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Undefined language (nonsense)

Is some nonsense important? Is philosophy the love of wisdom? Does it begin in wonder? Does it search for the truth?

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Is some nonsense important nonsense?

Query: Wittgenstein: some things we say about life are important nonsense.

And what makes you think that an undefined combination of words is important. And if by 'nonsense' you don't mean 'undefined', then you are not using the word 'nonsense' the way Wittgenstein's logic of language uses it ("If a sentence is meaningless, it is not as it were its meaning that is meaningless" (PI § 500)) -- but then what do you mean by the word 'nonsense' -- 'foolishness'? But all that is important about foolishness is to avoid it; there is no wisdom in foolishness (Indeed, the words 'wise' and 'foolish' are antitheses).

Philosophy must be of some use and we must take it seriously; it must make clear our thoughts and so our actions. Or else it is a disposition we have to [hold in] check, and an inquiry to see that this is so; i.e. the chief proposition of philosophy is that philosophy is nonsense. And again we must then take seriously that it is nonsense, and not pretend, as Wittgenstein does, that it is important nonsense! (Source: Frank Ramsey's view of philosophy)

If talk about "the mystical", "God" and "ethics" really has been demonstrated to be nonsense -- i.e. sound without meaning -- then it cannot be wise to pretend that such talk is important. If we can't talk about it, then we can't talk about it, and we "can't whistle it either". It is like a ladder without rungs -- i.e. no ladder at all, not one it is possible in any way to climb (cf. TLP 6.54).

"But you must pay attention to your nonsense!"

What might be called "important nonsense" -- in the sense of "foolishness not to be avoided" is found in a much later remark of Wittgenstein's: "Don't be afraid of talking nonsense, but you must pay attention to your nonsense!" (CV p. 56) That remark means: Don't stifle, don't cut off, the raw material of philosophy (PI § 254) -- i.e. say what you are inclined to say and only afterwards subject it to criticism (as indeed you must subject everything in philosophy). In other words, beware of dismissing your inclination out of hand as if you were embarrassed by it or felt that it simply must a priori -- i.e. prior to putting your thesis to the test in dialectic -- be wrong. That is what "Don't for heaven's sake, be afraid of talking nonsense! Only don't fail to pay attention to your nonsense" (CV (1998 rev. ed.) [MS 134 20: 5.3.1947] means. (Cf. hormesis.)

Silly (dumm) = stupid

If people did not sometimes do silly things [Dummheiten = stupid things], nothing intelligent would ever get done. (CV p. 50)

"Without fools, there would be no wisdom."

We learn by our mistakes. Were we afraid to be mistaken, we would never learn that we are not wise.

Being afraid of talking nonsense is the mistake I almost made with a bit of "important nonsense" in the Synopsis of Wittgenstein's Logic of Language, important precisely because (1) it is what we are inclined to say, and (2) because we need to see -- in just what way -- what we are inclined to say is a false account of the "grammar" of our language. I am referring to this bit: "our own invisible but real self to which [it seems?] we sometimes refer when we speak" (The false account of the grammar (or logic) of our language).

"... then we must pay attention to our nonsense and not pretend like Ludwig that ..." There would be no point to calling language that conveys meaning -- however mysteriously it does that -- 'nonsense' unless one imagined that one were describing the metaphysical reality of language, as Wittgenstein thought he was doing when he wrote the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus; Wittgenstein did not intend the word 'nonsense' in the TLP to be jargon, but from the standpoint of his latter "logic of language" that is what it in fact is.

The antitheses 'wise' and 'foolish'

In sum. Wittgenstein: "If nothing foolish were ever done, nothing wise would ever be done either." "Words are deeds": if nothing foolish were ever said .... Logically this is the need for antitheses, but in our context: foolishness speaking, the foolish things we say, or are inclined ("want") to say, are "philosophy's raw material".

How does one distinguish between important and unimportant nonsense?

There are many ways to slice a cake: which words -- i.e. "signs" (The distinction between a sign (ink marks, sounds) and its meaning (use), in Wittgenstein's jargon) -- we use to make distinctions may or may not be important; but there are limits to how far a concept can be extended before its name loses its connection with its original or normal meaning. Isn't "Language that communicates the sense of a combination of words" what everyone calls meaningful language -- i.e. not nonsense?

Further, just what is the meaning of 'important nonsense', and how does one distinguish between important and unimportant nonsense? A distinction that cannot to put into words is fishy in philosophy, to say the least. Does what is important nonsense mysteriously make "manifest" that it is important? Does what is unimportant nonsense mysteriously "show" that it is unimportant? If philosophy is rational, and it is, then whatever that is, it is not philosophy.

Philosophy is, begins, searches for ... (Replies to Internet queries)

Query: Philosophy:
a. begins with wonder
b. is the love of wisdom
c. searches for the truth
d. All of the above.

Words, words, words: 'wonder', 'wisdom', 'searches', 'truth' -- the important question isn't asked: what do those words mean in the context of philosophy? The multiple choice is also not complete:
(e.) The meaning of the first three choices is undefined and therefore I cannot know whether they are true, or false, or their language is nonsense. And from Socrates I have learned that, in the words of Augustine, "He only errs who thinks he knows what he does not know." And from Socrates I have also learned that, in the words of Xenophon, "Those who think they know what they do not know are misled themselves and mislead others."

