume VI, XVI, 1)
Endnotes
Kant, geometry, philosophy, and grammar
As Copleston describes it, if I understand, according to Kant a geometer invents his concepts independently of experience, whereas the philosopher takes his concepts from experience (and tries to them "clear, explicit and definite"). (A History of Philosophy, Volume VI, X, 3. Kant, Enquiry into the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals (1764), 2)
But don't the geometer and the philosopher both take and invent: both set limits to experience by means of concepts: both create abstractions (selections)? The difference is that only the (borders of the) concepts invented by the philosopher to capture phenomena are open to revision, whereas the concepts of geometry are not: they are bound by the strictest of rules (as is the game of chess). On the one hand logical consistency and plausibility, and on the other logical necessity.
The geometer invents the geometrical objects he studies in the sense that they are abstractions and do not exist (lines without width, planes without depth), but it can hardly be said that triangles, lines and planes are not given to us in experience. The point of geometry was "to measure the earth" (and it is significant that there are compass and straightedge constructions), not to be a fantasy world. And if metaphysics "ends with definitions", it is because the philosopher has chosen limits for the phenomenon he is examining, which is another way of saying the philosopher has invented concepts (abstractions).
Philosophical definitions" versus grammatical clarifications (Kant)
... when philosophers construct definitions arbitrarily [i.e. when the concepts are "not something given to him but something which he has himself created"], these definitions are not properly speaking philosophical definitions. "Such determinations of the meaning of a word are never philosophical definitions; but if they are to be called clarifications at all, they are only grammatical clarifications." I can explain in what sense I intend to use the term ... but then I am acting as a grammarian rather than as a philosopher. (Copleston, idem. Kant, Enquiry 1, 1)
Kant and 'grammar'
Kant thus seems to say that "geometry is grammar" (cf. PI § 373: "Grammar tells what kind of object anything is"; geometry as grammar), or, in other words, according to Kant geometric definitions (which are verbal definitions) belong to grammar. So Kant appears to have used the word 'grammar' the way Wittgenstein does, saying that explanations of verbal meaning are the work of the grammarian, which amounts to calling verbal definitions (i.e. rules for using words) "grammatical definitions". In contrast, "philosophical definitions" are real definitions (i.e. hypotheses about the nature of things).
[Although, Kant did think that Euclidean geometry is knowledge of space, which means either that some tautologies (i.e. propositions that can be derived from grammatical rules) are knowledge or that not all of geometry's propositions are rules of grammar or their derivatives (i.e. whatever can be derived from grammatical rules). But Kant did not think in those terms.]
Aristotle made the distinction explicit when he contrasted nominal and real definitions: "the name thunder can be defined as noise in the clouds" versus "the nature of thunder is the noise of fire being quenched in the clouds". Nominal definitions belong to grammar.
Berkeley's Criticism of Locke's Distinction between Primary and Secondary Qualities
[LOCKE:] Some qualities are inseparable from a body, whatever changes it undergoes. A grain of wheat has solidity, extension, figure and mobility. If it is divided, each part retains these qualities. "These I call original or primary qualities of body, which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us, viz. solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number." Besides these primary qualities there are also secondary qualities. The latter are "nothing in the objects themselves but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities". Such are colours, sounds, tastes and odours. (Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Volume V, V, 4)
[BERKELEY:] But this distinction will not do. It is impossible to conceive primary [qualities] entirely apart from secondary qualities. "Extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable." Further, if, as Locke thought, the relativity of secondary qualities provides a valid argument for their subjectivity, the same sort of argument can be employed with regard to the primary qualities. Figure or shape, for example, depends on the position of the perceiver, while motion is either swift or slow, and these are relative terms. Extension in general and motion in general are meaningless terms, depending "on that strange doctrine of abstract ideas". In fine, primary qualities are no more independent of perception than are secondary qualities. (ibid. XII, 4)
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