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Philosophy in the Sleep-deprived Mind

The method of Socratic induction and general definition. Which is disputed in ethics, the facts or the way the facts are looked at?

Context: as I have used Wittgenstein's expression "logic of language" for my own thinking in philosophy, by 'logic of language' I mean how the distinction is made between language with meaning and language without meaning in philosophical discussions (or Socratic dialectic or dialog).

[One who writes] with serious intent [writes words that can] speak in their own defense [and] present the truth adequately.

[When he writes he collects] a store of refreshment both for his own memory, against the day "when age oblivious comes", and for all such as tread in his footsteps ... And when other men resort to other pastimes, regaling themselves with drinking parties and suchlike, he will doubtless prefer to indulge in the recreation I refer to. (Plato, Phaedrus 276c-d, tr. Hackforth)

I am looking forward to [visiting] you as a rational creature that has had enough sleep. (Albert Schweitzer, Letter of 23 December 1953, tr. Neugroschel)

Another year and I am older and tireder, but forcing myself to focus ever more thoughtfully on what I want to say in philosophy, but not better or wiser. What follows is "Philosophy within the Limits of Unrestful Sleep". And unrevised it is more mortifying than refreshing.

Subjects on this page ...

Notes for the Desk Drawer

Where else would they be for? More conversations with myself.

Induction in general definition and ethics (Socratic logic)

Query: how did Socrates use inductive argument to provide general definitions?

The historical Socrates used the method of induction to define words in ethics (words such as 'piety', 'justice', 'courage', and 'self-control; of course, he did not think of himself as defining words, but instead as defining the things the words named (a synonym for 'common name' is 'class name')). He would take examples from our life of common names and compare things called by those names to find their defining common quality (or, essence, i.e. that without which they would not be what they are).

An example of induction. How does the good man live our life? The good shoemaker makes the shoes brought to him for repair better, not worse. The good tinker mends pots (He makes them better not worse). The good builder makes structures strong, not weak (better not worse). The good horse-trainer makes horses better not worse. And so in each of these cases, the good artisan benefits rather than does harms. Their common nature is: in all the arts, the good practitioner is the one who makes things better rather than worse (or, benefits rather than harms). And, therefore, in the art of living (Ethics, Plato's "we are discussing no small matter, but how to live"), the good man makes things better rather than worse; he benefits rather than harms others -- including enemies and wrong-doers, because it is not the nature of the good (man) to do harm to anything or anyone.

Plato's Republic 335b-e is a refutation of the traditionally accepted proposition or thesis that "the good man benefits his friends and harms his enemies".

The raw material for Socrates' analogies

"But you see, Socrates," explained Critias, "you will have to avoid your favourite topic, -- the cobblers, builders and metal workers; for it is already worn to rags by you in my opinion." -- "Then must I keep off the subjects of which these supply illustrations, Justice, Holiness [piety], and so forth?" (Xenophon, Memorabilia i, 2, 37, tr. Marchant)

Earlier I wrote about Plato's method in ethics of tautologies: "If the good man does harm, then what does the bad man do?" But comparisons -- a proposition that A is like B in such-and-such-a-way -- is not a tautology, but a true or false statement. Meanwhile, abstracting the common quality, namely "The good benefits rather than harms", is an example of "induction". When Plato offers a Socratic definition of 'clay', he examines different kinds of clay to find what their common nature (or, essence) is: "clay is earth mixed with moisture, never mind whose clay it may be [whether the potter's, the ovenmaker's, the brickmaker's or the dollmaker's]" (Theaetetus 147a-c). According to Aristotle, that would be an example of induction and general definition.

What then is the general definition of 'good man'? Regardless of his occupation, the good man is the man who makes things better, not worse; who benefits, not harms. But is the conduct of man's life, e.g. his treatment of other men (or, justice) an occupation? An analogy, a comparison is made -- is it justifiable? "Just as the good artisan does no harm in his work, so too the good man does no harm in his life" is argument by analogy; but that method of argument does not prove a thesis; rather it persuades to a point of view ("just as"), or, in other words, it says: See it this way! (More examples are needed to make this clear.)

What do we normally call an argument? An example might be, "if we look, we find that we call circles and squares and triangles all by the common name 'shape'." The abstracted common quality (namely, what all shapes have in common [if there happens to be a defining common quality]) would be abstracted by induction, the conclusion introduced by the word 'therefore', a logical "therefore" not merely a persuasive one (which is all an argument by analogy has). (Examples are needed to make this clear and to test its truth.)

Note: Aristotle credits Socrates with two contributions to logic: induction and general definition (i.e. an identification of the essence of a class of things). When Critias forbids Socrates to teach "the art of words", Socrates says that he uses these illustrations to discuss moral virtue (or the moral virtues). Shoemakers, tinkers, builders and horse trainers are used that way above.

Descartes and Socrates, their different Methods and Aims

Query: Descartes, suspect everything.