And so the answer might be All (d.), or Some [(a.) or (b.) or (c.)] -- or None of the above, which is another option that is not offered. If the multiple choice is about philosophy as we inherited it from Socrates and Plato, then the answer being fished for is (d.) ... although (e.) is the only philosophically correct answer.

a. Philosophy "begins with wonder" (Plato, Theaetetus (155c-d). The "wonder" spoken of is puzzlement, or, perplexity, not awe: philosophy begins in someone's being puzzled by something in logic, ethics or metaphysics, and wanting to solve the problem that is puzzling him.
b. The Greek roots of the word 'philosophy' are "love of wisdom", but how is the word 'wisdom' defined in philosophy?
c. As to Philosophy "searches for the truth". On the one hand, Yes, because, for us, Socrates has bound forever the concepts 'philosophy' and 'truth' to one another. But, on the other hand, No, because although they were philosophers, Socrates' contemporaries the Sophists (as Plato usually describes them) were not seeking the truth but only how to win arguments through persuasion ("mere plausibility"); that rather than the truth was the "wisdom" (or, knowledge) worth having, according to them.

Philosophy "is the love of wisdom"

Maybe philosophy could be called "love of wisdom" because actually wouldn't we call (1) knowledge of how to reason (Logic) -- wisdom? And (2) knowledge of how to live our life (Ethics) -- wisdom? And (3) knowledge of what is reality, what illusion (Metaphysics) -- wisdom?

Would we not call knowledge in these three areas -- logic, ethics, and metaphysics (The Stoics divided philosophy into three parts) -- wisdom?

So maybe this is like how I defined 'philosophy' as 'rational ways of looking at things in the context of logic, ethics, metaphysics'. We could say then that "Philosophy is love of wisdom in logic, ethics, metaphysics."

Of course that definition may be criticised as being unhelpful for anything more than orientation: it points you in a direction but does not take you very far along its path. On the other hand, definitions are given for various reasons, and orientation is one of those; indeed in this case, orientation may often be just what is wanted. (Why define the word 'point' in geometry?)

Is there any place else where we would speak of wisdom? Maybe we might speak of "practical wisdom", e.g. knowing which kind of knot to use to secure a boat's mast. But I don't think that we would call that 'wisdom' rather than 'knowledge', however important that knowledge may be. But by whichever name we call that -- "wisdom of the sea" e.g. -- we do not call it philosophy. So maybe we should speak of "philosophical wisdom".

Query: how is logic both a branch of philosophy and tool of philosophy?

The question of how to reason well is itself a philosophical question, as is the question of how to distinguish sense from nonsense in philosophy. And both those questions belong to logic, and so logic must question itself while it also questions the other parts of philosophy. Nothing in philosophy is un-questionable, including its tool for questioning itself -- i.e. logic.

Query: why is the phrase "the unexamined life is not worth living" so applicable for philosophy?

Because that is what philosophy does -- or is: examining our life (The two parts of Know Thyself! e.g.). But that by itself is not philosophy's defining characteristic, because religion also examines our life; of the two, however, only philosophy uses nothing beyond thoroughgoing reasoning about our natural experiences of life, to examine our life and thought.

Query: philosophy begins in wander meaning.

Wandering out of a "community of ideas", to ask questions that community does not ask, to be puzzled by things it is not puzzled by, to see things in ways it does not see them: philosophy beginning in "wander". (Even misspellings, as well as paraphrases (synonyms), can serve philosophy: the suggestion of ideas.)

Essence and the Ether (Plato and Einstein)

Query: why is there essence rather than nothing? in classical philosophy.

Plato: because there cannot be knowledge unless it is knowledge of what is unchanging (Heraclitus' effect on Plato's thinking), and therefore there must be essences (things that cannot change without ceasing to be what they are, i.e. without ceasing to exist at all), whether those essences are Forms or something else -- because is there not knowledge? Cf. Einstein's clocks and measuring-rods (rulers): these could not exist in empty space, and therefore "the ether" just must exist, for otherwise it cannot be the case that we know anything -- and don't we know things? For Einstein, 'to know' = 'to measure'.

Plausibility, Truth

The multiple choice above also did not offer the possibility: Philosophy "searches for plausibility".

Query: a separate soul and body and therefore the possibility of life after death is the only plausible account of human ontology.

I would not want a mere plausibility for the answer to such a question -- I would not want what only seems to be true (cf. PI § 258), which is what plausibility is --, not if that question affects how we should live our life. What is ruinous (as a slippery slope) to philosophical integrity about plausibility is that it deludes us into believing that we know what we don't know, e.g. what death is. Plausibility disguises ignorance. But the wise man must forthrightly acknowledge the limits of his ability to know, and in this case that means recognizing that the relation of mind to body vis-à-vis an afterlife for man is an utter mystery.

