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Philosophy old and older

It seems a long time since I had anything new to say. I grow old saying the same old things about older things, talking to myself so as not to fall asleep, an old man telling the same stories over and over again.

Preface: all philosophy is a critique of the logic of language, that is, an answer or a silence to the question: How is language-with-meaning distinguished from language-without-meaning in philosophy? (The words 'the logic of language' are from Wittgenstein's book, but this is my jargon.)

Although it is philosophy's foundation (its methods of examination and criticism, principally contradiction and definition), logic is only one part of philosophy. The other parts, according to the Stoics, are ethics or how to live our life, "no small matter", as Plato says, and metaphysics: what is real(ity), what not? But all parts of philosophy are done by the light of natural reason and experience alone. Logic is used in every rational study, but without metaphysics and without ethics, there is no philosophy, and that is just what Wittgenstein wanted.

The Month of the Falling Leaves

"Wittgenstein says that there can be no valid system of philosophy which is not based on mathematics and science." (Bruce Marshall, The Month of the Falling Leaves (1963), i, p. 6)

Bertrand Russell might have agreed with the communist Polish propagandist, as might the Vienna Circle. Logical Positivism: "The meaning is the method of verification": if it isn't empirical, it isn't at all.

Would Wittgenstein have agreed at the time of the TLP? What would it mean to say that TLP is based on mathematics and science? Would that be a false statement? "The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts" (TLP 4.112), tr. Ogden). If the essence of language that is not nonsense is the propositional form 'This is how things stand in the world' [4.5], then is the "logical clarification of thoughts" the rejection of anything that is not a proposition of natural science [6.53]? Is that what "based on science" means? No, it isn't.

"Philosophers must no longer have their heads in the air. Philosophers must have their foots on the ground." (Marshall, op. cit.)

I think Wittgenstein might have said that. The reason they should not "have their heads in the air" is because all they will find there are Luftgebäude ("constructions of air", "houses of cards") (PI § 118): because the meaning of language is found on the ground, if there is to be an objective distinction made between sense and nonsense.

"... before Linguistic Analysis had been invented" (Marshall, p. 7). But "Linguistic Analysis" -- if that means Russell's "logical grammar" (in contrast the Wittgenstein's "surface grammar") -- is as old as Russell's "On Denoting", a work which was written in 1905, years before the character of the story was born (if he was 50 years old in 1963) -- if not far, far older (Plato, Sophist 257b-c). Or if "linguistic analysis" means the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions, that distinction belongs to Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). The TLP dates from WWI.

Philosophy very old

Query: does wisdom begin in wonder?

I'd say that is where it ends -- but only if it begins there as well, in not thinking you know what you don't know (Plato, Apology 21d), aware that you are, and it is the nature of existence that you will always be, surrounded by perplexity ("wonder").

Query: is questioning everything critically the final end of philosophy?

By 'end' meaning: the purpose of philosophy or its culmination? As to the query: Why -- what other end could philosophy have, if as Socrates says, man is without wisdom, e.g. knowledge of what death is and of why anything at all exists and if reality is no more than what he can perceive with his five senses?

Query: was Socrates really wise? A man that knows he is not wise is wise. Socrates, philosophy.

As wise as man can be (Apology 23a-b) -- for what that's worth, and it's not worth nothing, for to know that you are not wise is to know something important to know. If you remember that knowing that you don't know how to ski is not knowing how to ski: the Catholic word 'discernment' is not a synonym for 'knowledge'.

Query: who was told by the Delphic oracle that they were smarter than Socrates?

Reasoned the White King, "If as Apollo's oracle says, Nobody is wiser than Socrates, then we must banish Socrates and acquire Nobody's wisdom instead." (Grammatical jokes)

Query: was Socrates right, that the wisest person is the one who knows that in the end he knows nothing? Plato, double ignorance.

The words "in the end" would mean: after and only after examining all one thinks one knows that it is important to know about our existence. And there is the ignorance before and the ignorance afterwards: conceited ignorance versus Socratic ignorance; that is one meaning for Plato's "double ignorance".

Rational Wonder

Query: 'philosophy' Greek meaning. Socrates' rules for logic.