Descartes took mathematical certainty (logical deduction) as the model and method for his philosophy -- i.e., the kind of certainty (PI ii, xi, p. 224) that comes from strict, all-encompassing rules, rules which he thought to be laws of nature rather than conventions. Descartes examined the ideas in his own mind following logic's rules of deduction. He did not think his ideas to be mere "concepts" -- i.e. rules for using words -- but instead the names of realities, and that those ideas existed innately in his own mind rather than having been acquired (learned)..

The query may be an allusion to Solzhenitsyn's Cancer Ward: "There was this philosopher Descartes. He said, Suspect everything." And there is a related story in the Gulag Archipelago.

Query: compare Descartes' method of self-doubt to Socrates' manner of questioning people.

Descartes questioned himself alone: the method and conclusions of his meditations do not have to face the tests of refutation by others. Whereas in Socratic dialog or dialectic, both the theses of Socrates' companions and his own counter-theses are put to the test to be accepted or refuted.

With which method would there be more danger of unclarity and falsehood, with Descartes' method of introspection or the Socratic method of dialectic?

Descartes questioned only what he himself knew, whereas Socrates questioned what anyone knows (and does not know). But not only their methods but also their aims in philosophy were different. Socrates' search was for knowledge in ethics only, whereas Descartes sought knowledge in metaphysics by a lonely method. (The purpose of doubt in philosophy.)

Query: the function of ignorance.

Discovering ignorance in yourself may teach you humility = self-knowledge. (1) Part of "Know thyself" is to recognize your limits, and so not to over-reach or under-reach yourself. (2) In Socratic philosophy, the gravest ignorance is to think you know what you don't know, and thereby to be misled yourself and to mislead others. (3) Further, no one seeks to know what he thinks he already knows, but if you recognize that you don't know something (are ignorant of something), you may be spurred to seek to know it (discover the truth). (4) Further still, there is "learned ignorance" = knowing that and why there are important things you may never know but always be ignorant of.

Ignorance is not bliss in philosophy, which is the rational pursuit of knowledge in logic, metaphysics and ethics. A philosopher is one who wants to know the truth and understand why he does not know the things he does not know.

Ethics and Self-control

Know you not that a good man does nothing for appearance sake, but for the sake of having done right?

"Is there no reward then?"

Seems it to you so small a thing and worthless, to be a good man ...? (Epictetus, Discourses iii, 24, tr. Crossley)

If, as according to Xenophon's Memorabilia, the good is what is useful, what reward -- i.e. benefit or use -- is there in the policy "Bear and forbear"? What kind of human being do you want to be, then, a good man or a bad? (The question is rhetorical. It is a grammatical reminder that the combination of words 'Why should you want the good for you?' like 'Why should you want to be happy?' is nonsense. 'All things seek the good, unless ignorance diverts them' is a tautology.) Epictetus's motto is an expression of Socrates' identification of "temperance" (self-control) as belonging to the excellence (moral virtue) that is proper to (and therefore the good for) man.

But why, if Virtue is knowledge?

We don't always succeed in ethics -- but we don't always fail either. But how can it be that we sometimes fail, if, as we say, we know what we should do, and if virtue is indeed knowledge? Someone does wrong (1) because he does not keep watch over himself to forestall being ruled by beastly instincts and the bad habits he formed in his time of ignorance of the good; and (2) because of insincerity: "It is wrong," one says, but one thinks, "It is not wrong, but on the contrary justified (e.g. impatience)." But there is something else: (3) we do wrong simply because we are ignorant of the facts needed to make a logically compelling choice between x and not-x, despite our having reasons for, reasons against.

But this is also correct: That ethics ("being ethical") is not a state but an act ("being ethical"). And one begins afresh with every act (the counter is reset): the present act is not negated by past acts. To be "every day growing in goodness" means to be every day working to be less imperfect in ethics -- i.e. to be acting in ethical ways, keeping watch over oneself (recollected), not to be attaining a magical state named "goodness". (To fall into despair over one's past wrong-doing is vanity. The important thing is to go forward.)

The beginning of philosophy is to know the condition of one's own mind ... (ibid. i, 26)

The condition of the ignorant mind is of not knowing itself, the condition of the unexamined life.

Question: Do you want self-control to make yourself a good human being -- or to make a display -- i.e. in order not to lower yourself in the eyes of others? If you were quite alone in the universe would you want self-control (temperance), e.g. in order not to lower yourself in your own eyes? Vanity may sometimes be a useful tool (it may prompt you to do what is good) -- and shouldn't shame be a useful tool as well? If the result we have in mind is only this: to become a good human being -- i.e. if ethics truly is practical -- then does the "why" matter? (In any case identifying motive here belongs to the realm of "whatever seems correct is going to be correct".)

But how could motive be a factor or indeed possible if moral virtue is knowledge? Because we don't always have knowledge, and because noble intentions are part of moral nobility -- and it is after moral nobility that ethics aims, even if noble intentions, despite being conscientiously undertaken, don't always result in the intended outcomes.

"Virtue is knowledge"

Socrates: If you do not know what is good, you cannot do what is good (because you will always aim for what you believe to be good), and if you know what is good, you cannot fail to do what is good (because you will always aim for what you believe to be good) -- i.e. moral virtue is knowledge (Xenophon, Memorabilia iii, 9, 5).