"Confess thine ignorance." Wittgenstein, apropos of I don't know what, wrote in his notebooks: "The edifice of your pride has to be dismantled" (CV p. 26). What Plato called conceited ignorance, i.e. thinking you know what you don't know e.g. about the mystery of our existence, is the most stubbornly resistant part of that edifice to bring down.

I don't believe that Plato wanted plausibility here either, and indeed in Phaedo 92c-d he deprecates belief based on whether a thesis seems plausible or not. Plato presents proof of the pre-existence (i.e. its existence apart from the body) of the soul: our acquaintance with the notion of perfect equality although no one has ever seen such a thing (ibid. 65d). As to the post-existence of the soul, Plato argues that it cannot die: for life does not admit death (i.e. its opposite) but withdraws as does heat at the approach of cold (ibid.105c-106d; cf. Plato and Essence above).

Whatever the validity (-- 'validity' = 'standing up to the test of reason' --) of Plato's proofs, they are not merely plausible: they are either true or false -- or a misunderstanding of the logic -- i.e. the grammar -- of our language. Of course a thesis is always subject to being refuted in dialectic by later thinking (107b, 91a-b), and that is the why of Plato's uncertainty about such things.

And I do not believe that uncertainty is feigned; I do not believe that Plato ever confused his beliefs (much less his speculations) with actual knowledge; his uncertainty is real: Platonic dialog is not Platonic dogma.

Wittgenstein to Drury: "Can you imagine St. Augustine saying that the existence of God was "highly probable"!" (Recollections p. 90) I think it would be a rare bird who would accept mere probability (which in philosophy means mere plausibility) in these matters.

From above: "... if that question affects how man should live his life". But for Socrates' ethical life-picture such questions are without effect: regardless of their answers (answers which no man knows), for Socratic ethics the good for man is to live according to the excellence that is proper to man (as man and as an individual man: "Know thyself!"), above all according to the ethical excellence (moral virtue) that is proper to man.

Another method for discovering what the good is for man is Plato's method of tautologies in ethics. The answers to such questions, if they were knowable, is also without effect on this method.

Query: why does Socrates always inquire about a word's definition?

In Plato's early, Socratic dialogs, where his literary Socrates still resembles the historical Socrates in the dialogs' focus on definitions in ethics (how man should live his life), Socrates seeks a standard of judgment -- i.e. a definition of the kind that will tell us in any and all cases whether something (e.g. some act) is brave (Laches) or pious/holy (Euthyphro) or not. However, why does he seek definitions in Xenophon's Memorabilia? To clarify our thinking, so that we are not misled by our presumption that we know what we do not know.

"Words are names of things"

Query: are piety and reverence the same thing?

Always the presumption: If we are not talking nonsense -- i.e. uttering mere sounds without meaning (meaningless sounds) -- then we must be talking about something (some "thing" as in "A noun is the name of a person, place or thing"), and that something must be real (or have some reality about it). "Words are names and the meaning of a name is the thing the name stands for."

The query's picture of language ... What an utter muddle ("surrounded by vagueness and confusion" and "mere sound without sense" metaphors) my thinking would still be in were it not for what I have called "Wittgenstein's logic of language". I must remind myself of that the next time I deprecate, not only Wittgenstein's view that ethics is irrational -- but also Wittgenstein himself for holding that view (which I myself also held for all too many thoughtless years). Socrates is my teacher -- but Wittgenstein is no less (the confluence and coalescence of my ideas). My debt to both is limitless, to the first in thoroughgoing reason in ethics and philosophical methods, to the second in logic of language. The philosophical standard of 'to know' = 'to give an explanation of what you know to others' originates with Socrates and is restated by Wittgenstein (PI §§ 210, 208; Xenophon, Memorabilia iv, 6, 1; Plato, Laches 190c).

Wittgenstein's view of ethics should not be allowed to be smuggled into anyone's philosophy merely on the presumption that, because it is Wittgenstein's ethics, it must follow from his logic of language, and therefore that to accept Wittgenstein's logic one must also accept his ethics. Because there is no "must" here: the logic and ethics are independent of one another: one is a way of looking at language, the other a way of looking at how man should live his life.

Is my account above an example of "the Wittgensteinian anti-Wittgensteinian revolt" (to adapt Theodore Von Laue's idea)? No, because it does not use the methods of Wittgenstein's logic of language to refute his account of ethics. (An example of that revolt would be my criticism of the TLP.) Can Wittgenstein's thesis that ethics is fundamentally irrational, be refuted in dialectic? Or is all that can be done here is to say: "Look at things this way!" -- i.e. that all one can do here is to replace one viewpoint with another, the Kantian with the Socratic? That is the question. (I wonder if I do not all too hastily classify accounts as ways of looking at things rather than as theses that should be put to the test in dialectic.)

Beyond the first circle

"Or have some sort of reality about it" (cf. PI § 36), even if it isn't a perceptible reality. -- Well, isn't 'piety' the name of something real, and isn't 'reverence' the name of something real? And the moment you are led up that path is the moment you are lost forever to understanding the logic of our language! (Lasciate ogni speranza, voi ch'entrate! Or what Virgil will lead you back down that path?)

