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Is Reason not the Excellence most Proper to Man?
Preface: In order to "Know thyself" (and therefore how one should live one's life) it is necessary to know what manner of being man is. Is there a specific excellence that is proper to man, without which he cannot be a good man? And is not that excellence reason? But if reason is only able to rule in logic and metaphysics -- but not in ethics -- then how can reason be that excellence? Or can reason also rule in ethics?
Are the limits of reason in ethics more important than what can be done with reason in ethics? The three parts of Stoic philosophy can be described using Plato's form of expression.
Topics on this page ...
- The Three Parts of Philosophy
- Definitions are explanations of meaning, but they can also be tools
- The School of Pythagoras, for children who think they go to school to teach rather than to be taught
- The school of skepticism (Sextus Empiricus)
The Three Parts of Philosophy
Philosophy is the love of wisdom in metaphysics, logic and ethics, and may be defined using the form of expression in Plato's Republic and Gorgias:
- Ethics: "we are discussing no small matter, but how to live."
- Logic: we are discussing no small matter, but how to think: reason and the meaning of language.
- Metaphysics: we are discussing no small matter, but what is real: reality versus illusion (mere appearance).
And so there are the three parts of philosophy all expressed in Plato's format of "we are discussing no small matter, but ..." Well, those are the three parts, according to the Stoics. Of course there are many ways to slice a pie chart, partition philosophy.
In Greek Stoic's terms, their 'mathematics' = our 'natural science', and their 'physics' = our 'metaphysics'. (What is the history of the word 'logic' in philosophy? Ethics as that part of philosophy "concerned with life and all that has to do with us" (Diog. L. i, 18).)
[In these pages I have used the word 'metaphysics' to mean: (1) speculation about what is not in plain view but seems can be deduced from what is (e.g. common natures from common names); and (2) the eternal questions of existence and perspective.]
Query: the branch of philosophy which reflects on natural thinking itself is called?
Logic: no small matter, but how to reason by the natural light only; how to think by the natural light of reason alone. [About 585 B.C. philosophy began with Thales' use of natural reason alone as the "engine of discovery", seeking a natural (in contrast to mythical, myths about the gods) explanation of the natural world.]
Has reason the power to change men's lives?
Note: this continues the discussion of why, if "virtue is knowledge" and talk of "weakness of the will" is unserviceable, nonetheless self-discipline is needed to overcome base instincts and bad habits formed in the time of ignorance of the good.
To adapt the Apostle Paul's words "I came to you, not with Greek learning, but with the power of the Holy Spirit to change men's lives" [cf. 1 Thessalonians 1.5, 1 Corinthians 2.4], in philosophy we might say: "... with the power of reason to change men's lives". Socrates comes to us with the power of natural reason to change our life, not either with mysticism (Paul's "Holy Spirit") or unreason (Kant's "categorical imperative").
What is serviceable in ethics. Rather than thinking of yourself as rejecting bad habits, think of yourself as forming good habits, and thus find sweetness in learning good habits rather than frustration in your struggle against bad. That is, look at self-discipline (self-control) -- because this way is what is serviceable in ethics -- as gaining something, rather than giving up something. No one mourns the loss of what is bad -- but we may easily not think to take joy in the gain of what is good (cf. the perversity of a human heart which savors resentment but neglects gratitude).
You do not have to remain as you are, with your present reactions, attitudes and disposition, because bad habits can be changed, even what we call one's "natural disposition" or temperament can be changed, because they are, or can be treated as, bad habits. You can like Socrates "grow daily in goodness" ... but that does demand self-discipline = self-watchfulness to step back, to ward off a reaction which seems a natural (instinct) although it is often second nature. (A habit is "an acquired instinct": it is an acceptance, e.g. of anger and self-righteousness, as if that instinct were good rather than evil.)
[If the life of reason (of rational moral excellence) is the life that is the good for man, then is it not the case that one can become a good human being through "care of the soul"?]
"... and try to understand"
What is the meaning of Paul's words (for is it clear what Paul means by 'wisdom') when he reminds his followers that "not many of you were wise after [according to] the flesh" (1 Corinthians 1.26) when they were called? Is it shown by the following, which was written by St. Bonaventure?
... he went about all the cities and towns preaching the Gospel, not with the words of human wisdom, but in the power of the Spirit, announcing the kingdom of God. (The Life of Saint Francis of Assisi, ed. Manning (1867), iv, tr. not named)
Does that mean that Paul did not speak to the understanding, that he somehow bypassed reasoning, like someone pouring sand unshaped into a vessel? But that is not what the Lord does in the Gospel when he says "Give ear, and try to understand": Jesus asks his hearers to think: What is the meaning of my words; what is the meaning of this story (parable) I tell you? All his life and from his youth Albert Schweitzer had thought that "the fundamental principles of Christianity have to be proved true by reasoning", although as the Lord says, it may sometimes be difficult to reason to an understanding of his words.