Man only wants to do what is evil when he mistakes it for what is good.

"Ways of looking at things" (and other opacitious notions)

I earlier thought that propositions like 'The good is the useful' state ways of looking at ethics, neither logical inferences nor statements of empirical fact nor metaphysical theories about what moral virtue really is.

The proposition 'Moral excellence is knowledge' is an interference, the conclusion of the argument that begins with the postulate or definition 'All things aim for their perceived good'.

But there are other ways to approach ethics, other places to begin. For example, Wittgenstein's, Kant's.

Socrates begins with the postulate (as in geometry, presumption or definition -- which?) that the good for a thing is existence in accordance with the excellence (areté) that is proper and unique to that thing. And reasons and concludes that the excellence for man is the life of rational (i.e. reasoned all the way through and consistent with public experience) moral virtue.

Now, do you want to say that a postulate is a way of looking at things? Or is what follows from it a way of looking at things? Does calling it that make anything clearer? No. You might say that different postulates from those Socrates chose are possible (or for a non-rational "ethics" no argument, just "values") such as those Kant chose.

Socratic ethics sets forth a line of reasoning to be accepted (agreed to) or refuted in discussion. Now, is that discussion about the mutually acknowledged facts in plain view (the picture) -- or about the frame around the picture (the frame of reference)? Specifically it might be about either. (Examples are needed.)

Rather than different ways of looking at the facts, could we say: different ways of organizing the facts or of classifying them -- or of conceiving (conceptualizing) them? That also doesn't make things clearer. Is there a disagreement here about the facts or not? There is disagreement about the selection of the first premiss. But if the premisses are bedrock (postulates, axioms), then how can anyone rationally choose between them? Is there no way? Before I said there wasn't, but examples are needed to answer that question. What we can say is that just because a proposition is treated as a postulate doesn't mean that it is beyond (outside) philosophical criticism ("parallel postulate") -- an examination would be necessary to determine what can and what can't be undermined. ("The Bible is the word of God" e.g.)

According to Wittgenstein, it is possible to dispute ways (means) to ethical goals (ends), but not the goals themselves. The goals are "absolute values" which can neither be defended nor refuted (i.e. discussed philosophically). Can that claim not be challenged by Socrates; can he not say that the goal, namely to live in accord with the specific excellence proper to man, is knowable; that what that excellence is can be disputed (discussed, argued), as well as the best ways to accomplish that goal, but that the goal is knowable -- in sum, ethics is rational?

But you can't have it both ways: either Socrates' premiss is a postulate or it is knowable (justifiable by reasons or facts) -- but not both. But then Wittgenstein's statement about the aim would be a merely logical point, not an existential point, namely that a postulate is bedrock; as such it justifies, but it cannot itself be justified (otherwise it would not be a postulate). Well, but is Socrates' first premiss a postulate or a proposition of fact?

Mustn't Wittgenstein refute Socrates' claim, not just play the woman and declare it false, pointing to "absolute value" instead? And mustn't Kant, with his claim that individual and inscrutable conscience is sovereign in ethics, refute the Socratic claim? Why shouldn't one's conscience direct one away from the good, if one is ignorant of the good? (Plato's method of tautologies in ethics has a vital role to play in this dialog, e.g. "If the good [virtuous] man is cowardly, impious, unjust, intemperate, then what is the bad [vicious] man?" and "If the good for a thing is to exist in a way that is not consistent with its highest nature, then what is the bad for that thing?" (We can dispute what that thing's highest nature is, of course.))

"That's not a conclusion (logical inference) -- that's an interpretation." Is x the only possible (logically sound) conclusion? When it isn't, that's when you have a way of looking at things = interpretation. For example, "virtue is knowledge" -- is that the only possible conclusion if "all things aim for their perceived good" is true?

Examples are the true masters to follow in logic-philosophy, the test of whether you understand or not, of whether you know (in any respect) what you are talking about or not.

Miscellaneous Interlude

Query: what do you call a word that can be substituted for a person, place or thing?

A queer fish indeed. Are there any such words? I would not say that a word could be substituted for my wife, if I happened to have a wife. "... substituted for the name of a person, place, etc." The answer is: pronoun; the name of a person, place, etc., is: noun.

Query: Wittgenstein, philosophers clarify language.

It is not easy to know quite what 'clarify' means when Wittgenstein says that philosophy is the clarification of propositions (TLP 4.112), but maybe it is to sort the goats from the sheep: propositions of natural science to one side, nonsense to the other. But later, I don't think it is "clarify language" so much as "use language to clarify philosophical problems" (PI § 109).

Query: the ethical mysticism of Reverence for Life meaning.

The "mysticism" is, I think, the notion of the unity of all life that somehow binds all living things in solidarity, at least in the understanding of man, the ethical being (To 'revere life' is to protect and enhance life). It is 'mysticism' because it goes beyond what is knowable naturally; because all we know is (1) of the existence of individual wills-to-live, and (2) of the ethical personality that is me [or, "that I find within myself" -- but not as if it were a thing apart from me: it is me, my very nature as man to be an ethical will-to-live]. What does 'the unity of all life' mean? Is there a shared essence -- Well, what is "will to live" to mean if not "the essence of life" (What all life has in common is its will-to-live)?