"Reality, not mere words"

Socrates to Theaetetus: "And if someone thinks mustn't he think something?" -- Th.: "Yes, he must." -- Soc.: "And if he thinks something, mustn't it be something real?" -- Th.: "Apparently." (PI § 518; cf. Plato, Theaetetus 189a)

Are not 'piety' and 'reverence' the names of phenomena, and aren't those phenomena real? And so why ask about how we use the words 'piety' and 'reverence' rather than about the phenomena those words name? (Partly, because logic is only concerned with language, partly because philosophy is not a natural science (empiricism), partly because, according to Wittgenstein, the philosophical problem is found in the misunderstanding of the use of those words in the language, not in a muddled understanding of the phenomena they name: Tell me what you are calling 'piety'; cf. tell me what you are calling 'games'; and, as with Socratic induction, we shall see if there is an essence of piety or an essence of games.) Concepts are definitions: they set limits: those limits are in the language, not in the phenomena ("There are many ways to slice a pie").

And so this reminds me of Stalin's view of Shostakovich's opera Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk District: "Muddle Instead of Music". Because in the query above -- as I am reading it (for the query may after all simply be asking for definitions according to a dictionary e.g.) -- there is "muddle instead of philosophy".

Query: what is Plato's notion of justice & how does it conflict with that of Thrasymachus?

Before I spoke of "impressionistic definitions" (or, "impressionistic meaning"), and that applies as well to a word's "analytical meaning" [Linguistic Analysis' account of concepts]. The picture here: concepts [abstractions] are "things" you have notions about what they are (or really are). And so: What is justice really? (but never: "How do we use the word 'justice'?" Contemplation versus logic of language.) And so, according to the picture, Plato has a notion, Thrasymachus has a notion, Mr. N.N. has a notion -- and we wander about [lost] in a cloud.

Query: how long have non-sense words been tested?

"Preliminary investigations suggest that this combination of words is undefined, but further laboratory tests are needed to establish our hypothesis" (cf. "What is the meaning of this concept really?"). That versus "what anyone [who speaks the language] knows and must admit" (Z § 211). If we couldn't distinguish between sense and nonsense in the language we speak everyday, then we would fall silent, like Cratylus. But isn't our language based on the presumption that we can distinguish sense from nonsense (PG i § 81, p. 126-7)? "But suppose we are all madmen?" That picture presupposes a god who can see what no man can see -- i.e. it is a picture that is not an hypothesis.

Justice, virtue and vice

Query: Thrasymachus argues that justice is not a vice but rather ...

... that it is a virtue for the weaker to serve the interests of the stronger, and thus that virtue for the lamb is to be eaten by the wolf, because the wolf is stronger, and that is natural justice. But enough of that. What might be interesting would be to argue that justice is or is sometimes a vice -- i.e. that the good man may be unjust, for may it not be unjust to be merciful to those who do unethical deeds or who break just laws -- and is not the good man merciful? (It is the bad man who is unmerciful.)

Résumé. There are two difficulties with Plato's discussion of justice: (1) there is the question of whether the English word 'justice' is equivalent to Plato's Greek. When discussing the proposition "It is just to benefit one's friends and harm one's enemies", it seems to be. But when Thrasymachus enters into the discussion it no longer seems to be: they do appear to be talking about something, but they never identify what they are talking about. And (2) there is the distinction we make between equity (fairness) and law; because may not justice according to one sometimes be injustice according to the other? But Plato does not make that distinction in the first book of his Republic.

Query: PHI2010 essay on justice is for the ignorant; the wise pursue their own interest at the expense of other people.

That is an essay for school? I will set aside the possibility that here 'justice' = 'the laws of the state'. And then, in other words, the query's thesis is: The wise man is the evil man, and vice versa. The vicious life is the good for man; moral virtue is for those who are ignorant of the good, which is really evil: "Fair is foul, and foul is fair". (The pretension and lack of seriousness that "hover through the fog and filthy air" of the Sophists' academe.)

Here a question suggests itself to me, which in my ignorance I don't know the answer to, although maybe there is an answer to be found somewhere in Plato's dialogs. Question, then: In Plato's eyes are law and equity the same, such that if laws are not equitable (fair), then they are not the true laws? Would that follow from the necessity of there being, in Plato's view, an essence of law? When Antigone makes a distinction between man's law ("thy writ, o king") and God's laws, does she imply that if there is disagreement between those two, then man's law is not (or is not really) the law at all? This may or may not answer that question with respect to Plato:

SOCRATES: When, therefore, would-be legislators miss the good, they have missed law and legality. (Greater Hippias 284d, tr. Jowett)

Empty space and time

Query: James Jeans, "And the substance out of which this bubble is blown, the soap-film, is empty space welded to empty time."

That quotation is found in my account of Jeans' Mysterious Universe. But I don't remember that image: "empty space welded onto empty time", and I should have done because -- Well, what's "empty time" when it's at home? It looks from this fragment as though Jeans were here treating the word 'time' as having a grammar similar to 'space' (as in full, partially full, or empty space), but we know ways to use the expression 'empty space' whereas we don't use the combination of words 'empty time' -- what might we mean by it? Time that is not measurable? But the combination of words 'time that is not measurable' is sound without sense: the meaning of the word 'time' is given when the method of measuring time is given; if there is no such method, then there is no time (And that is of course a grammatical remark).