The love of rational wisdom. There are two parts to rationality: (1) that wisdom must be sought by the natural light of reason alone, and (2) that its propositions must not be in contradiction to one another. Rules of logic = rules for reasoning (and these are not simply deductive, because meaning is not a determined by syntax but of use in the language). Socrates' logic is his methods of seeking wisdom: (1) induction leading to general definition in ethics, and (2) the standard that what someone knows can be stated in propositions (Xenophon, Memorabilia iv, 6, 1; Plato, Laches 190c), and that those propositions must stand to the rational tests of reason and experience which is public, or be refuted for being not what one knows but only what one thought one knew (but does not).

The meaning of 'natural' in philosophy

Query: Socrates' method of the inquisition of knowledge.

Inquiry made by the natural light of reason alone, into what one knows or thinks one knows, based on the two Socratic tests which are its standards of clarity and truth and falsity -- namely contradiction in logic, but also unclarity in definition, because 'logical' has two meanings in philosophy, one of which is language meaning, and the other of which is "contradiction in sense" (in contrast to "contradiction in form"). Philosophy inquires into natural -- i.e. publicly verifiable, perceptible to the senses, not supernatural -- experience: it results in what man can know independently of divine revelation.

Metaphysics is about a hidden reality philosophers think can be deduced from visible reality by the examination of natural experience. Note that Socrates did not concern himself with metaphysics, but only with logic and ethics.

The meaning of Apollo's words

Query: the real meaning of the Delphic oracle's pronouncement that "no man is wiser than Socrates".

Who can read the mind of God? The pronouncement has no "true" or "real" meaning until a test is set to identify that meaning. How, then, is the oracle's (apparent) riddle -- at least Plato's version of it -- to be solved: "How can no man be wiser than Socrates if Socrates (apparently) is not wise?" There may be many possible answers, but any answer would have to pass the two tests Socrates would subject it to, namely logic and experience -- or stand refuted as a false meaning.

Plato derives from Socrates' experience -- again, at least as Socrates' experience is described by Plato -- that "No man is wiser than Socrates" because "No man can be wiser than Socrates", because the only wisdom man can have is to know that he is not wise, which is the wisdom Socrates has -- and Plato's answer stands to the tests of reason and experience.

There is very different meaning for the oracle's words that appears to pass the Socratic tests as well. To know what the important things to know are, which are the important questions to ask, even if you cannot answer them, is to know something important; it is wisdom. And further, Socrates may be seen as the wisest man because he knows, at least generally, what the good is for man, and therefore how man should live his life (namely in accord with the specific excellence that is proper to man, which is rational moral virtue).

Query: stupidity for Socrates.

To think you know what you don't know (Xenophon, Memorabilia iii, 9, 6; Plato, Sophist 229c) and not wonder (in Plato's sense of 'wonder' = 'to be perplexed' or 'puzzled') at your own ignorance. That is "stupidity" in the Socratic world-picture. It is "conceited ignorance", the unexamined life of presumption (fatuity).

Query: the Greek word 'phylos' shows that philosophy took its origin from the city in ancient Greece.

I'm thinking that this query about "the etymological definition of philosophy" is a true/false question on a school assignment. (There was an ancient harbor city in the far southwest Peloponnese named 'Pylos', which word would be pronounced differently from 'phylos', but that city does not seem to have had anything to do with philosophers.)

Query: explain why philosophy begins in wonders.

That, I'd say, is precisely how it doesn't begin, i.e. with wonders (prodigies): the philosopher is not perplexed by the extraordinary, but by the ordinary.

Query: in philosophy what is a man who acts before he thinks called?

In philosophy specifically, I don't know; normally in English: 'imprudent', 'rash', 'impetuous', 'improvident' -- but his patron is Epimetheus, the one who "gave no thought" before he acted, the one who in his creation left man naked and defenseless -- a condition in which man would have perished if Prometheus, who "gave thought" before he acted, had not given man fire ("fire" both actual, and symbolic = discourse of reason). And it was Epimetheus who accepted Pandora from a vengeful Zeus to be man's wife, destroying man's peace, Hesiod says.

Query: philosophy began when human beings began to wonder.