"Reverence for Life"

The important thing is for all of us to properly mull over the question of when damaging and killing are permissible.... Much will be achieved once people become reflective and wisely realize that they should damage and kill only when necessary. That is the essence. The rationalization of individual cases is a different matter.... I do not know whether I am doing the right thing in deciding one way instead of the other. (Albert Schweitzer, Letters 1905-1965, tr. Neugroschel (1992), Lambaréné, [1951], p. 218)

That I think is the essence of the practice of reverence for life, quite apart from its foundation in Schweitzer's thinking. As Schweitzer saw ("I do not know whether I am doing the right thing in deciding one way instead of the other"), in his ethics there is the absence of the universal (foolproof) standard Socrates sought for any and every particular circumstance.

Query: Wittgenstein, color of the number 3.

This query came from far away Finland. But that is not L.W., but R.W.A. And so the Internet, as it was in its early years, when it still held promise for the individual.

The geometric plane is a map. The map's points are addresses in the plane

Query: the study of geometry begins with the word 'point'.

It should not, but it does, and rather than "study of", it should be "confusion about". The study of map-reading does not begin with the word 'point', although we of course must talks about points on a map (The shortest distance between two points on the globe is often an arc rather than a straight line e.g.); but no one asks "what kind of object" a point is in map-reading, and no one should in geometry either.

Relations between Earlier and Later Wittgenstein

Bertrand Russell suggested the terms 'WI' and 'WII' instead. WI would be the philosophy of the TLP.

Query: meaning is picture, Wittgenstein.

Is the essence of language -- i.e. of its meaning (because that is the aspect of language that is important in philosophy) -- picture-making ("We make for ourselves pictures of the facts")? That is the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus's account of meaning; however, "This is how things stand" = "statement of fact" = "picture" -- seems to be founded on the TLP's strange notion of fact.

Does Wittgenstein give examples of the pictures which he says are the meaning of language? Are 'It is raining' (TLP 4.461) and 'A book is on the table' (to Parak) examples of propositions of fact [factual propositions] according to the TLP's account of language meaning? Are those "propositions of natural science"? They are both pictures.

Note that 'meaningless' in the TLP means no more than: 'cannot be put into words that form [make up, compose] a statement of fact'. And that "what we must pass over in silence" (because we cannot put it into words that state facts) is neither non-existent nor "meaningless" -- as we normally use the word 'meaning' -- according to the TLP.

Is the word 'picture' to be taken in a simple-minded way (i.e. in the most obvious of all the various ways we use the word 'picture') in Wittgenstein's context?

When many years later [1949] he told his friend "It is impossible for me to say in my book one word about all that music has meant in my life" -- what kind of impossibility was this? Was it a logical impossibility? Would it have been meaningless talk -- or would it merely have been off-topic, a wrong-headed attempt to make the spirit of his work explicit (CV p. 7-8)? That is the question.

(Earlier Wittgenstein had said [1929]: But the tendency to thrust against the limits -- e.g. to try to talk about absolute value in ethics or aesthetics -- points to something. But I asked: when is nonsense not nonsense, i.e. how can you so much as even point to the meaning of what is without meaning? This shows that the TLP uses the words 'sense' and 'nonsense' in an eccentric way, redefining them as if their meaning were a metaphysical question.)

Query: running full tilt against the limits of language? Language is not a cage.

That was my own old translation of Wittgenstein's remark, which is here quoted back at me. But now I think it ought to be rendered: "Running into the limits of language; language is not cage." But later Wittgenstein did talk about bumping into a wall (PI § 464), even though he now defined 'sense' and 'nonsense' differently. (Note that in the TLP language really is a cage, because according to that book there are things that cannot be put into language (words) that is not nonsense [6.522].)

The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps which the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language. (PI § 464)

And yet Wittgenstein also said that there is no wall ("Language is not a cage") ... but once we recognize that there is no wall (other than what is, and what is not, defined language -- i.e. the sense and nonsense that we ourselves create [cf. Z § 259]) -- that's when the problem in trying to understand Wittgenstein's later thinking begins, not ends. Because if there is no wall (no cage), then why is the metaphysical use of language (e.g. Plato's discussion of the soul as a spirit, or Fichte's denial that there is a "thing in itself") impossible? That is the question.

What can be described can happen too ... (TLP 6.362)

But that is a false account of the grammar of our language. Rather, whatever can be described can be described. A thought experiment is not an experiment. And what can be thought need not be a real possibility -- "Thought can be" not only "of what is not the case" (PI § 95), but also of what cannot (as a real possibility) be the case. A proposition need not express a real possibility but only a logical possibility in order for it not to be nonsense.

Query: Wittgenstein and Rationalism.

Is the TLP a work of Rationalism (according to Wittgenstein)? Does it not claim to be a Rationalistic ladder with which to climb out of the hole of Rationalism? Rationalism = trying to express by means of language what can only belong to the grammar (rules of sense and nonsense) of the language (PP iii, p. 312). It is "metaphysics", Wittgenstein's eternally targeted enemy.