But, on the other hand, in empty space there is no change, for there is nothing there to change, and as such time in empty space is therefore unmeasurable, and if one wants to employ a perplexing form of expression, one can speak of "empty time" in the context of empty space, although all 'empty time' would mean is the absence of time or "timelessness". (Cf. Einstein and the ether.)

That we must be very careful about making deductions (drawing conclusions) from small fragments (which is what I have just done) does not stop classicist archaeologists from deducing an ancient philosopher's thoughts from a very few fragments; the danger is of reading into fragments what one wants to find in them, of seeing them through one's own eyeglasses (cf. reading Socrates into Confucius), which like a net determine and limit what one can "catch", i.e. see, with them.

Does learning to read come before learning how to criticise what you read?

Query: Socrates' statement that he does not know everything: the only thing I know is that I don't know everything.

To the closed-minded man, a book is a mirror: he sees only his own ideas in it, and just that, nothing more. (I wonder how often it is that way with me.)

A man's mind may be closed by many things, among them pretensions to wisdom ("conceited ignorance"), limited liberal arts schooling, and his own nature, because a man may be open-minded despite his lack of education (The concepts 'uneducated' and 'closed-minded' are related, but nonetheless quite distinct).

But I am guessing that the query's "everything" should be "anything", or "anything really worth knowing", or "anything really beautiful and good" (Plato, Apology 21a-d; ibid. 23b).

And No, you should not try to answer a question in philosophy before you figure out what it is asking or asking for (because without knowing that you cannot know the criteria for its being answered correctly) -- but on the other hand: How often the misapprehension of a question has led me to a worthwhile thought.

Maybe the multiple choice above comes from a reading "comprehension test": "According to the article you have just read, the correct answer is" (-- but then why look on the Internet for the correct answer? But in any case, as innumerable times before, the search engine directed the query to the wrong page on my site (misdirection engines)). There is something worthwhile about such tests, however, because although uncritical reading is of no worth, one must learn to understand what one has read before one can learn to fairly criticise what one has read. Otherwise one criticizes a straw-man of one's own creation.

Query: in two sentences each define any three branches of philosophy and state their subject matter.

But learn to tell a simple story in words of one syllable and you'll be a heducated person (The promise of schooling). Well, yes, but here is my version: The Three Parts of Philosophy according to the Stoics, using Plato's form of expression as my model.

Open versus closed to the public, and other philosophical remarks

Wittgenstein's logic ... of language wants only a clear view of what is "open to the public" about language, its civil status (PI § 125), because what is public is objective, and it is an objective distinction between sense and nonsense that is sought by (what I have called) "Wittgenstein's logic of language".

Logic's rules are public, as are e.g. the moves of a chess piece or as the rules of other games are. (Note.--A comparison is always made thus: A and B are alike in such-and-such ways, and in this particular case, the only comparison I am making is to the public-ness of games, not to the strictness of their rules.)

God grant the philosopher insight into what lies in front of everyone's eyes. (CV [MS 135 103 c: 27.7.1947])

If a thing is hidden in logic of language it is only because we overlook it. Which doesn't mean that seeing it is easy. Certainly it is not for the man who first sees it, although after he points it out, it may seem obvious to us.

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Grammatical remarks as sign-posts. There are warning sign-posts that mark off false paths, i.e. mistaken notions about how language works that foster philosophical [-- not problems (In Wittgenstein's view, there are -- or is it: there can be? -- no philosophical problems; it's a nice question; "the essence of a philosophical problem") -- but conceptual] muddles. Philosophical Investigations § 87 also speaks of sign-posts, but of a different kind: definitions as sign-posts.

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Locke's "When my body goes for a carriage ride, my mind goes with it" is a grammatical remark (i.e. if it is a statement of fact, then it is a statement of grammatical fact -- i.e. a description of how we use our language). As is "When my mind wanders off, my body does not go with it", e.g. if I fall into daydreaming.

All Locke has the grammatical right to say is, not that his mind goes for a carriage ride, but only that his sense receptors (eyes, ears, which belong to the body) go for a carriage ride. His mind may be quite distracted, not there at all, not attending to his senses. The word 'mind' as we normally use that word -- and that is the way Locke thinks he is using it -- is not the name of an object of some unknown kind; it can go for a carriage ride only in the way that it can go to the moon on a broomstick. (The mind is wherever one's attention is focused. That is "the location of the mind".)

My first thought was that Locke's remark was in the spirit of G.E. Moore's defense of common sense, a protest against the philosopher's statement that the mind can exist apart from the body (as in the picture of death as "a transfer from this place to some other"). But at most I think you could say that Locke's remark might be used that way.

Then it would be like Tolstoy's "You say I am not free, but I have lifted my arm and let it drop", which misses its target because it does not know where its target is. And that is because metaphysics always operates "on a deeper level", and that is why "common sense" revolts -- i.e. pointing out normal rules of grammar -- against it such as Samuel Johnson's kicking a post to refute idealism miss their mark in every way except grammatically.