That is not historically true, because one may be perplexed ("wonder") without seeking the solution to one's perplexity (i.e. an end to one's ignorance) by the natural light of reason alone; mythology exists before -- or simultaneously with -- philosophy. (In contrast, mythology is not always serious explanation: the story of Persephone and the seasons was always a fairy tale, not to be taken any more seriously as an explanation than the Greek myth of the origin of the spider as natural history. Yet Persephone's story was taken seriously both by the superstitious -- and by the pious or religious.)

Query: man shouldn't wander in perplexity.

At my age, I don't know; maybe not in complete perplexity; Socrates was not completely perplexed; he did get somewhere in his reasoning in ethics (by responding to the precept "Know thyself") and by setting the standard for knowledge he set for philosophy. But to want not to wander in perplexity -- for the young who passionately seek the truth and who are not yet disillusioned by our apparent (or demonstrable?) inability to know or understand the most basic "whys" of our existence, maybe it is desirable.

In my youth I wanted nothing so much as to overcome the vagueness and confusion, the metaphors that are not metaphors (because they cannot be restated non-metaphorically) that envelopes our life like a cloud. I would say that philosophy may begin for some in just this state of perplexity. And that to wander in perplexity at the beginning of the age of reason is even desirable, if the alternative is a lifetime of shallowness, thoughtlessness -- or of unreason rather than reason.

"Was the answer to the mystery that there was no mystery?" (Marshall, Urban the Ninth (1973), xii, p. 88)

Wittgenstein in the TLP said that was indeed the answer: "The riddle does not exist." But he had later to contradict himself. And indeed the non-existence of "the riddle" would itself be a riddle. If there no mystery, the absence of a mystery is itself a mystery. If there were no mystery, that in itself would be a mystery.

After many years of philosophy someone may accept that we are bound to eternal perplexity about the eternal questions, and that the most we can do is escape from the perplexities we has self-created, as e.g. through ignorance of the logic of our language, and through ignorance of fallacies in reasoning (as e.g. when an insight mistakes Some for All), through thinking ourselves wise when we are not, and through ignorance of the good for man (Solzhenitsyn: "so many years of not knowing how to live").

Query: modern wonders in philosophy.

Are there new "philosophical phenomena" to discover and be perplexed by? Are the eternal questions the phenomena of philosophy -- and is their number ever reduced or increased? Isn't philosophy today as it was yesterday?What there are in philosophy are the possibility of new ways of looking at things (new metaphysical "theories" = new organizations of selected data), revised concepts.

The following query, which is the question of metaphysics, has not changed.

Metaphysical Wonder

Query: first philosopher to question reality.

Is that what Thales did? What would contrast with 'reality' in Thales' case? Not 'illusion' -- I don't think, but instead something like 'a state of reality' (as ice is a state of water) -- i.e. something changeable (and so liquid, solid, vapor would be changeable states of the one unchanging thing, namely water, and so water would be the reality that answer's Thales' question)? But I am only speculating (as did Aristotle, only differently) as to what Thales meant by his answer: Reality is water.

Query: philosophy is essentially divided into which two branches?

According to Wittgenstein: into logic and metaphysics, but the Stoics, and other Greeks who came after Socrates, would not say that the subject 'Ethics' is not part of philosophy (although Descartes in effect did).

Aristotle did not regard logic as part of philosophy, so that for Aristotle the teo branches would be metaphysics and ethics.

We might also say the two branches are realism or the direct object of perception is "the thing in itself", and idealism or the direct object of perception is "an idea in the mind" of "the thing in itself" (whatever "things in themselves" and "ideas in the mind" are when they're at home.)

"There are many ways to slice a pie."

Query: geo-metric philosophy.

The form of this query is very good, because it shows the root words of 'geometry': earth and measure (land surveying). Descartes is an example of a geometric philosophy -- i.e. one modeled on the deductive method of mathematics.

Query: the way things appear is not the way they really are.

That is not as yet metaphysics, but rather "Nothing is really as it appears to be" is metaphysics. Metaphysics always (wildly) generalizes from an insight into a few cases to a claim about all cases.

Existential Wonder

Query: what is ontological wonder and does metaphysics arise out of it?