Query: why are beliefs statements of fact about the way things are?

Possibly by definition of the word 'belief'. But we use the word 'belief' in various ways. Are positive beliefs about the Gospel's miracles necessarily statements of fact "about the way things are'? The meaning of the common name 'belief' is not a common nature. There is no essence of belief.

'A riddle without an answer'

"I think you might do something better with the time," she said, "than wasting it in asking riddles that have no answers."

The Hatter's remark seemed to her to have no sort of meaning in it, and yet it was certainly English. (Alice in Wonderland vii; cf. BB p. 56: "it sounds English")

The form of expression or "sign" (In Wittgenstein's jargon the word 'sign' means the purely physical aspect of language, e.g. marks on paper, spoken sounds, gestures, in contrast to a word's use in the language) 'Is reality confined to what is in principle perceptible to the senses?' is "certainly English", and it does not seem to be nonsense, although a Yes or No answer is not a logical possibility (not unless we introduce the picture of a god who sees what we do not see), and treated as a "real possibility" both its affirmation and negation are nonsense.

That is indeed an example of "a riddle without an answer", and the question may be compared to a picture or pictures. It suggests pictures to us, and it seems that those pictures must teach us its meaning (PI II, iv, p. 178), but do they?

Is Alice right when she says that we are "wasting the time" (in this instance, with idle pictures)? For that was once also Wittgenstein's response: "Reading the Socratic dialogues one has the feeling: what a terrible waste of time!" (CV p. 14, remark from when Wittgenstein was 42 years old). In those early dialogs, doesn't Plato pose riddles without solutions, e.g. in the Euthyphro he asks what the absolute standard for deciding whether a thing is pious or not is, but does not find anything even resembling one?

Belief that there is a reality that cannot be known by sense perception

Quite apart from the question whether or not the existence of God can be proved, belief in God implies, for example, that reality is not confined to what is in principle perceptible by the senses. (Frederick C. Copleston, SJ, Religion and Philosophy (1974), "Introduction", p. ix)

Though they would be unlikely to express themselves in this abstract way, a good many people believe implicitly that to be or to exist is to be a possible (in principle) object of sense-perception, and logical positivism can be seen as attempting to justify theoretically this widespread implicit belief. (Copleston, Memoirs (1993), xi, p. 139)

The first quotation is not found in the context in which I remembered (or "thought I remembered") it, nor is it posed as a question in its actual context. Neither is the second quotation posed as a question, but nevertheless the question I ask was sparked by Frederick Copleston. (Related, or perhaps it is the same belief, is the materialism "a good many people believe in" apropos of the soul and whether there is an afterlife.)

Query: riddles with no real answer that mean something.

Well, after all, this is it: do they really mean something or are they merely "words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound" (Hobbes)? What we can't say is that the word 'riddle' is meaningless without its antithesis 'solution' -- unless we say that all riddles are without solution. But all we are saying here is that some riddles are without solution. (We can say that they only have the form of riddles, that they aren't "really" riddles -- but it does not make their meaning clearer if we simply remove them from one category without placing them in another.) We point: Here are examples of riddles with solutions, but in contrast here are riddles which are essentially without solutions.

"Why is a raven like a writing-desk?" The question is a well-formed English question; there does exist an institution of language use, namely riddles and solutions, that uses this form. However, Lewis Carroll did not invent a riddle-and-solution in this case. -- Indeed, he intended for there to be no solution; that is the point of the incident in the story.

For example, the solution "Poe wrote on them" has been offered. And it is a clever solution -- but, on the other hand, to offer any solution is to not to see the point of the story -- namely that it is a mad tea party.

Query: requires no answer questions.

Should our "Questions without answers" be regarded [treated] as rhetorical questions? For do we really expect [solicit] an answer to them? I don't know -- why shouldn't we? For we did not ask them to be idle, after all. We asked them hoping for some kind of answer. (In the beginning was the question; the grammatical investigation of its meaning came later.)

Wittgenstein: People say that philosophy hasn't progressed since Plato, "that we are still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were the Greeks" (CV p. 15). Wittgenstein attributes this to conceptual confusion, to following false grammatical analogies between different regions of language, which amounts to an inability to see the deeper grammar beneath the surface.

Comment. Conceptual confusion certainly there is. But maybe it isn't the nature of philosophy to progress. (With respect to the "eternal questions", maybe the aim is simply to be aware. Maybe they are rhetorical.) Besides, if philosophy really is rational ways of seeing things -- or interpreting things -- in logic, ethics, and/or metaphysics, how could it progress? Philosophy doesn't progress; it just goes elsewhere, from one frame of reference to another (and sometimes back again).

Too general, too vague. What are examples of contrasting ways of seeing things in philosophy -- mutually irrefutable ways?

More notes unintendedly only for myself

Query: what did philosophy mean to Socrates?