What we could say is that Tolstoy gives an example of what we call being 'free', and then the question is: How is his disputant using the word 'free' -- is there anything that he would call being 'free'? And if not, then what is the word 'unfree' to mean? -- i.e. the word 'unfree' has 'free' as its antithesis and is without meaning without it; if '~p' is nonsense, then p (e.g. 'Man is not free') is not a statement of fact.

Metaphysics tries to raise doubts about "common sense" "appearances" -- i.e. about what we see when we open our eyes, hear when we listen, touch, smell or taste. (But, you see, as we normally use the word 'appearance' it contrasts with 'reality', and we only call something an appearance because we are able to point to and verify what the reality behind the appearance is.) The reality behind what to "common sense" "appears" to be reality is the "deeper level" metaphysics seeks. In this particular case, what metaphysics offers are fantasy pictures -- i.e. imaginative inventions to which nothing in our experience corresponds (i.e. our experience cannot verify metaphysics' picture-theories; if it could those theories would be natural science rather than metaphysics) -- which, when well drawn, nonetheless are of great interest.

Why? Here is one possibility: that the idea that there is a deeper level to reality than we know or are able to know has its source, like "the riddle of our existence", in human instinct. And that man's response to that instinct leads to religion or philosophy and, sometimes, to metaphysics. Natural science, on the other hand, by its very nature has nothing to say about such "riddles" -- riddles which may express themselves in muddled language, but which are nonetheless as real as anything else that has its source in human instinct.

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A cow who wanders into a corn field is not held morally responsible. Yet even though we recognize that a drunken person is not responsible for their behavior, because he is not of sound mind, we nevertheless hold a man who commits a crime while drunk morally responsible for what he has done. "He chose to drink," we say. But mentally ill people are also held morally responsible even when it is recognized that they are acting out their illness, and no one chooses to be mentally ill. We do not find this comical. Do we find the judge comical who says "There but for the grace of God go I" -- but nonetheless jails the defendant? But putting a cow on trial, we would find comical. (Is that all there is, what is there -- like our life is "just there" (OC § 559) without higher explanation, "the given" = ways of life, language-games as proto-phenomena (PI II, xi, p. 226; § 654)?)

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Whenever I have to fight with language in order to express myself, I always suspect that my form of expression is clumsy because my thinking is unclear. And it usually is that way.

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Spontaneous generation of mouse:
Believe in order to see. (To look credulously.)
Disbelieve in order not to see. (Indeed, not even to look at all.)

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Socrates, the master of those who don't think they know what they don't know: Il maestro di color che non pensano sapere ciò che non sanno.

Man's original sin according to philosophy: thinking he knows what he does not know. Man's culpable presumption. And as often as I warn myself against that, just as often do I catch myself doing exactly what I have warned myself against doing. And so it goes day after day after day again.

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The moment anything (e.g. the law, institutions) is placed above common humanity, the moment it is thought that there is something more important than to treat other human beings with love, that is when every kind of cruelty becomes possible. (Tolstoy, Resurrection ii, 40)

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If man were to create an animal he would create the domestic pig. In fact he did create it, and his ridicule of that poor degraded creature is ridicule directed at a mirror.

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"The Emergencies Ministry reported that the bad weather with heavy snow and winds of 20-25 m/sec would remain in the region on Saturday." -- From the public prints. 'Heavy snow and high winds cause bad weather' is an example of a grammatical joke.

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Autobiographical, all-too autobiographical. "Wine attracted her ... because it gave her ease and confidence in her own worth, which she did not have without it" (Resurrection 1, 2). As that woman in the story was, so was I in my youth, without confidence in my own worth. Humiliation is a great teacher of common humanity to man (although even suffering requires enlightenment if it is not to be destructive (Dostoyevsky)).

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Twenty-five years ago now, I remember reading a book, sc. Bread by John Rimington, which was published in 1960 for secondary age school children and thinking: in our day this book would be for college age students. And now I see what is given to college age students and I think ... Of course children now learn much more mathematics than we did at their age, but maths will not tell you how to live your life. Nor will the natural sciences. And as to the value-laden thought-worlds of the social sciences, these are suited only to turn the unphilosophically-minded into ideologues.

*

Query: enemies of tautology.

Self-contradictions? but, then, who are -- dico, what are -- the "friends of tautology"?

Note: Although of course the combinations of words that make up the queries on this page might be given -- i.e. could have invented for them -- various other meanings, I am reading them in a philosophically interesting way. And what is "a philosophically interesting way" when it's at home? One that leads me to have, what I regard as being, worthwhile "thoughts of my own" apropos of the query's words.

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Apropos of "If a lion could talk, we would not understand him", nor would he understand us. At the United Nations if a speaker's joke does not translate from one language to another, the translator simply indicates when to laugh. (Although maybe what is humorous in one culture may not be in another -- even quite the contrary, but I don't know what the translators do then.) And so, too, we could cue a lion when to laugh, but the lion would not therefore have acquired our concept 'humor'. It would not "understand" -- i.e. see the point (Why does man say this? Why does man laugh at this?) of -- man's jokes.