But ontology = the metaphysics of being ("Being"); the one does not arise out of the other. What would have sense would be to ask what existential wonder (i.e. puzzlement) is, and to answer that it is the wonder evoked by the existence of anything at all (which is distinct from wondering at the how-ness of existence). Existential wonder is the wonder expressed by the first of the eternal questions.

Query: why do we need answers?

Most obviously we don't, because we haven't any answers, and yet -- here we are.

Query: man, know thyself, and the immorality of the soul. By Socrates.

Well, this is a good example of what man does not, indeed cannot, know about himself: namely the metaphysical nature of his soul's existence (i.e. whether his essence is soul and body (Aristotle) or soul alone (Plato)); which is why his wisdom -- i.e. his knowledge of the answer to this, as to the other eternal questions, -- is worthless (Plato, Apology 23a-b). About the metaphysical nature of the soul, Plato and the materialists -- speculate. (unlike the historical Socrates, who did not). But speculation, even when it results in conviction (Plato, Gorgias 526d), is not knowledge.

The query could be rephrased: "man, know the limits of thy self-knowledge."

Plato and Language-meaning

Query: what is logic in philosophy according to Plato?

How did Plato use the Greek word logos? If Plato did as Guthrie says Socrates did, then for Plato, logic = definition, i.e. real (nature-assigned), not conventional (language-assigned), definition: the meaning of a word is the essence of the thing the word names, e.g. the meaning of a common name is the common nature it names.

Words and Things

For him words were things, not merely labels upon ideas. (Robert Hugh Benson, Lord of the World (1907), iii, 2, 1)

Is it a closer picture to the truth to say that words are "labels upon ideas" -- "ideas" because "in general we don't use language according to strict rules, and its use isn't taught that way either" (BB p. 25) -- and 'idea' is the word that suggests this? "The meaning of a word is normally an indefinite idea (other words are 'concept', 'notion'), although it can be or can be made definite in the particular case."

Only in very special cases (as e.g. when in chemistry's jargon is defined in a school classroom), explanations of meaning are given afterwards if at all rather than before the use of a word. And these explanations of meaning = "general definitions" normally are only sign posts, not strict rules.

"The meaning of a word is an idea, not a grammar (set of rules)." Vagueness isn't made clearer by further vagueness. An "idea", an incomplete set of rules for the use of a word, a set that doesn't always tell you how specifically "to go on" (PI § 151).

Question: if we don't normally use language by following strict, or even explicit, rules, then what is the point of Wittgenstein's language game metaphor? ("Objects of comparison")

"The meaning of a word is the essence the word names"

For remember that in general we don't use language according to strict rules -- it hasn't been taught us by means of strict rules, either. We [i.e. Wittgenstein], in our discussions on the other hand, constantly compare language with a calculus proceeding according to exact rules.

This is a very one-sided way of looking at language. In practice we very rarely use language as such a calculus. For not only do we not think of the rules of usage -- of definitions, etc. -- while using language, but when we are asked to give such rules, in most cases we aren't able to do so. We are unable clearly to circumscribe the concepts we use; not because we don't know their real definition, but because there is no real "definition" to them. (BB p. 25)

A definition sets definite limits, as a wall marks off the limits of a field. Wittgenstein seems to have in mind here language as it is used in philosophy, because "primitive language games", everyday transactions, are played according to strict rules.

Why then do we in philosophizing constantly compare our use of words with one following exact rules?

The answer is that the puzzles which we try to remove always spring from just this attitude towards language.

The man who is philosophically puzzled sees a law in the way a word is used [a meaning that should be the same in all contexts], and, trying to apply this law consistently, comes up against cases where it leads to paradoxical results. (ibid. p. 25-26)

This is similar to the picture that The meaning of a word is the essence the word names, for an essence cannot be altered, cannot be augmented or reduced: it is like railroad tracks that are anchored in bedrock. For example, the essence of 'to measure': it has to be always the same thing, the same procedure, and yet what could be more different than the examples given in Plato's Euthyphro (7b-c), calculating, weighing, using a yard stick (All invoke a standard, but the standard and procedures are very different).

"The essence of measuring is that it invokes a standard" -- "The essence of a standard is that it invokes a rule the following of which leads to an objective result" -- but those are very general definitions, and without examples to explain their meaning, they are too general to serve as more than orientation (e.g. words for use in gardening rather than in astronomy).