There is the word 'philosophy' and there is the field of learning philosophy. (1) How did Socrates define the word 'philosophy' (that is a question for grammar); in the Phaedrus Plato suggests 'lover of learning'' (as Pythagoras had meant 'lover of wisdom'); the word 'philosophy' did not have a fixed meaning even at the time Plato was writing (the historical Socrates may never have used that word). (2) What importance did philosophy have to the life of Socrates? For Socrates, philosophy was a way of life; he lived to search (logic and experience were his guide) for moral excellence and to practice moral excellence (virtue).

Query: there is no absolute definition of holiness, Plato.

An absolute meaning would be the same in every context, but words with only "relative meaning" would have meanings that varied by context. In the Euthyphro Plato presumes that the word 'piety' has an absolute meaning, that there is an essence of piety.

Socrates, was he "weird"?

A "professional philosopher", professor of philosophy (Plato, Euthydemus 307a-c), a university, establishment figure, wrote:

The biographical tradition reinforces our unease [with Socrates' rationalism] by depicting Socrates as in many ways a weird and inhuman person making excessive demands on human nature in both himself and others. (The Oxford History of Greece and the Hellenistic World (1986 [reissued 2001, p. 283]), Chapter 10 "Classical Greek Philosophy" by Julia Annas)

Now to make "a reactionary remark which does no credit to my development and is conditioned by lack of phosphorus in my brain" (Dostoyevsky, The Crocodile), and which I shall counter in a moment, I must say that given that the author is female I'm surprised that she didn't use the word 'creepy' rather than the word 'weird'. Was Wittgenstein also "a weird and inhuman person making excessive demands on human nature" in the eyes of Professor Annas?

The economist Alfred Marshall came to the conclusion that "there was nothing useful to be made of women's intellects". And I have never been able to figure out what women, creatures fitted by nature to the seraglio, the zoologist's harem, have to do with philosophy. (I earlier wrote that there is something feminine about Voltaire's thinking both in style and even in substance, and I did not mean that as a compliment. Self-obsessed creatures all.)

Women do well in school because they like to follow rules; it makes them feel both clever and safe; it is a form of "playing house" and punishing their errant dolls. Women do not really want equality with men, but instead all the rights of men with all the privileges of women.

If you try to understand women by analogy to men, you will misunderstand them. Women are best regarded not as the female of the human species but rather as a distinct species in themselves. We don't observe butterflies in order to understand the behavior of donkeys.

Now, do I really believe anything that I have just written? Maybe the part about "different species".

Hipparchia of Maroneia (ca. 300 B.C.)

On the other hand, there is Hipparchia who became a Cynic philosopher.

She fell in love with the discourses and the life of Crates [who] was implored by her parents to dissuade the girl, and did all he could, and at last, failing to persuade her, got up, took off his clothes before her face [Note that Crates was not a handsome man: "He was ugly to look at, and when performing his gymnastic exercises [for which Greek men stripped naked] used to be laughed at" (vi, 91)] and said, "This is the bridegroom, here are his [only] possessions; make your choice accordingly [i.e. is this what you really want?]; for you will be no helpmeet of mine, unless you share my pursuits." The girl chose, and adopting the same dress, went about with her husband and lived with him in public and went out to dinners with him. (Diog. L. vi, 96-97, tr. Hicks)

At one such symposium (dinner, banquet), being teased by a man, she responded, "... do you suppose that I have been ill advised about myself, if instead of wasting further time upon the loom [-- Weaving cloth was part of caring for the household, which, tradition said, was the excellence proper to woman --] I spent it in education?" (ibid. vi, 98) What kind of education is Cynicism?

Is Cynicism "really a philosophy, and not, as some maintain, just a way of life"? (ibid. vi, 103)

I wouldn't like to set the limits of our concept 'philosophy' too narrowly. One might call the teaching of Socrates "just a way of life", for there is only logic and ethics (Plato's "we are discussing no small matter, but how to live") (and logic only for the sake of ethics) -- but no metaphysics in it. The important point for me, however, is that both Socrates and the Cynics are guided by natural reason alone (rather than e.g. tradition or religious revelation).

Metaphysics and "wonder"

Query: philosophy had its origin in man's sense of wonder. "Philosophy begins in wonder." Metaphysics.

When Plato said that philosophy begins in wonder (Theaetetus 155c-d), by 'wonder' he meant perplexity. But for the pre-Socratics, philosophy (metaphysics) seems rather to have begun in curiosity, with the question: what can be known (speculated) about the nature or essence of reality by the light of natural reason alone? (Awe, in contrast, is a religious rather than a philosophical phenomenon.)

Perplexity, however, is the condition of anyone who wonders about the eternal questions (questions without answer), questions which I, even if I alone, call metaphysics. And we bump our head with a thud against the riddle of existence, unable to either deny the riddle or see a way forward towards solving it.

The Riddle in No Way Exists

Query: the question asked is nonsense, philosophy.

According to Wittgenstein [TLP 6.51], a question that cannot be answered is not a question; it is nonsense. "The riddle does not exist" [6.5] -- i.e. there is no expression of wonder that can be put into words that is not nonsense. (Actually Wittgenstein meant more than that; although without justification (for if some things "make themselves manifest" [6.522], "show" rather than "say", then how is it that the riddle does not do that too -- indeed does anything more emphatically "make itself manifest" than "the riddle"), he meant there really is no riddle of existence to wonder at. (Later he made a grudging compromise.))