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"All men are rational. Robert is a man. Therefore, Robert is rational." This shows that the premise 'All men are mortal' is different from 'All men are rational'. The first is a universal generalization which no one disputes ("... e dovete morire"); it an example of a proposition about which we are certain, although the proposition itself is not (cf. Wittgenstein's On Certainty (e.g. OC § 4) where he discusses just such propositions). But the other is a proposition the truth or falsity of which we are willing to dispute -- i.e. although Robert is a man, he may or may not be rational.

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I read once of a visit by an American professor of philosophy to one of Britain's blue brick universities (It may have been Cambridge). The professor was asked by the students if it was true that in America credit was given for "effort" (I place the word 'effort' in double-quotes because it went undefined in the discussion), and when they were told that it was true, the students laughed. I would like to have asked those students, Britain's brightest and finest, if they were all working at the level of Plato and Aristotle, say, and that if they were not, then what did they imagine they were being given credit for -- if not effort.

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I wonder how often I reject a remark or account simply because it runs counter to what I want to believe is (or "must" be) correct. Or because I find its form of expression repulsive (Rather like disliking a book, not on account of its content, but on account of its font-face or page layout). Further, Wittgenstein (to Drury, I think): "differences in temperament are behind more disagreements than you would imagine". But what did he mean by 'temperament' ('temperamental') -- 'being predisposed to reject any commonly held view'? As e.g. what I wrote, rightly or wrongly, about Wittgenstein himself: "... much of Wittgenstein's thinking -- both about life and about philosophy -- arose from someone's assertion of p and Wittgenstein's almost perverse response of not-p!"

*

Christianity, and the brutality of our life. When I think of how few people I care about and how few people care about me, it is both terrible and frightening. And I think that the psalmist was wrong when he said, "I would rather be a doorkeeper in the house of the Lord than dwell in the tents of ungodliness", because civilization (cities, towns, countries) is the source of this brutality, whereas in the pastoral life there are few people; everyone knows everyone else, and even if two people do not like one another, they still feel a responsibility to one another. It is a great tragedy that Jesus was wrong, that his days were not "the last days", that this world and all it loves remains, and we are all left in the hands of the devil.

The world of false caring. Other human beings as a way to make money, "Life as a commercial transaction" (Chernyshevsky). If people want your money, or don't want "to get in trouble" with their paymasters, they are "nice" to you, "friendly". But it is all false caring. And this insincerity is the most brutal aspect of our life.

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Wisdom and the Greek poets

The saying "Better that you had never been born; best now that you die soon", Nietzsche called "Greek folk wisdom". But that is not "folk wisdom", not if it comes, as it does seem to come, from Sophocles' Oedipus at Colonus (at line 1225), here in three translations. The speaker is a chorus of elders of Colonus:

Not to be born at all
Is best, far best that can befall,
Next best, when born, with least delay
To trace the backward way. (Tr. F. Storr)

Not to be born is, past all prizing, best; but, when a man hath seen the light, this is the next best by far, that with all speed he should go thither, whence he hath come. (Tr. Richard C. Jebb)

Not to be born is best, and, if one is born, to return thither whence one came with least delay is second best by far. For once he has passed youth with its passionate follies, man meets the blow of affliction and every weariness is there -- envy, sedition, strife, war, and carnage. At last his lot is old age, disparaged, strengthless, unapproachable, friendless, wherein every ill of ills is one's companion. (N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Greece 3rd ed. [1986], iv, 3, p. 344)

Is that the wisdom that comes from suffering, the only source of wisdom for man's life, according to the chorus of old men of Mycenae, the city of the House of Atreus, in Aeschylus' Agamemnon, c. lines 176-178?

Or is that wisdom that the gods punish those who disregard the laws of "justice and kindliness" (Hesiod), not to mention meekness (self-knowledge) and modesty (not over-reaching oneself; cf. Sophocles, Antigone c. lines 1350-1353)?

*

There are irradicable weeds in Candide's garden, 'weeds' meaning 'undesired plants'. Those weeds are the human vices ('vices' as opposed to 'virtues'), vices found in each of us that each individual must cure himself of. And that is why there are no good societies, although some social arrangements are more Christian -- if "Christian is as Christian does" -- than others, but that does not mean that their citizens are ethical; because ethics is not simply good practices: it is [philosophical] reflection about good and evil; it is choice rather than obedience to an external force (whether physical or ideological).

And thus the Stoics' ideal of "a society of good men and women" is not located in any one place or time but is spread across the earth, made up of individuals from all the earth's societies, as in Wittgenstein's Sketch for a Preface: "So I am really writing for friends who are scattered throughout the corners of the globe" (CV p. 6 [MS 109 204: 6-7.11.1930]), 'friends' meaning here 'people who are receptive to my way of thinking'. But the Greek philosophers thought differently, for they said: "Even if as yet unknown, a good man [i.e. morally virtuous] is already a friend." That is a more worthy definition of 'friend', I think.

When Jesus says, "Go learn the meaning of the words I desire mercy, not sacrifice" (Matthew 9.13), that also means that God desires equity (mercy), not law (mercilessness), love of neighbor, not "burnt offerings": fairness tempered with mercy is faithfulness to God (cf. Hosea 6.6). (The Athenian courts sought to avoid trial by law, first seeking rather mediation to resolve disputes between men.)