Words and Reality

... For others this had been the supreme struggle -- the difficulty of decision between the facts that words were not things and yet that the things they represented were in themselves objective. (Benson, op. cit.)

And it is precisely because there are so many abstract terms" in our language that the question of what those terms "represent" is a perennial perplexity in philosophy, the project of which is to make sense of abstract terms. (Aristotle versus Kant | The False grammatical account)

Query: Plato on the relation between language and the world.

We could answer this query the same way as the query "What is logic in philosophy according to Plato?", namely that: Words are names, and the meaning of a name is the thing the name stands for, whether physical or abstract. (Although maybe the query concerns Plato's Cratylus.)

Query: techniques of definition of language in logic.

The query suggests that it is clear (obvious) which meaning of the word 'meaning' we are to use, whereas there are many meanings of 'meaning'.

If we adopt Wittgenstein's choice, we can identify various kinds of definition = explanations of meaning: (1) sign-for-sign, i.e. definition by equivalent words or synonyms (A DEF.= B), (2) ostensive (pointing at things and at phenomena), (3) play-acted ("to sit down in a chair", but also emotion or disposition words, e.g. 'sorrow' and 'hope'), (4) by portrayal of a way of life ('beauty' and the Romantic Movement in art, music, literature), (5) by related concepts and short stories. But there will be, I imagine, many more kinds of explanation of the use of words in the language, as well as variations of those listed here.

Another kind of explanation of meaning (i.e. definition) might be called General definition clarified by enumeration (i.e. made clear by examples), as in the next query:

Query: define philosophy and illustrate its major branches.

If we define 'philosophy' as "the love of (or thirst for) wisdom in metaphysics, logic, and ethics", then the illustrations -- i.e. list -- of the "major branches" will belong to an essential definition of 'philosophy'. In contrast, if "the eternal questions" are an illustration of metaphysics, does that belong to the definition of 'philosophy' or only to a definition of 'metaphysics'? I would say to 'philosophy' as well -- but only because that is how I see philosophy.

A definition is a tool, namely an explanation of meaning, and it is specific enough when the explanation is clear to the person the explanation is being given to. Wittgenstein used the formula "Now I can go on" (PI § 151), and if we watch what the person who says this does, and if he indeed goes on to use the word 'philosophy' the way we have instructed him to, then we say that he has understood (understanding is a public event). Of course, there is more to this, because philosophy isn't imparted as rote learning, and someone may come to see philosophy differently than his instructor has taught him to.

[Examples and meaning, their relationship in logic of language.]

Know thyself. Logic. And madness

Query: fear of knowing oneself.

In philosophy -- in this context -- it is fear of the words 'I don't know'; of breaking down your vanity, admitting your helplessness, i.e. fundamental, most fundamental, gravest ignorance about our existence. Those Socrates questioned were unwilling to accept that they did not know what they thought they knew. Theirs was conceited ignorance.

"No one knows the answers to those questions" -- well, I don't know that; I only know that if anyone knows, they haven't told me or I haven't understood what they have told me.

Query: logical questions without answers.

The word 'logical' might mean various things, too many things. Can a logical question be without an answer -- or is any "question essentially without an answer" illogical? One cannot be ignorant of the answers to questions that don't exist, and therefore is to ask the eternal questions madness?

Query: Socratic irony in the Apology. When Socrates claims to be ignorant about a subject ...

By "claims" does the query mean that Socrates is being ironic -- i.e. dishonest, deceitful, lying to his companion -- when he says that he doesn't know? When Socrates says he doesn't know, he means that he has questioned himself enough to know that he himself does not know the answer to the question; and although he may have seen by means of this self-questioning what the answer is not, he must also make his companion see (Sophist 229c-230d).

Nowhere that I can see in the Apology does Socrates claim not to know what he does know. If one regards Socrates in the Euthyphro as only pretending not to know -- why? in order to make a fool of Euthyphro by showing that Euthyphro does not know what he thinks he does? Doing that would itself be foolish because Socrates, like any reader of the dialog, can see that Euthyphro is never going to admit his own ignorance.