Wittgenstein speaks of "the mystical feeling" [6.45]. What does 'feeling' contrast with -- 'thought'?)

Query: philosophy begins with wonder, Wittgenstein.

According to the distinction Wittgenstein made between conceptual investigations and factual investigations, philosophy often begins with following misleading and false analogies between forms of language. And that could be the perplexity that Plato is noting, although Plato does not see philosophy that way: in his view philosophical problems are questions about reality to solve, not conceptual muddles to be dissolved -- i.e. shown to be nonsense. (Wittgenstein's theories about the origin of philosophy.) Which is correct or are both correct -- depending on examples?

Query: why do you think Plato said that philosophy begins with wonder?

There is a difference between "with" and "in", but in any case you should not guess, but instead look at Plato's words in the context in which he said them. Because most any meaning might be assigned to words taken out of context, just as to an aphorism. ("What gives language meaning?") If you ask a student "Why do you think ...?" of an aphorism, then you must accept the answer that suggests itself to the student, mustn't you? (But your instructor will not mark you by that standard.)

Grammar and Language Queries (More)

Query: when grammar is not logical.

By 'illogical' here we mean either (1) without rules, or (2) with too many exceptions to the general rule. The past tense of 'send' for example is not 'sended', and where there are many such cases we may say that the language's grammar is "not logical". By 'illogical' I think we normally mean such forms of expression as 'contrary to the rules', or, 'breaking the rules', or, 'not following or deducible from a general rule'?

At school we were told that English is 60% irregular. The word 'irregular' could be synonymous with 'exceptional' or 'not logical'.

Query: meaning of the term 'grammar' that has nothing with rules.

If 'grammar' = 'any description of the use of language', then if we describe cases where there is no general rule (or where there are too many exceptions to the general rule for our liking), maybe those cases would be the query's ruleless grammar.

The word 'beautiful' is a word without a grammar if 'grammar' = 'rules for the use of language', because there are no rules for its use, only descriptions of its use.

Just how many exceptions is a rule allowed to have before we must give up calling it a 'rule'? Of course there is no "must"; the concept 'rule' is fluid. However, a "language game also has a point", and if there are "too many" exceptions, there is no point calling something a 'rule' -- (although you still might if you wanted to, but to what end -- in order to claim that there really is a rule, that English really is regular, albeit in an irregular sort of way?)

We never have to surrender a theory. We can make unlimited accommodations to reality, to make the facts fit the theory. But the intent was just the opposite, namely to make the theory fit the facts (Myson).

Why is there no plural form of the word 'information' (no 'informations') in English, as there is in Italian (informazioni)? The past tense of 'sneak' is 'sneaked' (There isn't a word 'snuck' in school-standard English) -- Why? There is no rule; if you are learning English, you just have to memorize this "non-rule" -- or "the rule in this particular case"?

Would a rule that only applied to one case be a rule -- i.e. what we call a 'rule'? If so, then would there be no "grammar that has nothing with rules"?

"It is a rule of English grammar that the past tense of 'sneak' is 'sneaked'." -- Well, don't we say that -- i.e. isn't that a way we normally use the word 'rule'? Then what do we mean by the word 'rule' in this type of case? E.g. 'the command'?

In Wittgenstein's jargon, "any description of the use of language is 'grammar'". Is that only in Wittgenstein's jargon? -- To the extent -- i.e. extension of our concept 'grammar' -- that he applied it, so far as I know, but note that Kant called defining of words the work of a grammarian (philosophers, he says, define things).

But about a style of drawing which he called "metaphysical" --i.e. "seen against the background of the eternal" ("art is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis"), Wittgenstein wrote, "it is a language without grammar; you couldn't say what its rules are" (CV p. 75 [Notebooks 1914-1916, 2nd ed., tr. Anscombe, 7 October 1916]).

But if it doesn't have a grammar, then according to Wittgenstein's jargon is it a language at all? If there are is no way to distinguish between sense and nonsense, then meaning becomes a question of "whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'" (PI § 258). And then "what are you going to do about philosophy" (Parmenides 135b) if we cannot make a verifiable distinction between sense and nonsense?

If the use of a language cannot be described at all, then it isn't what we call a 'language' -- but that is different from saying that if the description does not consist of rules, then it is not what we call 'grammar'. But, according to my account of Wittgenstein's work, he equated logic with grammar ('grammar' = 'logic'), and a logic that does not consist of rules is not what we call 'logic'! Are there "rules of sense and nonsense" (and is there sense and nonsense without rules)? As exemplified by what? Well, it makes sense -- i.e. this language is defined -- to say that starlings flock together but not that stones flock together.

Query: imponderable questions that can't be answered.
Query: riddles I don't understand, puzzlements.

But I think that is a definition of 'imponderable question', not a statement about a more or less accidental characteristic of imponderable questions, as if there were imponderable questions that could be answered. By contrast, it is characteristic of "word problems" in maths to confuse children; that is not essential to such problems, however, but only an accident produced by wretched teaching.