And all of that is what I think.

*

Come to your work when you are fresh, and leave it before you are exhausted, i.e. before your mind can no longer see straight, so to speak; I want to see and say what is new, not merely repeat old logic of language saws.

[Come to your work when you are fresh. Leave it before you are exhausted. Exhaustion murders ideas as well as sleep.]

*

... my wife hath begun to learn this day [to dance], but I fear will hardly do any great good at it, because she is conceited that she do well already ... (Diary of Samuel Pepys, 25 April 1663)

Plato contrasts "conceited ignorance" (Sophist) with Socratic ignorance (Apology).

*

Two projects, two points of view, in philosophy

A project in philosophy. To write a paper about Kant and Plato, and for the first half use Kant to criticize Plato as if you were a Kantian, and for the second half use Plato to criticize Kant as if you were a Platonist. If you can do that (maybe) it shows that you have mastery over your subject matter. (That is not what I do in contrasting the logics of Wittgenstein and Socrates, however; there, at the end, I maybe do try to take up a standpoint independent of either of the two; but whether I succeed or not, I do not go very far.)

For Bertrand Russell's "Theory of Descriptions"

Another project. Use Russell's idea this way, e.g. Wittgenstein's statement "I am not a religious man ..." Replace the word 'religious' with a series or collection of descriptions, e.g. "I do not do this [i.e. such-and-such specific things]. I do not think this." Or in the case of asking someone "Are you religious?", drop the word 'religious' completely and in its place use descriptions such as "Do you do this or that? Do you think this or that?" and so on. That is to say, by doing this you are giving a definition of the word 'religious' -- i.e. you are saying what you mean by that word -- a definition that can replace entirely the word 'religious' (as synonyms can do), as if that word did not exist at all.

But although that might say what you mean by the word 'religious', it would not be a definition of what we mean by that word. Lost would be the members of the class {descriptions, religious} not included in your definition, as well as the many associations and pictures the word 'religious' suggests to us.

Now the same project with abusive language, e.g. as when we say "What do you mean by calling x ridiculous?" Entirely replace the word 'ridiculous' with specific descriptions of x such as "x is this", "x is that", and so on, just as if the word 'ridiculous' did not exist.

"But in order for someone undertake that project, wouldn't the concept 'ridiculous' have to exist even if there were no word 'ridiculous' nor any other name for that concept?" The trouble with that notion is that if we cannot define 'concept' as 'rules for using a word', then how is the word 'concept' to be defined in the absence of language? "But how could our descriptions be synonymous with the word 'ridiculous' -- if there were no concept 'ridiculous'?" That reasoning looks circular. And again, how are you defining the word 'concept'?

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Contrary to a remark Wittgenstein once made: No, we are here to have a good time. It's just that most men are mistaken about what the good for man is. To identify pleasure with the good is the mistake of "the common man", "the world", "the many" (See Plato, Protagoras 354c). And that is that kind of "good time" Wittgenstein was alluding to when he said "We're not here to have a good time"; on the contrary, he told one of his students: "Take life seriously!" (But I think Wittgenstein's categorical imperative view of ethics is mistaken, that Socrates is right, Kant wrong.)

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Discourse of reason as a foundation of sand

Has reason the power to make man ethical? It has, but ethics is practical -- i.e. its aim is not to be a mere bystander or observer in ethics, but to amend our life for the good -- and what works for "care of the soul" may sometimes be rational, but other times maybe not. But -- my first thought is to say -- only what can stand to the test of dialectic is ... But on the other hand, what can now stand to the test of Socratic dialectic can later fall to the test of dialectic. Dialectic (discourse of reason), it seems, can also build a house on sand.

But Socratic dialectic tests (cross-questions) propositions (theses) to see whether they are true, false or nonsense. It does not test ways of looking at things. Question: is the proposition 'The good for man is to live in accord with the excellence that is proper to man' a way of looking at things or is it a proposition that can be tested for its truth or falsity in dialectic, e.g. by asking whether that or some other proposition states what the good is for man? Well, you know I don't know. Right now that distinction is looking like a house of cards. Or is it simply this: that philosophy examines everything, even first principles or axioms ("ways of looking at things"). But what does it examine (test) them for?

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Arguments are not circles

A must be ~B, because A cannot be B. Therefore, A is ~B.

That is an example, I think, maybe, of a circular argument. (But how is it circular? Is the argument's conclusion simply a restatement of its premises rather than a conclusion drawn from them?) "A cannot be B" -- what kind of necessity is that? It doesn't look like either logical or real possibility. Its possibility is the possibility of the "coherence theory of truth": what the net makes it possible to catch. For example, "That cannot be the true result of the referendum, because no measure could ever have that level of support." How do you know? "I just know. Unlike the White Queen, I can't believe impossible things."

"Isn't it obvious!"
"How can you doubt it!"

I don't call a proposition true just because I am inclined or want to believe that it is true. And I don't call a proposition false just because I am disinclined or do not want to be believe it to be true.

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