Irony in discussion is an attitude of superiority, not of companionship, for one does not make one's companion better, but on the contrary harms him with that attitude: the only humiliation sought for one's companion is the self knowledge that he does not know what he thought he did, but must, as Socrates does, continue to seek to know.

Again, it is not possible to know the historical Socrates: we make for ourselves, or allow someone else to make for us, an image -- Proper names as defined in Russell's Theory of Descriptions -- of him, of who we think he was. The irony found in Plato's Euthyphro is Platonic; the Socrates of Xenophon is guileless (without being naive or ill-prepared for discussion).

Query: what did Socrates want to do with the oracle's words, and what did he actually do?

In Plato's Apology, at first Socrates had thought to tell Apollo's oracle that the statement "No one is wiser than Socrates" had to be false because, Socrates thought, he knew that he himself had no wisdom [21b], and he set out to prove that the god's words were false (by finding someone who was wiser than Socrates) [21c], but when he discovered that he could find no wise man, he saw in what way the oracle's words were true [21d, 23a-b].

They had at any rate -- philosophy

Query: what do you think will happen to you after you die?
A philosopher knows that he knows nothing.

Certainly nothing about what death is.

What is important to you in life -- is that independent of your circumstances, e.g. suppose you were alone, set apart, never to see other human beings again -- would what is important about your life change for you? There would no longer be social ethics, but personal ethics would be unchanged -- if you are living as you should be now. The excellence proper and available to man might be diminished, but it would not be eliminated by a solitary existence.

There would still be philosophy. But you would not write to be read, or maybe you would because all writing is that way whether you expect anyone will read it or not, e.g. my pages about philosophy that no one sees?

But wouldn't your life be pointless? But we spoke about this before: Many good things in life are pointless -- Bach's instrumental music is pointless -- but that does not make them uninteresting or not worth living for. Alone or with companions, a man must seek to become what is the good for man. Justice ("doing one duty to other men" [Gorgias 507b, 522c]) would not exist but piety, courage and self-control would. And there would always be knowledge and understanding (wisdom) to pursue. One's way of thinking and life shouldn't change that much, if one is living as one should be living now, after the solitude.

Tolstoy on life and death

Query: why does Tolstoy think death robs life of its meaning?

Does he think that? or does he think death reveals life's true meaning, which is not "this world and all that it loves"? but instead to love one's neighbor as one loves oneself (That is Ivan Ilych's thought as he lies dying), and when one makes anything more important than loving one's neighbor every false way of life becomes possible. Death robs life, not of meaning, but of its worldliness meaning.

As to this world, if all is to be lost, all forgotten, what are you going to do at the end of your life, tie a pretty ribbon round it -- and throw it in the trash?

The door is always open

"Brave lad. A moment's courage and it is done."

Why must we stay at our posts, as Plato says (Phaedo 62b), the posts God has assigned us (Well, are they that?) But there is no "must" about it if "the door is always open" (Epictetus) and one has the courage to walk oneself through it. The door appears open -- but the door to what? Not only the way out of this life, but to an eternal sleep or to a transfer to someplace else, possibly worse, if one doesn't think one knows what one doesn't know.

Query: Socrates' question, who am I?

What am I ("Know thyself" = seek to know what manner of being you are)? would be clearer, I'd say. The word 'who' suggests Socrates' social identity: "Who am I? Socrates, an Athenian citizen of the deme of Alopece in Attica, whose father was Sophroniscus, an Athenian stonecutter, whose wife is Xanthippe," etc.

"Because they don't think they will ever become philosophers"

"You see now how many readers you have in Poland ... Polish people are very deeply interested in philosophy."

"So it would seem." Who, [Professor] Hilliard thought, could imagine one of Her Majesty's Nosey Parkers at Dover producing a copy of Language, Truth and Logic for A.J. Ayer to sign? (Month of the Falling Leaves iv, p. 22)

And yet that was a very "popular" book (Bertrand Russell took credit for the ideas in it). The closest people in the English-speaking world come to philosophy is in things like the popular biographies of Wittgenstein. (It is never in that world a happy thing for philosophy to have "lots of friends".)

That is the reason, according to Diogenes the Cynic, "why people give to beggars but not philosophers, because they can imagine themselves one day becoming lame and blind -- but not one day becoming philosophers" (Diog. L. vi, 56).

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