Definitions are explanations of meaning, but they can also be tools
All explanations of meaning are definitions. (Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge, 1930-1932, ed. Desmond Lee (1980), p. 112)
Nonsense is produced by trying to express by the use of language what ought to be embodied in the grammar. (PP iii, p. 312)
That would be another way of saying that "there are no real definitions in philosophy" ..... In some respects, my own understanding of Wittgenstein is as comparatively hard-edged as his thought was in the early 1930s; it softens with the Philosophical Investigations and later. For example, early on the meaning of any [and all] word was its use in the language, so that he would say, as I used to, that one use of a word was to name (rather than saying that "the meaning of a name is often explained by pointing to its bearer"); later it is only "for a large class of cases -- but not for all ..." (PI § 43)
Proper names do not function differently as symbols from such words as 'and'. Their meaning is given by their use, by the rules applying to them. (PP iii, p. 312)
Rather than "hard-edged" above, I might have said dogmatic ("It often happens that we regard a philosopher's thought as less in flux (developing) than he ever did himself"), as indeed was Wittgenstein at that time. That was because his ideas then were new to him, as they are maybe only slightly less so for me still today.
The following search query was found (as were the others marked "Query" below) in the logs of my Web site:
Query: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.
It would be clearer, if you are going to take these words, which were not intended to be a slogan or thesis [metaphysical theory], out of Wittgenstein's context of "for a large class of cases -- though not for all" (PI § 43) to say "A meaning of a word is its use in the language", for any word at all may be looked at from that point of view.
But on the other hand, it may be that Wittgenstein intended his remark as a proposition (or, simple statement of fact -- a fact about English language usage that is, not as it were a fact about meaning -- (The word 'meaning' is only the sign (sound, ink mark) 'meaning' plus whatever use human beings make of that sign; Wittgenstein likened a sign to a tool, where what interests him about the tool is its use only) -- This is what we mean by the word 'meaning' in a large class of cases where we say that word, rather than, as according to my account: This is a useful (to philosophy) selected definition of the word 'meaning' -- which would appear then to be my "logic of language", not Wittgenstein's ...
... in which case my account ("There are many meanings of 'meaning' -- Wittgenstein chose one") would be a false account (although see the lecture note recorded by Moore), although I am unsure about whether I present Wittgenstein's views as more conventional, as opposed to "restrictive" (see above), than they actually were.
Query: definition of illusion according to different psychologists.
There cannot be "a real definition of illusion" in psychology (as if psychology were a branch of physics as e.g. optics is), only a verbal definition of the word 'illusion'. But some verbal definitions of that word may be more useful to psychology (or in a particular psychologist's work, or in particular work in psychology) than others. cf. Wittgenstein's remarks about grammar. He does not give a real definition, but only a verbal definition of the word 'grammar', one that is useful for his work in philosophy.
Other examples of this. I am very strict [restrictive] in my application (and that means in my thinking, not only writing) of the word 'nonsense', as well as of 'sign' and 'concept', even though of course we use those words in countless ways, not just in the ones I have selected (i.e. I have made them my jargon). In my Socrates of Xenophon page I write that "an explanation of meaning is a definition by any other name"; but that is as blanket and extended a use of the word 'definition' as Wittgenstein's was of 'grammar', because we do not normally call giving examples a 'definition'. There is also Socrates' selected meaning of the word 'know'.
Query: psychology and the difference between disposition and mood.
That is an example of looking for real definitions in the impressionistic fog (where the meaning of a word is merely -- whatever seems correct to me). It is what Wittgenstein's logic of language is a liberation from.
The School of Pythagoras, for children who think they go to school to teach rather than to be taught
The order and method which Pythagoras preserved, and afterwards those who succeeded him, in the ... instruction of disciples, is said to have been this: -- [he whom Pythagoras approved] was immediately admitted to his discipline, and, for a certain time, was enjoined silence; the period was not the same to all but it varied according to his opinion of their talents. He who observed silence, heard what was said by others; but was not suffered to inquire, if he happened not to understand, nor to make remarks on what he heard. No one was silent for a less space than two years, in which process of being silent, and of hearing, the disciples were called hearers.
But when they had learned what is of all things the most difficult, to be silent and to hear, and were instructed in the art called the holding the tongue, they were permitted to speak, to ask questions, to write down what they heard, and to communicate their own opinions. In this stage they were called mathematicians, from the sciences upon which they were beginning to learn and reflect upon; for the ancient Greeks called geometry, gnomonics, music and the other profounder sciences, mathematics.
After being initiated in these sciences, they proceeded to study the formation of the world, and the primary principles of nature: they were then called theorists.
Source: The Attic Nights Of Aulus Gellius, Book i, Chapter 9, tr. W. Beloe, first Eng. tr., London: 1795, p. 37-39)
Query: why do you suppose it was so frustrating to hear Socrates speak?
Bertrand Russell did not like talking to Maynard Keynes: "He made me feel a fool." And many men who discover that they don't know what they thought they knew feel the same way. And vain men felt humiliated when Socrates refuted their pretensions that they knew what they did not know. That is one meaning that might be given this query.
Query: someone said he knew nothing and was regarded as the wisest.
By the gods and his companions, yes, but by other men he was regarded as a dangerous fool, which is why he was put to death: that Socrates said he knew nothing troubled no one: that Socrates said that no one else did either -- did.