Symptoms versus criteria, causes and grammar

Query: why in depression we find doubts in everything.

Is that a symptom of depression, or a criterion for 'depression' (i.e. a defining characteristic for the application of that word)? Actually, I don't know; those words are not defined absolutely but relative to context (Z § 438) in Wittgenstein's jargon: "finding doubts in everything" or "being dissatisfied with seemingly every aspect of one's life" might be either a criterion (logic of language) or a symptom (natural science) depending on context.

Is someone depressed because he "finds doubts in everything", or is finding doubts in everything one of the things we call 'depression'?

Compare "crying and sadness" -- does sadness cause crying? Here it is not clear what 'cause' would mean, because is it clear what the proposition 'The word 'sadness' is the name of an agent' might mean? We conjure up the picture of a nebulous "something" and say that is the meaning of 'sadness' or "what sadness is when it's at home". But it was not by means of that picture that we learned to use the word 'sadness' nor how we would teach others to use that word (acquire that concept). The picture comes later as a false explanation fostered by a false analogy: every event is caused by an agent, and crying is caused by sadness, and therefore sadness is an agent. (We acquire the concept, learn to use the word, 'sadness' in the flow of everyday life (Wittgenstein), not in the classroom.)

"Do rotting teeth cause pain?" versus "Do gray clouds cause gloomy weather?" The first is a question of natural psychology; the second is a grammatical joke. But 'Sadness causes crying' may be either an empirical (symptom, although neither essential nor sufficient) or a grammatical (criterion) proposition.

Query: will there be any more numerals invented in the world?

What are we calling numerals, 'numerals'? Anyone may use his imagination to invent new characters (a new notation) to replace the Arabic or Roman numerals. Compare these two queries: (1) Has all the mathematics that it is possible to invent already been invented? and (2) Have all the ways in which checkmate is possible in chess been identified? This shows that mathematics is not a completed system like chess. A calculus is only a game played according to strict rules -- after its creation (if Wittgenstein's account, or rather my understanding of it, is correct).

Query: how would you explain the word 'grammar' to children?

Why was Socrates able to use the method of question and answer? Because before Socrates questioned others, Socrates questioned himself to see what he knew and what he only thought he knew but did not know (That was why he was confused by the oracle's words, because Socrates knew nothing important to know). And so before you ask how to teach the use of a word to a child, ask how you would teach the use of that word to yourself, because every explanation you can give yourself, you can give the child too (PI § 210).

You might speak of grammar as being like the traffic laws of language: without those laws there would be chaos on the roadways. We use analogies, make comparisons. A general definition of the word 'grammar' might be 'a set of rules' if rules are essential to the meaningful use of words. (In the grammar of our language, there are rules of syntax, but there are also rules of sense and nonsense.) And you might compare speaking language to playing a game: the 'rules of the game' are the 'grammar' of the language, and just as a valid move in a game is only made by obeying the game's rules, so too a word is used with meaning only if the rules of syntax and semantics are obeyed. That is Wittgenstein's metaphor (simile, comparison). And it is only a comparison -- because words, especially in philosophy, are often used -- or attempted to be used -- without obeying strict rules.

But the good teacher will also invent other ways of explaining things to students. Confucius on teaching: the good teacher is good at drawing ingenious examples to make people understand him.

If you are unwilling to think about things for yourself, then how will you teach children to think about things?

Query: What does the oracle of Apollo say about Socrates, and how does Socrates go about trying to find the truth of the message?

Socrates does not try to find the truth of Apollo's message, but to find its meaning. Because gods do not tell lies, the message is true. But its meaning is not clear to Socrates (Plato, Apology 21a-d)?

More writing than can possibly be supported by time and thought is required at school, and it is damaging to the student's intellectual integrity. If there is any condition that is necessary to the study of philosophy it is total honesty, ingenuousness, humility. (But there is allusion enough to all this elsewhere.)

Query: what did the oracle at Delphi say that inspired Socrates to devote his life to inquiry?
Query: Socrates, classical riddle.

The riddle: "No man is wiser than Socrates. Of all men living, Socrates most wise." These words puzzled Socrates, for he asked himself: How can it be that no man is wiser than I am, when I have no wisdom at all? And he decided that the solution to the riddle must be that Socrates is wise only because he knows that he is not wise, and to know that one is not wise is to be as wise as any human being can be. He thought, Plato says, that Apollo had referred to him as if to everyman, i.e. as an example, but not a unique example, of someone who does not think he knows what he does not know, and is in that way, if in no other, wise.

That is, according to Plato's Apology, why Socrates was moved to a "life devoted to inquiry": his trying to solve the riddle posed by Apollo's oracle at Delphi, for if he could find someone wiser than himself, this would show that Socrates' solution to Apollo's riddle was incorrect, that there was instead another solution (as I myself think there was, because I think that second version "Of all men, Socrates most wise" is also true, that Socrates was indeed most wise -- because, although he knew nothing else, he did know how man should live his life, namely in accordance with the demands of rational moral virtue ... unless, that is, to think that is to think that I am wise when I am not).

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