But another reason it may have been frustrating to hear Plato's Socrates speak was his demand for general definitions of words that don't have general definitions. Rather than try to answer the question "What is the essence of piety?" his hearers ought to ask "But does piety have an essence?" Nonetheless, the demand of Plato's Socrates is not ethically idle, whatever its logic-of-language status may be. (What is the path to "Know thyself"? Need it be the path Plato suggests?)
Note that Xenophon's Socrates also asks his companions for definitions, although Xenophon does not say that these were demands for common nature definitions: "Whenever anyone argued with him on any point without being able to make himself clear [Socrates] would lead the whole discussion back to the definition [logos] required ..." (Memorabilia iv, 6, 13, tr. Marchant)
But yet another possible source of frustration relates to the school of Pythagoras, to children who go to school thinking that they are there to teach rather than to learn, which is another way of saying, children who want to express their own ideas rather than listen to the ideas of others. Reading or hearing the Platonic dialogs they want to state their own objections rather than try to follow Plato's argument. Part of their frustration, however, belongs to the limitation of Socrates' method, which is to get step-by-step agreement from his companion: if you agree with the argument so far, then I will continue; but if you do not agree, then we must now hear your objection .... Plato gives an account of one way such an argument-discussion might go, not the only way. And we have to accept this when studying his dialogs.
But of course children do not have the detachment of scholars: they want to test all ideas and they want to test them now, even before understanding them, even before properly studying them. And why would they have the detachment that may come with age, as the lava of youth cools, as faith in finding the "some great truth out there" fades ... For the young philosophy is not academic, but vital. And this is why they are drawn to Socrates and his method of discussing philosophy with them, of questioning everything [At his trial Socrates was accused of "corrupting" the young by teaching them to doubt the very foundations of Athenian thinking and therefore society that rested on it]. Or the serious-minded are.
And yet, too, there is something right about Pythagoras' demand of learning to silence one's own thoughts in order to hear -- ponder and perhaps understand -- the thought of others. It belongs to the intellectual discipline that the student must acquire.
Plato's school of thought
If the entrance to Plato's Academy was inscribed with the words "Let no one who has not studied geometry enter here", should that motto of his school not be taken as the key to Plato's thinking. Preferring principles to experience, the axiomatic method described in Phaedo 99d-100a. But Euclidean geometry, like chess, is a game played according to strict rules, whereas philosophy is not. Or if it is, Plato certainly has not demonstrated that it is, nor that the method of geometry is the method appropriate to all other subjects. What would become of a builder who knew geometry but not the strength of his building materials? But Plato was aware of that of course; nonetheless, in philosophy he took Parmenides as his guide, not letting himself be "governed by an aimless eye, an echoing ear and a tongue". If reason says that they must be an essence of piety, then there is one, regardless of how we actually use the word 'piety'.
[Plato and the school's motto: Geometrical versus mathematical proportion.]
The school of skepticism (Sextus Empiricus)
[Greek doctor of medicine, mentioned in Diog. L. ix, 116, 117. His date is circa A.D. 200.] Three works survive ... the first an outline of the case for philosophical scepticism, the last two a summary rejection of dogmatic philosophies, divided by subject-matter.... Although he used compilations rather than original sources, Sextus is a valuable source of information on earlier philosophy.... In particular, he is one of the best sources for Stoic logic.
Source: Oxford Classical Dictionary 2nd ed. (1970), article signed D.J.F.
... in this final stage of the Hellenistic culture, there were skeptics who recalled all the doubts of Protagoras ... Towards the end of the second century Sextus Empiricus, of unknown date or place, gave the skeptical philosophy its final formulation in several destructive volumes of which three survive. (p. 494)
To every argument, says Sextus, an equal argument can be opposed, so that in the end there is nothing so superfluous as reasoning.
Deduction is untrustworthy unless based upon complete induction; but complete induction is impossible, for we can never tell when a "negative instance" will turn up. [Pyrr. Hyp. ii, 204]
"Cause" is merely a regular antecedent (as Hume would repeat),
and all knowledge is relative [ibid. III, 29; i, 135-8]. Similarly there is no objective good or evil; morality changes across every frontier [ibid. III, 210], and virtue has a different definition in every age.
All the arguments of the nineteenth century against the possibility of knowing whether God exists or not are stated here, and all the contradictions between benevolent omnipotence and worldly suffering. [Adv. Math. i, 148; Pyrr. Hyp. iii, 9-11]
But Sextus is a more complete agnostic than the agnostics, for he affirms that we cannot know that we cannot know [Question: doesn't the explanation of the meaning of that proposition create an infinite regress?]; agnosticism is a dogma. [Pyrr. Hyp. i, 7]
[But Durant says that according to Sextus, certainty isn't needed in our life; probability is enough; and that] suspension of judgment (epoché, holding back; aphasia, saying nothing) in philosophical questions, instead of disturbing the mind, brings it a careless peace (ataraxia). [ibid. i, 8, 25] Meanwhile, since nothing is certain, let us accept the conventions and beliefs of our time and place ... [ibid. III, 235; Adv. Math. i, 49] (p. 494-495)
Source: Will Durant, Caesar and Christ (1944).
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